Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196
#_id: "B00000524"
#_source: array:38 [
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
"fullName" => "Radu VRANCEANU"
"lastName" => "VRANCEANU"
"firstName" => "Radu"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"email" => "vranceanu@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+33 (0)1 34 43 31 83"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "2092"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/vranceanu-radu/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tEKz0_sAAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2050-8269"
"career" => array:10 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6218
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1994-09-01"
"endDate" => "1998-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6219
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1998-09-01"
"endDate" => "2001-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6220
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2001-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6221
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2001-09-01"
"endDate" => "2014-09-01"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directeur de la recherche"
"en" => "Dean for Research"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6222
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2014-09-01"
"endDate" => "2015-09-01"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Vice doyen des professeurs"
"en" => "Associate Dean for Faculty"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6223
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2015-09-01"
"endDate" => "2018-09-01"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Responsable de département"
"en" => "Department head"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6224
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2016-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Président du Comité Déontologique"
"en" => "President of the Deontological Committee"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6225
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2020-01-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Référent à l'intégrité scientifique"
"en" => "Referent for scientific integrity"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6226
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2003-09-10"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur à THEMA (UMR 8184) CNRS"
"en" => "Research fellow with THEMA (UMR 8184) CNRS"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Cergy-Pontoise"
"en" => "Université Cergy-Pontoise"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#6227
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2000-01-01"
"endDate" => "2001-05-01"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economic Affairs Oficer"
"en" => "Economic Affairs Oficer"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ONU"
"en" => "ONU"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Suisse"
"en" => "Switzerland"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:4 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6198
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1994"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Doctorat en Economie"
"en" => "Doctorat en Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
"en" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6200
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1999"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "HDR (Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches)"
"en" => "HDR (Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6197
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1991"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "DEA d'Economie Appliquée"
"en" => "DEA d'Economie Appliquée"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Institut d'Etudes Politiques"
"en" => "Institut d'Etudes Politiques"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#6201
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1984"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômé"
"en" => "Diplômé"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti"
"en" => "Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Roumanie"
"en" => "Romania"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => "<p>Radu Vranceanu est professeur d'économie à l'ESSEC et chercheur associé au THEMA (CNRS). Docteur en économie de l'Université de Paris 2, HDR, il a développé une expertise dans l'analyse des inefficacités informationnelles et la formation des anticipations. Il a réalisé des études appliquées aux problèmes aussi variés que les crises financières et de change, politiques monétaire et de dette publique, gestion de la recherche, le contrat de travail, etc. Il est également engagé dans la recherche en économie expérimentale. Radu Vranceanu a une expérience de fonctionnaire international auprès de la Commission Economique pour l'Europe des Nations Unies. Il a dirigé la recherche à l'ESSEC pendant des nombreuses années. Il est à présent le Référent à l'Intégrité Scientifique de l'ESSEC.</p>\n"
"en" => "<p>Radu Vranceanu is Professor of Economics at ESSEC Business School and a research fellow with THEMA (CNRS) research center. He holds a Doctorate in Economics from the University of Paris II, HDR, and is widely recognized as having special expertise in the theory of expectations and the analysis of informational inefficiencies, which he has applied to various fields including financial and exchange rate crises, monetary and public debt policies, research management, defense economics, labor contracts and managerial behavior. He is also a contributor to research in experimental economics at ESSEC, with studies in team production, lies and deception, negociation and cordination games. In 2000-2001 Radu Vranceanu worked for the UN Economic Commission for Europe; he also served as a Dean for Research of ESSEC Business School for many years. Since 2020, he is the ESSEC representative for scientific integrity (RIS).</p>\n"
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2050-8269"
"en" => "https://www.linkedin.com/in/radu-vranceanu-12115188/"
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie de l'information - Modélisation économique - Economie expérimentale - Travail - macro et analyse générale de l'économie"
"en" => "Economics of information - Economic modelling - Experimental economics - Travail - macro et analyse générale de l'économie"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Macroéconomie et économie internationale"
"en" => "Macroeconomics and International Economics"
]
"distinctions" => []
"teaching" => array:6 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6212
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2011"
"endDate" => "2016"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
"en" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6213
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2004"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
"en" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6214
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2012"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
"en" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
"en" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6215
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2009"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
"en" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6216
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2005"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
"en" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#6217
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2007"
"program" => null
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
"en" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
]
"otherActivities" => array:12 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6195
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2017-09-01"
"endDate" => "2023-08-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "501"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'une association professionnelle, d'un groupe d'experts ou d'un conseil d'administration"
"en" => "Member of a professional association, of an expert group or of a board of directors"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre externe du Comité Scientifique de la Burgundy School of Business"
"en" => "External member of the Scientific Committee of the Burgundy School of Business"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6199
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2010-01-01"
"endDate" => "2011-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "501"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'une association professionnelle, d'un groupe d'experts ou d'un conseil d'administration"
"en" => "Member of a professional association, of an expert group or of a board of directors"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Président Elu du ITFA"
"en" => "President Elect of the ITFA"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6202
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2015-12-01"
"endDate" => "2019-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "204"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Activités de recherche"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'une association académique"
"en" => "Member of an academic association"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre du WES Expert Group (Analyse Economique http://www.cesifo-group.de/)"
"en" => "Member of the WES Expert Group (Economic Analysis http://www.cesifo-group.de/)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6203
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2009-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"year" => null
"uuid" => "204"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Activités de recherche"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'une association académique"
"en" => "Member of an academic association"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de l'Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale"
"en" => "Member of Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6204
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => null
"year" => null
"uuid" => "104"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Activités de recherche"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Reviewer pour un journal"
"en" => "Reviewer for a journal"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Relecteur pour Business and Society; Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility; Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Labour Economics; Nature Human Behaviour; Plos One; Review of International Economics"
"en" => "Reviewer for Business and Society; Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility; Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Labour Economics; Nature Human Behaviour; Plos One; Review of International Economics"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6205
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2001-01-01"
"endDate" => "2001-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet soutenu par l'IER et la Banque Mondiale : Romanian Monetary Policy 1995-2001"
"en" => "IER and World Bank supported project : Romanian Monetary Policy 1995-2001"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6206
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2002-01-01"
"endDate" => "2002-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet financé par l'IER et l'UE : Deregulating International Movements of Capital in Romania"
"en" => "IER and EU financed project: Deregulating International Movements of Capital in Romania"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6207
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2003-01-01"
"endDate" => "2004-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet financé par l'IER et l'UE : "Romanian monetary policy and institutions: Meeting the EU challenge""
"en" => "IER and EU financed project: "Romanian monetary policy and institutions: Meeting the EU challenge""
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6208
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2005-01-01"
"endDate" => "2005-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Financing defense firms in France (and Europe), une étude sous la coordination de M. Guille et J. Belin, Université Paris 2, financée par le Ministère Français de la Défense"
"en" => "Financing defense firms in France (and Europe), a study under the coordination of M. Guille et J. Belin, Paris 2 University, financed by the French Ministry of Defense"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6209
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2006-01-01"
"endDate" => "2006-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Activités professionnelles"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Expert Indépendant pour la Commission Européenne et OSB Consulting (Autriche) - Peer Review de "Incentives for indefinite contracts in Spain""
"en" => "Independent Expert for the European Commission and the OSB Consulting (Austria) - Peer Review on "Incentives for indefinite contracts in Spain""
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6210
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2002-01-01"
"endDate" => "2003-12-31"
"year" => "2002"
"uuid" => "103"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Activités de recherche"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture"
"en" => "Editorial Board Membership"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre du comité de lecture - Economic Systems"
"en" => "Editorial board membership - Economic Systems"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#6211
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2007-01-01"
"endDate" => null
"year" => null
"uuid" => "103"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Activités de recherche"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture"
"en" => "Editorial Board Membership"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture - Global Economy Journal"
"en" => "Board of the journal - Global Economy Journal"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
]
"theses" => array:6 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6228
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2005"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2005"
"student" => "BEN LAKHDAR C."
"firstJob" => "Professor, University of Lille"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
"en" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6229
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2007"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2007"
"student" => "MANGOT M."
"firstJob" => "Free-lance consultant"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
"en" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6230
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2009"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2009"
"student" => "NAIDITCH C."
"firstJob" => "Lecturer, University of Lille"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
"en" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6231
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2016"
"startDate" => "2011"
"endDate" => "2016"
"student" => "PEIA Oana"
"firstJob" => "Assistant Professor - University College Dublin School of Economics"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
"en" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6232
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2004"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2004"
"student" => "ROMANIUK K."
"firstJob" => "Professor, China"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
"en" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#6233
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2012"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2012"
"student" => "VALAT E."
"firstJob" => "Researcher, INED"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
"en" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
"en" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#6196}
}
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:21:24.000Z"
"contributions" => array:378 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6234
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6614"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6614"
"slug" => "manager-unethical-behavior-during-the-new-economy-bubble"
"yearMonth" => "2003-12"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Manager Unethical Behavior during the New Economy Bubble"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2003). Manager Unethical Behavior during the New Economy Bubble."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie les facteurs qui ont contribué à l'accroissement du nombre de cas de PDGs manifestant des comportements non-éthiques dans l'économie américaine au cours des années 1990. L'analyse met l'accent sur le contrôle interne affaibli, les incitations négatives résultant de la rémunération à base de stock-options, la déréglementation excessive dans les secteurs bancaire et comptable. A tout cela s'ajoute le bruit spécifique de l'environnement spéculatif de la Nouvelle Economie."
"en" => "This paper investigates factors that brought about during the late nineties a surge in management unethical behavior within the US economy. Key structural causes are a weakened internal control, perverse incentives related to managers' compensation, excessive deregulation in the banking and auditing sectors. Unethical behavior was further enhanced by the large economic noise specific to the New Economy bubble."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6236
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6684"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6684"
"slug" => "migration-and-coordination-a-global-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2015-05"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Migration and Coordination: A Global Approach"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). Migration and Coordination: A Global Approach. Dans: 25th Annual Conference of the International Trade & Finance Association."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "25th Annual Conference of the International Trade & Finance Association"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6238
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6796"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6796"
"slug" => "opening-the-capital-account-of-transition-economies-how-much-how-fast"
"yearMonth" => "2002-11"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Opening the Capital Account of Transition Economies: How Much, How Fast?"
"description" => "DAIANU, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2002). Opening the Capital Account of Transition Economies: How Much, How Fast?"
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans les années 90, les organisations financières internationales (OCDE, FMI, Banque Mondiale) ont poussé les PVD à ouvrir le plus vite possible leur balance de capitaux. Ce document souligne qu'en absence de fondements micro et macroéconomiques sains, cette politique risque d'augmenter l'instabilité de ces pays. Il défend l'idée d'une approche séquentielle où les contrôles sont levés graduellement."
"en" => "In the 1990s, international financial organisations (IMF, OCDE, World Bank) pushed emerging economies to open their CA at a rapid pace. This paper argues why this policy may lead to increased instability, if a set of basic micro and macroeconomics criteria are not fulfilled. It defends the principle of sequencing the removal of various capital controls."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6235
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6807"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6807"
"slug" => "optimal-duration-of-work-and-the-generalised-production-function"
"yearMonth" => "1996-05"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Optimal Duration of Work, and the Generalised Production Function"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). Optimal Duration of Work, and the Generalised Production Function."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose une généralisation de la demande de travail néoclassique sur la base d'une fonction de production généralisée. Sous certaines conditions, l'existence d'une demande de travailleurs indépendante de la demande d'heures implique un conflit sur la durée du travail."
"en" => "The paper generalises the standard neoclassical analysis of equilibrium in the labor market. We first infer a generalised production function leading to a two dimension law of labor demand, for both hours and workers. Under several realistic assumptions, a conflict on the duration of work may arise in a general equilibrium framework."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6239
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6892"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6892"
"slug" => "pledges-as-a-social-influence-device-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence. Dans: 10th Annual Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics 2019 (ASFEE)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "10th Annual Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics 2019 (ASFEE)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#5851
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6893"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6893"
"slug" => "pledges-as-a-social-influence-device-theory-and-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Theory and Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Dans: 2019 Meditari Accountancy Research Accounting Forum (MedAR/AF)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Meditari Accountancy Research Accounting Forum (MedAR/AF)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6237
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7215"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7215"
"slug" => "structural-unemployment-in-eastern-european-reforming-countries-a-theoretical-framework"
"yearMonth" => "1994-09"
"year" => "1994"
"title" => "Structural Unemployment in Eastern European Reforming Countries: A Theoretical Framework"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1994). Structural Unemployment in Eastern European Reforming Countries: A Theoretical Framework. Dans: European Association of Comparative Economic Studies, 8-10 September. Budapest."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "European Association of Comparative Economic Studies, 8-10 September"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-03 13:37:43"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Un modèle de la détermination du chômage dans les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale. Deux secteurs en interaction, l'un fondé sur les négociations collectives, l'autre sur la concurrence, servent de fondement à l'analyse du problème."
"en" => "A theoretical model to assess unemployment in Eastern European countries. The two-sector model (one based on collective bargaining, the other on competition) establishes the conditions to analyse unemployment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6240
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7466"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7466"
"slug" => "the-value-of-lies-in-an-ultimatum-game-with-imperfect-information"
"yearMonth" => "2012-06"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., DUBART, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2012). The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information. Dans: 3ème Conférence Annuelle de l'Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale (ASFEE)."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "3ème Conférence Annuelle de l'Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale (ASFEE)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions le problème du mensonge dans un jeu de l'ultimatum, dans lequel les receveurs n'ont qu'une information imparfaite quant à la somme d'argent reçue par les offreurs. Les derniers peuvent envoyer un message invérifiable quant au montant reçu. En moyenne, 88.5 des offreurs vont communiquer un montant inférieur à la somme réelle. Le mensonge est associé systématiquement à une offre réelle plus faible."
"en" => "Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about the endowment received at the outset of the game. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders, simply in order to reduce their expected endowment and be able to submit smaller offers. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 19%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections increases. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6241
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7554"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7554"
"slug" => "une-etude-des-consequences-macroeconomiques-du-risque-de-defaut-sur-les-dettes-nationales-en-union-monetaire"
"yearMonth" => "1996-09"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Une étude des conséquences macroéconomiques du risque de défaut sur les dettes nationales en Union Monétaire"
"description" => "SOUVETON, R. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). Une étude des conséquences macroéconomiques du risque de défaut sur les dettes nationales en Union Monétaire."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SOUVETON R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Plusieurs pays membres de l'Union Européenne envisagent l'adoption d'une monnaie unique, mais souhaitent maintenir l'autonomie des politiques budgétaires. L'article est consacré à l'étude du risque de répudiation de la dette publique dans ce contexte particulier. Nous nous préoccupons essentiellement des relations entre la probabilité de défaut, le taux d'intérêt et plusieurs variables macroéconomiques, telles que la production, la dette de l'Etat ou le déficit public. Cette analyse théorique et empirique nous conduit à proposer la création d'un "Fonds de Compensation Européen" destiné à aider les pays sujets à des chocs adverses."
"en" => "A core group of European Union member countries is about to set up a monetary union, but they are keeping their fiscal policies decentralized. This paper aims at analyzing the role played by the default risk on Treasury bonds, in this particuliar framework. We focus on the interactions between the risk-adjusted interest rate and several main macroeconomic variables like income, public debt and government spending. In particular, our analysis suggests that a "European Compensation Fund" would provide support for countries affected by adverse shocks."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6242
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7691"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7691"
"slug" => "ethical-boundaries-of-capitalism"
"yearMonth" => "2005-01"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "Ethical Boundaries of Capitalism"
"description" => "DAIANU, D. et VRANCEANU, R. [Eds] (2005). <i>Ethical Boundaries of Capitalism</i>. Ashgate Publishing Limited."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Direction d'ouvrage"
"en" => "Book editor"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'ouvrage regroupe onze chapitres rédigés par des experts en management, socio-économie et philosophie politique, qui mènent une réflexion sur la capacité du système capitaliste à soutenir l'émergence d'un environnement éthique."
"en" => "This book gathers eleven chapters, drafted by experts in management, socio-economics and political science, they analyze whether the capitalist system is able to support the development of an ethical environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6243
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7735"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7735"
"slug" => "moral-foundations-of-management-knowledge"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "Moral Foundations of Management Knowledge"
"description" => "DJELIC, M.L. et VRANCEANU, R. [Eds] (2007). <i>Moral Foundations of Management Knowledge</i>. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DJELIC M.-L."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Ethique"
1 => "Management"
2 => "Théorie managériale"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Direction d'ouvrage"
"en" => "Book editor"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une collection de treize études pluridisciplinaires sur les fondements éthiques de la théorie du management et de son socle disciplinaire."
"en" => "The book gathers thirteen multidisciplinary studies in the moral foundations of management therory and its founding disciplines."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6244
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7860"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7860"
"slug" => "facta-non-verba-an-experiment-on-pledging-and-giving"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "“Facta non verba”: An experiment on pledging and giving"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., MATEU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>“Facta non verba”: An experiment on pledging and giving</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "MATEU G."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "SUTAN A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 16:21:10"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not\n
keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.
"""
"en" => """
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not\n
keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6245
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7868"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7868"
"slug" => "a-matching-model-of-the-academic-publication-market"
"yearMonth" => "2010-02"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2010). <i>A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Appariement"
1 => "Editeurs"
2 => "Revues académiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose un modèle d'appariement pour étudier le fonctionnement du marché des publications académiques. Il permet d'analyse le phénomène de "desk-rejection" et propose une explication pour la montée en puissance de droits de soumission d'articles."
"en" => "Given the myriad of journal titles in economics and business administration, scholars can sometimes target the wrong journal. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture this type of informational friction. The key modelling device is a paper-to-journal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies. The model is then solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6246
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7870"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7870"
"slug" => "a-model-of-hospital-congestion-in-developing-countries"
"yearMonth" => "2018-04"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "A Model of Hospital Congestion in Developing Countries"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., SIRVEN, N. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). <i>A Model of Hospital Congestion in Developing Countries</i>. 1804, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SIRVEN Nicolas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Hospital congestion"
1 => "hospital size"
2 => "referral system"
3 => "health policy"
4 => "developing countries"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01791106"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper explains the observed hospital congestion in developing countries as the result of the interaction between ambulatory care physicians who refer patients to hospitals, and hospitals which must detect the severity of the incoming patients’ disease. In an imperfect information environment, physicians might refer to top-tier hospitals patients with mild diseases that could be properly addressed by regular hospitals, just to fulfill patients’ demand for the best care. Yet, the triage capability of top-tier hospitals declines if the hospital is subject to congestion, which, in turn, provides incentives to physicians to refer more patients to these hospitals. The model presents two equilibria, one with perfect triage, and another with triage errors and hospital congestion. In this last equilibrium, a higher hospital size raises the likelihood of congestion."
"en" => "This paper explains the observed hospital congestion in developing countries as the result of the interaction between ambulatory care physicians who refer patients to hospitals, and hospitals which must detect the severity of the incoming patients’ disease. In an imperfect information environment, physicians might refer to top-tier hospitals patients with mild diseases that could be properly addressed by regular hospitals, just to fulfill patients’ demand for the best care. Yet, the triage capability of top-tier hospitals declines if the hospital is subject to congestion, which, in turn, provides incentives to physicians to refer more patients to these hospitals. The model presents two equilibria, one with perfect triage, and another with triage errors and hospital congestion. In this last equilibrium, a higher hospital size raises the likelihood of congestion."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6247
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7871"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7871"
"slug" => "a-model-of-manager-corruption-in-developing-countries-with-macroeconomic-implications"
"yearMonth" => "1998-04"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1998). <i>A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie l'influence sur l'investissement international de l'anticipation d'une corruption des managers dans les pays en voie de développement. Une première partie souligne l'influence micro-économique d'une quête de réputation sur le comportement des managers. Dans un second temps, deux extensions montrent les conséquences macro-économiques de l'effet de réputation. Suivant la nature des engagements entre investisseurs et managers, des situations d'équilibres multiples favorables ou défavorables à l'économie émergente vont apparaître."
"en" => "The possibility of facing corrupt managers is an important factor explaining foreigners' hesitations about investing in developing countries. This paper aims at investigating how reputation concerns influence managers' behavior and country-specific attractiveness. The first part of the text analyzes the optimal decision rule of a manager who is able to transfer in his own hands a fraction of the firm's income. The macroeconomic implications of this simple model are investigated in the second part of the paper, where analysis is cast in an overlapping generation framework. Economy-wide corruption, development prospects and global profitability appear to depend on the duration of the relationship between investors and managers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6248
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7872"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7872"
"slug" => "a-model-of-scholarly-publishing-with-hybrid-academic-journals"
"yearMonth" => "2014-03"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "A Model of Scholarly Publishing with Hybrid Academic Journals"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2014). <i>A Model of Scholarly Publishing with Hybrid Academic Journals</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might use publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors, readers and publishers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house will choose the open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals’ accessibility-quality profiles."
"en" => "In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might use publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors, readers and publishers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house will choose the open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals’ accessibility-quality profiles."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6249
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7873"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7873"
"slug" => "a-model-of-structural-and-cyclical-employment-in-transitional-economies"
"yearMonth" => "1995-01"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "A Model of Structural and Cyclical Employment in Transitional Economies"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). <i>A Model of Structural and Cyclical Employment in Transitional Economies</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Le modèle proposé analyse l'impact des facteurs structurels ainsi que l'impact des fluctuations de la demande globale sur l'emploi dans les économies en transition. Il est démontré que les gouvernements peuvent rechercher un taux d'inflation "optimal" , ce taux est d'autant plus faible que la réforme des entreprises et la privatisation sont rapides. Dans ces conditions la stabilisation macroéconomique et la privatisation sont des objectifs mutuellement compatibles."
"en" => "The proposed model analyses the structural factors determining employment as well as the aggregate demand influence on employment fluctuations in transitional economies. It is shown that governments can seek an "optimal" target inflation rate , the quicker the pace of enterprise reforms and privatization, the lower the inflation rate."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6250
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7881"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7881"
"slug" => "a-simple-matching-model-of-unemployment-and-working-time-determination-with-policy-implications"
"yearMonth" => "1998-12"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "A Simple Matching Model of Unemployment and Working Time Determination with Policy Implications"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (1998). <i>A Simple Matching Model of Unemployment and Working Time Determination with Policy Implications</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le chômage et la durée de travail dans un modèle d'appariement, à la Pissarides (1990). Le secteur productif est représenté par une grande firme en situation de monopsone sur le marché du travail. La première partie de ce texte est consacrée à l'étude d'un système libre, où les employeurs peuvent ajuster l'horaire de travail. Nous montrons que, sous certaines conditions, surcroît de travail interne et chômage peuvent coexister. Une simulation numérique permet ensuite d'étudier l'effet sur le chômage d'une contrainte légale sur la durée du travail."
"en" => "This paper develops a matching model, à la Pissarides (1990) to analyze working time and unemployment determination in an economy with trade frictions. The productive sector is represented by a large firm acting as a monopsonist in the labor market. The first part of the text analyzes an unregulated economic system, where employers hold the right to manage working time. By numerical simulation it is shown that in the steady state inside overwork and unemployment may unfortunately coexist. The model is then used to investigate the consequences in terms of unemployment of a binding constraint on working hours."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6251
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7885"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7885"
"slug" => "a-two-country-model-of-high-skill-migration-with-public-education"
"yearMonth" => "2013-01"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "A Two-country Model of High Skill Migration with Public Education"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>A Two-country Model of High Skill Migration with Public Education</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers' education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota of skilled migrants. Additional migration raises earnings prospects in the source country and attracts more talented people to that profession, what we refer to as the sector-specific brain gain effect. This game presents a single stable equilibrium with positive migration. Compared to the cooperative equilibrium, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the poor country systematically under-invests in education. Whether migration is too strong or too weak depends on the size of the brain gain effect. Furthermore, the size of the welfare gain to be reaped by moving from non-cooperative to the cooperative organization of migration also depends on the strength of the sector-specific brain gain."
"en" => "This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers' education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota of skilled migrants. Additional migration raises earnings prospects in the source country and attracts more talented people to that profession, what we refer to as the sector-specific brain gain effect. This game presents a single stable equilibrium with positive migration. Compared to the cooperative equilibrium, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the poor country systematically under-invests in education. Whether migration is too strong or too weak depends on the size of the brain gain effect. Furthermore, the size of the welfare gain to be reaped by moving from non-cooperative to the cooperative organization of migration also depends on the strength of the sector-specific brain gain."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6252
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7895"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7895"
"slug" => "an-attitude-model-of-environmental-action-evidence-from-developing-and-developed-countries"
"yearMonth" => "2017-01"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "An Attitude Model of Environmental Action: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries"
"description" => "DAVINO, C., ESPOSITO VINZI, V., SANTACREU VASUT, E. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). <i>An Attitude Model of Environmental Action: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "ESPOSITO VINZI Vincenzo"
"bid" => "B00067049"
"slug" => "esposito-vinzi-vincenzo"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SANTACREU VASUT Estefania"
"bid" => "B00318975"
"slug" => "santacreu-vasut-estefania"
]
2 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAVINO Cristina"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Environmental attitudes"
1 => "Environmental policies -Development, Culture"
2 => "Multivariate Analysis"
3 => "Partial Least Squares."
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01457539"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes the determinants of individual attitudes towards environmental action by means of an original PLSPM model of Environmental Awareness-Social Capital-Action (EASCA). Estimates build on survey data on 34.612 individuals from 42 different countries, as provided in the fifth wave of the World Value Survey (2005-2009). Besides the benchmark global estimates, we perform subsample analysis for developed and developing countries, as well as country analyses for four major economies: China, India, Germany and the United States. Doing so allows us to underline structural differences between countries or main groups of countries. In particular, we find that environmental awareness and trust in not-for-profit organizations are the main determinants of individual action in support of environmentally friendly policies. The quality of environmental policymaking should improve if these cultural differences are better understood and taken into account."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the determinants of individual attitudes towards environmental action by means of an original PLSPM model of Environmental Awareness-Social Capital-Action (EASCA). Estimates build on survey data on 34.612 individuals from 42 different countries, as provided in the fifth wave of the World Value Survey (2005-2009). Besides the benchmark global estimates, we perform subsample analysis for developed and developing countries, as well as country analyses for four major economies: China, India, Germany and the United States. Doing so allows us to underline structural differences between countries or main groups of countries. In particular, we find that environmental awareness and trust in not-for-profit organizations are the main determinants of individual action in support of environmentally friendly policies. The quality of environmental policymaking should improve if these cultural differences are better understood and taken into account."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6253
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7914"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7914"
"slug" => "asset-prices-and-asymmetries-in-the-feds-interst-rate-rule-a-financial-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2008-01"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Asset Prices and Asymmetries in the Fed's Interst Rate Rule: A Financial Approach"
"description" => "ROMANIUK, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Asset Prices and Asymmetries in the Fed's Interst Rate Rule: A Financial Approach</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ROMANIUK K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Choix de portefeuille"
1 => "FED"
2 => "Prix des actifs"
3 => "Règle monétaire optimale"
4 => "Théorie des options"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-09 09:43:52"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose plusieurs estimations de la règle de Taylor de la Fed et met en relief sa réponse assymétrique par rapport aux prix des biens et des actifs. Une explication est apportée, en s'appuyant sur l'approche développée par Romaniuk (2008). Dans cette perspective, la règle de decision du banquier central apparaît comme la solution de Merton (1971) au problème du gestionnaire de portefeuille, en supposant que le banquier central assure la gestion de trois "actifs": prix des biens, production et prix des actifs."
"en" => "According to empirical evidence brought in by this paper, the Fed seems to respond stronger to positive than to negative deviations in inflation from trend, it also presents an asymmetric response with respect to asset prices. We provide a theoretical explanation that builds on the methodology developed by Romaniuk (2008) for a central banker with two main goals, output and price stability. In this paper, the policymaker behaves as a portfolio manager who aims at stabilizing output, goods prices, as well as asset prices. An optimal, time-varying interest rate rule is obtained as the Merton's (1971) continuous time solution to the portfolio manager's problem. In a second step, option terms are included in the interest rate rule, in order to allow the central bank to react differently to positive and negative deviations of key variables from their targets."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7920"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7920"
"slug" => "bank-funding-constraints-and-the-cost-of-capital-of-small-firms"
"yearMonth" => "2015-01"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Bank Funding Constraints and the Cost of Capital of Small Firms"
"description" => "PEIA, O. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Bank Funding Constraints and the Cost of Capital of Small Firms</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEIA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper analyzes how banks’ funding constraints impact the access and cost of capital of\n
small firms. Banks raise external finance from a large number of small investors who face coordination\n
problems and invest in small, risky businesses. When investors observe noisy signals\n
about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a threshold\n
equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that a “socially optimal” interest\n
rate that maximizes the probability of success of the small firm is higher than the risk-free rate,\n
because higher interest rates relax the bank’s funding constraint. However, banks will generally\n
set an interest rate higher than this socially optimal one. This gives rise to a built-in inefficiency of\n
banking intermediation activity that can be corrected by various policy measures.
"""
"en" => """
This paper analyzes how banks’ funding constraints impact the access and cost of capital of\n
small firms. Banks raise external finance from a large number of small investors who face coordination\n
problems and invest in small, risky businesses. When investors observe noisy signals\n
about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a threshold\n
equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that a “socially optimal” interest\n
rate that maximizes the probability of success of the small firm is higher than the risk-free rate,\n
because higher interest rates relax the bank’s funding constraint. However, banks will generally\n
set an interest rate higher than this socially optimal one. This gives rise to a built-in inefficiency of\n
banking intermediation activity that can be corrected by various policy measures.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7922"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7922"
"slug" => "banks-risk-race-a-signaling-explanation"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Arbitrage risque"
1 => "Information imparfaite"
2 => "rendement"
3 => "Secteur bancaire"
4 => "Signalisation"
5 => "Stratégie de risque"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article explique l'accumulation excessive de risque par les banques avant la crise de 2007-2009 par un mécanisme de signalisation en information imparfaite."
"en" => "Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7932"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7932"
"slug" => "can-incentives-for-research-harm-research-a-business-schools-tale"
"yearMonth" => "2006-02"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). <i>Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Besancenot D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Classements"
1 => "Incitations pour la publication"
2 => "Marché des publications"
3 => "Revues académiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose un modèle du marché des publications académiques en économie et gestion. L'offre d'articles est présentée comme l'issue d'un jeu entre professeurs-chercheurs et doyens chargés de la politique salariale. La demande d'article reflète le processus de sélection d'articles par les revues. Après avoir défini l'équilibre du marché, ce modèle permet d'étudier les conséquences associées à une politique d'incitation à la publication, telle que mise en place par un grand nombre de business schools lors des dernières années. Parmi ces conséquences on peut compter sur une baisse de la qualité des meilleures revues, une réduction du nombre de publications réalisées par les meilleures institutions et une réduction de la rémunération espérée des meilleurs chercheurs."
"en" => "The paper develops a simple model of the market for academic publications in business and economics. The supply of papers is presented as the outcome of a game between researchers and schools' deans under imperfect information about the quality of a given paper. The demand for papers brings into the picture the editorial selection process. After defining the equilibrium of this market, the model allows us to study the consequences of more powerful incentives for publication in major journals. It turns out that too large bonuses, as implemented by business schools in the recent years, might bring about several unpleasant consequences, as a drop in the quality of major journals, a decline in the number of top-tier publications realized by leading research institutions and a fall in the expected compensation of top researchers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7933"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7933"
"slug" => "can-rumors-and-other-uninformative-messages-cause-illiquidity"
"yearMonth" => "2013-07"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity?"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., BESANCENOT, D. et DUBART, D. (2013). <i>Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Coordination"
1 => "Economie expérimentale"
2 => "Illiquidité"
3 => "Risque stratégique"
4 => "Rumeur"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L’article étudie si des rumeurs sans aucun rapport avec la valeur fondamentale peuvent provoquer des crises d’illiqudité. La première partie présente un modèle théorique, où les investisseurs peuvent utiliser le message non-informatif pour coordonner la décision d’investir dans un projet collectif qui peut réussir uniquement si un seuil minimal de participation est atteint; l’équilibre étudié est celui d’un global game avec n-joueurs, dont la solution a été proposée par Morris and Shin (1998). Le taux de participation est bas si les investisseurs reçoivent un message « négatif » et vice-versa. La seconde partie de l’article restitue les résultats de deux expériences, l’une conduite par Internet, l’autre dans le laboratoire expérimental de l’ESSEC Business School. Les deux tests corroborent les prédictions du modèle théorique. L’analyse permet d’envisager une nouvelle explication pour la propagation des crises financières d’un pays à l’autre, ou d’un marché à l’autre sans raison apparente."
"en" => "This paper analyzes whether false information, rumors and other uninformative messages can cause illiquidity. In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive an uninformative but emotion loaded message. If investors believe that the message has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We solve the model for the critical message separating the success / fail states of the project. It turns out that lesser investors will participate to the collective project when they receive a negative message as compared to the case when they receive a positive message. Predictions of the theoretical model are corroborated by data provided by an Online and a Lab experiment. Insights apply to contagion and market manipulation episodes."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7946"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7946"
"slug" => "coherence-temporelle-et-politique-de-privatisation-dans-les-economies-en-transition"
"yearMonth" => "1995-04"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Cohérence temporelle et politique de privatisation dans les économies en transition"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). <i>Cohérence temporelle et politique de privatisation dans les économies en transition</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'objet de cet article consiste à étudier la cohérence interne de la politique de privatisation dans les économies en transition. Le développement du secteur privé permet un accroissement de la production totale mais entraîne également une réduction du suremploi et un accroissement peu souhaitable du chômage. L'Etat est confronté alors à un conflit d'objectifs qui le conduit à faire un choix entre une privatisation rapide et une privatisation lente. Par une approche dynamique, et en supposant une formation rationnelle des anticipations, il est montré qu'un Etat ayant comme objectif prioritaire la protection de l'emploi peut néanmoins mener une première phase de privatisation rapide. Cette étape initiale, dont l'objectif consiste à influencer les anticipations, est suivie d'un ralentissement du rythme de privatisation, en apparente contradiction avec la politique antérieure. Le modèle permet une interprétation des stratégies de privatisation adoptées par plusieurs pays d'Europe de l'Est où, après une première vague de ventes d'entreprises, la "grande privatisation" semble bloquée."
"en" => "The goal of our paper is to study the internal consistency of the privatization policy in transitional economies. Private sector development not only fosters growth but also brings a fall in labor hoarding and an increase in unemployment. Governments must arbitrate between these two conflicting objectives, by means of selecting an appropriate privatization policy. By assumption, privatization may be either rapid or gradual. It is shown that in a dynamic framework, with individuals forming rational expectations, an employment-oriented government may however pursue a rapid privatization policy, at least during an initial period of time. This allows expectations to be manipulated, in order to achieve higher employment in the future. At that stage, seemingly contradicting the former policy, such a government will slow down the privatization speed. Our model provides an explanation for the experience with privatization in many Eastern European countries, where, after an introductory wave of much publicised sales, the process of privatising the bulk of industrial enterprises has been halted."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7959"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7959"
"slug" => "coordination-in-teams-a-real-effort-task-experiment-with-informal-punishment"
"yearMonth" => "2013-08"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2013). <i>Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Economie expérimentale"
1 => "Performance"
2 => "Sanction"
3 => "Travail d'équipe"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une étude expérimentale appliquée au problème du travail d'équipe. La tache consiste à compter le nombre d’occurrences du chiffre 7 dans des blocs de chiffre. Les équipes sont composées de deux joueurs. A chaque tour, le joueur qui fait le meilleur score peut appliquer une sanction à l'autre. Nous étudions les stratégies et les comportements des deux joueurs, dans une interaction qui dure quatre tours."
"en" => "This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7960"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7960"
"slug" => "corporate-profit-entrepreneurship-theory-and-business-ethics"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Corporate Profit, Entrepreneurship Theory and Business Ethics"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>Corporate Profit, Entrepreneurship Theory and Business Ethics</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. In general capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of profit maximization is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs."
"en" => "Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. In general capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of profit maximization is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7968"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7968"
"slug" => "crowdfunding-with-overenthusiastic-investors-a-global-game-model"
"yearMonth" => "2018-02"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). <i>Crowdfunding with Overenthusiastic Investors: A Global Game Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Crowdfunding"
1 => "entrepreneurship -global games"
2 => "overenthusiasm"
3 => "behavioral IO."
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01718793/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding. finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the pro.t of the platform."
"en" => "Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding. finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the pro.t of the platform."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7973"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7973"
"slug" => "daily-working-hours-unemployment-and-the-generalised-production-function"
"yearMonth" => "1995-12"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Daily Working Hours, Unemployment and the Generalised Production Function"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). <i>Daily Working Hours, Unemployment and the Generalised Production Function</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'étude aborde l'explication de la formation des horaires de travail dans une configuration concurrentielle du marché, en introduisant un outil de représentation de la technique appelé "fonction de production généralisée". Les équilibres obtenus ont la particularité de pousser les horaires de travail au-delà de l'offre et d'expliquer l'existence d'un conflit systématique sur la durée quotidienne du travail."
"en" => "This paper generalises the standard Neo-classical analysis of equilibrium in the labour market. Determinants of labour productivity are analysed in terms of an output density function leading to the definition of generalised production functions. In this framework, a firm's optimal choice implies a two dimensional law of labour demand for both workers and hours. Equilibrium in the labour market presents a disconcerting property : in a pure competitive world, where unemployment is nil, overwork might be a natural state."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7983"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7983"
"slug" => "desk-rejection-in-an-academic-publication-market-model-with-matching-frictions"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Desk Rejection in an Academic Publication Market Model with Matching Frictions"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Desk Rejection in an Academic Publication Market Model with Matching Frictions</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Appariement"
1 => "Editeurs"
2 => "Information imparfaite"
3 => "Revues académiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "De plus en plus souvent les éditeurs de revues académiques procèdent à une vérification préalable des articles soumis et rejettent d'office ceux qui ne correspondent pas à la ligne éditoriale de leur revue. Nous étudions ce phénomène nouveau à l'aide d'un modèle d'appariement, inspiré des travaux en économie du travail."
"en" => "Subject to a huge and growing number of journal titles in business and economics, scholars sometimes target the wrong journal. Editors resort more and more to paper pre-screening, and desk reject those that do not fit well to the editorial line. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture these matching frictions. The key modelling device is a paper-journal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. Our main endogenous variables are the submission fee and the tension in the publication market, itself directly related to the number of journal titles."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7988"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7988"
"slug" => "discontent-with-taxes-and-the-timing-of-taxation-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2016-01"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2016). <i>Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SUTAN A."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We propose a new approach to analyse the effect of diversification on a portfolio of risks. By means of mixing techniques, we provide an explicit formula for the probability density function of the portfolio. These techniques allow to compute analytically risk measures as VaR or TVaR, and consequently the associated diversification benefit. The explicit formulas constitute ideal tools to analyse the properties of risk measures and diversification benefit. We use standard models, which are popular in the reinsurance industry, Archimedean survival copulas and heavy tailed marginals. We explore numerically their behavior and compare them to the aggregation of independent random variables, as well as of linearly dependent ones. Moreover, the numerical convergence of Monte Carlo simulations of various quantities is tested against the analytical result. The speed of convergence appears to depend on the fatness of the tail; the higher the tail index, the faster the convergence."
"en" => "We propose a new approach to analyse the effect of diversification on a portfolio of risks. By means of mixing techniques, we provide an explicit formula for the probability density function of the portfolio. These techniques allow to compute analytically risk measures as VaR or TVaR, and consequently the associated diversification benefit. The explicit formulas constitute ideal tools to analyse the properties of risk measures and diversification benefit. We use standard models, which are popular in the reinsurance industry, Archimedean survival copulas and heavy tailed marginals. We explore numerically their behavior and compare them to the aggregation of independent random variables, as well as of linearly dependent ones. Moreover, the numerical convergence of Monte Carlo simulations of various quantities is tested against the analytical result. The speed of convergence appears to depend on the fatness of the tail; the higher the tail index, the faster the convergence."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8002"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8002"
"slug" => "ecb-monetary-policy-rule-some-theory-and-empirical-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2002-05"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "ECB Monetary Policy Rule: Some Theory and Empirical Evidence"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2002). <i>ECB Monetary Policy Rule: Some Theory and Empirical Evidence</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose plusieurs estimations économétriques d’une règle de Taylor pour la BCE, sur la base de données mensuelles extrêmement entre 1999.04 et 2002.02. Nos résultats montrent que la Banque centrale présente un comportement rigoureux : elle augmente son principal taux directeur de 1.2 points chaque fois que le taux d’inflation excède de 1 point le taux cible. Comme la FED, sa politique monétaire semble influencée par l’activité économique. La Banque va lisser dans le temps ses interventions sur le taux. Contrairement à l’un des objectifs annoncés, elle ne semble pas réagir aux fluctuations du taux de croissance de M3."
"en" => "This paper estimates different monetary policy rules for the ECB with monthly data during the period 1999.04-2002.02. The results show that the ECB exhibits a rather conservative behavior: a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation rate above its target brings about a 1.2 percentage point increase in the interest rate. Like the FED, its policy is influenced by real activity. The Bank also smoothes changes in interest rates over time. Despite the announced money growth “reference value”, it does not reacts to changes in M3 growth rates."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
33 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8004"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8004"
"slug" => "effects-of-currency-unit-substitution-in-a-search-equilibrium-model"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Effects of Currency Unit Substitution in a Search Equilibrium Model"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., ROCHETEAU, G. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Effects of Currency Unit Substitution in a Search Equilibrium Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ROCHETEAU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose un modèle de théorie de la recherche pour étudier les conséquences économiques d'une réforme monétaire dans lequel le taux de conversion n'est pas une valeur arrondie. Par hypothèse, dans le court terme, les consommateurs vont continuer d'utiliser des prix de réservation exprimés dans l'ancienne monnaie. De ce fait, ils doivent transformer les prix nouveaux dans l'ancienne unité de compte. Les agents diffèrent dans leur aptitude à faire des calculs exacts. Les entreprises peuvent discriminer entre les consommateurs en fonction de leur taux de conversion individuels. Par conséquent, les consommateurs entament un processus de recherche de prix inférieurs à leur prix de réservation. Un nouvel équilibre apparaît : dans certains cas la production diminue mais le surplus des consommateurs peut augmenter."
"en" => "This paper develops a search equilibrium model to explore the economic consequences of a currency reform which makes use of a decimal conversion rate. It is assumed that in the short run consumers keep on using the former reservation prices, expressed in the old currency. In order to make their buying decision, they must therefore convert the new displayed prices into the old currency. Agents differ in their ability to calculate the correct price. Firms may attempt to discriminate between consumers in keeping with their individual heuristic conversion rates. As a consequence of this price distribution, consumers engage in a time-consuming search process. The post-reform equilibrium may involve a different price disribution, changes in the activity level and in the surplus of the various types of consumers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
34 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8007"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8007"
"slug" => "effects-of-working-time-constraints-on-employment-a-two-sector-model"
"yearMonth" => "1997-03"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Effects of Working Time Constraints on Employment: A Two-sector Model"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Effects of Working Time Constraints on Employment: A Two-sector Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Des réductions d'horaire ont été appliquées en France à des industries fournissant un service productif : électricité, transport routier. L'étude s'efforce d'analyser les conséquences de telles mesures sur l'offre totale d'emploi. Elle combine une analyse originale de la formation des horaires à une étude d'équilibre traditionnelle et met en évidence les risques d'effets pervers."
"en" => "Mandatory working time reductions have recently been applied, especially in France in the public sector (electricity) or road transport. This text aims at analyzing the consequences of working time constraints imposed on the sector supplying the consumption goods industry with a basic productive commodity or service. A simple model of working time setting by firms is nested in a conventional microeconomic representation of the productive sector. Perverse effects on job creation are revealed in a comparative static analysis."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
35 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6268
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8032"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8032"
"slug" => "excessive-liability-dollarization-in-a-simple-signaling-model"
"yearMonth" => "2004-02"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => "Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2004). <i>Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une explication à l'accumulation des dettes externes libellées en dollars par les PVD, dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation. Par hypothèse, les banques n'ont aucun moyen direct de déterminer la situation financière des firmes. Les firmes solides seraient tentées de s'endetter en dollars moyennant des coûts administratifs élevés uniquement pour signaler leur type. Le succès d'une telle politique dépend du comportement des firmes fragiles : si le coût administratif lié à l'emprunt en dollars est faible, le secteur privé dans son ensemble peut choisir la dollarisation. Dans ce cas, l'effet de signal disparaît, tandis que toutes les firmes subissent des coûts administratifs élevés."
"en" => "If a dollar denominated external debt comes with so many risks, why do emerging economies allow for such an imbalance to accumulate ? The explanation provided in this paper builds on a simple signaling model. By assumption, lenders have no direct possibility to infer a firm's financial stance. Therefore sound firms might want to borrow dollars and bear a high clearance cost, just in order to signal their type. The success of this policy depends on the behavior of bad firms. When dollar borrowing clearance costs are relatively small with respect to the clearance cost of borrowing in the local currency, the whole private sector would opt for liability dollarization. In this case the signaling effect vanishes, while all firms bear high clearance costs."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
36 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6269
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8034"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8034"
"slug" => "experimental-estimates-of-mens-and-womens-willingness-to-compete-does-the-gender-of-the-partner-matter"
"yearMonth" => "2017-01"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Experimental Estimates of Men's and Women's Willingness to Compete: Does the Gender of the Partner Matter?"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). <i>Experimental Estimates of Men's and Women's Willingness to Compete: Does the Gender of the Partner Matter?</i> 1701, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG Seeun"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Willingness-to-compete"
1 => "Experiments"
2 => "Gender effect"
3 => "BDM mechanism."
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01457226/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In a classical experiment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) used the dichotomous choice of individuals between a piece rate and a tournament payment scheme as an indication of their propensity to compete. This paper reports results from a two person interaction of a similar type to analyze whether the preference for competition is dependent on the gender of the partner. It introduces a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit individual willingness to compete (WTC), defined as the amount of money that makes an individual indifferent between the two compensation schemes. Even when controlling for risk aversion, past performance and overconfidence, the male WTC is €3.30 larger than the female WTC. The WTC instrument allows for a more precise analysis of the impact of the partner's gender on the taste for competition."
"en" => "In a classical experiment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) used the dichotomous choice of individuals between a piece rate and a tournament payment scheme as an indication of their propensity to compete. This paper reports results from a two person interaction of a similar type to analyze whether the preference for competition is dependent on the gender of the partner. It introduces a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit individual willingness to compete (WTC), defined as the amount of money that makes an individual indifferent between the two compensation schemes. Even when controlling for risk aversion, past performance and overconfidence, the male WTC is €3.30 larger than the female WTC. The WTC instrument allows for a more precise analysis of the impact of the partner's gender on the taste for competition."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
37 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6270
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8035"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8035"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-bank-runs-under-partial-deposit-insurance"
"yearMonth" => "2017-04"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Bank Runs under Partial Deposit Insurance"
"description" => "PEIA, O. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). <i>Experimental Evidence on Bank Runs under Partial Deposit Insurance</i>. 1705, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEIA Oana"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01510692"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper presents experimental evidence on depositor behavior under partial deposit insurance schemes. In the experiment, the size of a deposit insurance fund cannot fully cover all deposits and the level of insurance depends on the number of depositors running on the bank. We show that this form of strategic uncertainty about deposit coverage exerts a significant impact on the propensity to withdraw, and results in a large frequency of bank runs. Runs are more likely when depositors have noisy information about the size of the insurance fund and as the maximum coverage increases, in line with a risk-dominant equilibrium selection mechanism. From a policy perspective, our results emphasize the limits of underfunded deposit insurance schemes in preventing systemic banking crises."
"en" => "This paper presents experimental evidence on depositor behavior under partial deposit insurance schemes. In the experiment, the size of a deposit insurance fund cannot fully cover all deposits and the level of insurance depends on the number of depositors running on the bank. We show that this form of strategic uncertainty about deposit coverage exerts a significant impact on the propensity to withdraw, and results in a large frequency of bank runs. Runs are more likely when depositors have noisy information about the size of the insurance fund and as the maximum coverage increases, in line with a risk-dominant equilibrium selection mechanism. From a policy perspective, our results emphasize the limits of underfunded deposit insurance schemes in preventing systemic banking crises."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
38 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6271
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8036"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8036"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-deceitful-communication-does-everyone-have-a-price"
"yearMonth" => "2018-06"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price?"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et DUBART, D. (2018). <i>Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price?</i> 1806, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Communication strategy"
1 => "Cost of lying -Inequality aversion"
2 => "Multiple price lis"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01822814v2"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, defined as the lowest payoff for which an individual agrees to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The core task is a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384.395: 2005). Deceitful communication brings about a constant loss for the receiver, and a range of benefits for the sender. A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the sender’s communication strategy contingent on the various benefits from deception. The results show that 71% of the subjects in the sender role will implement pure or threshold communication strategies. Among them, 40% appear to be process driven, being either "ethical" or "spiteful". The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the fixed cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this reservation payoff is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for "behaving well"."
"en" => "This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, defined as the lowest payoff for which an individual agrees to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The core task is a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384.395: 2005). Deceitful communication brings about a constant loss for the receiver, and a range of benefits for the sender. A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the sender’s communication strategy contingent on the various benefits from deception. The results show that 71% of the subjects in the sender role will implement pure or threshold communication strategies. Among them, 40% appear to be process driven, being either "ethical" or "spiteful". The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the fixed cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this reservation payoff is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for "behaving well"."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
39 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6272
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8037"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8037"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-gender-interaction-in-lying-behavior"
"yearMonth" => "2015-07"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men."
"en" => "The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
40 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6273
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8038"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8038"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-the-insidious-illiquidity-risk"
"yearMonth" => "2011-06"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on the "Insidious" Illiquidity Risk"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). <i>Experimental Evidence on the "Insidious" Illiquidity Risk</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper brings experimental evidence on investors’ behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default."
"en" => "This paper brings experimental evidence on investors’ behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
41 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8044"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8044"
"slug" => "fear-of-novelty-a-model-of-scientific-discovery-with-strategic-uncertainty"
"yearMonth" => "2015-02"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-09 09:42:45"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
42 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8048"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8048"
"slug" => "financial-distress-and-banks-communication-policy-in-crisis-times"
"yearMonth" => "2008-12"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Financial Distress and Banks' Communication Policy in Crisis Times"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Financial Distress and Banks' Communication Policy in Crisis Times</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Communication de crise"
1 => "Crise financière"
2 => "Risque de défaut"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une analyse de la stratégie optimale de communication des banques dans un modèle à information imparfaite. Il permet d'étudier l'impact d'une plus grande transparence sur la fréquence des faillites."
"en" => "This short paper analyzes banks' communication policies in crisis times and the role of imperfect information in enhancing banks' distress. If banks differ in their exposure to risky assets, fragile banks may claim to be solid only in order to manipulate investors' expectations. Then solid banks must pay a larger interest rate than in a perfect information set-up. A stronger sanction for false information would improve the situation of the low-risk banks but deteriorate the situation of the high-risk banks. The total effect on defaulting credit institutions is ambiguous. It is shown that, in some cases, the optimal sanction is lower than the sanction that rules out any manipulatory behaviour."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
43 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8049"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8049"
"slug" => "financial-instability-under-floating-exchange-rate"
"yearMonth" => "2003-03"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Financial Instability under Floating Exchange Rate"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2003). <i>Financial Instability under Floating Exchange Rate</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Fin des années 90, un grand nombre de pays en voie de développement présentaient un marché des capitaux ouvert et une dette en devises significative. Cet article s'interroge sur la compatibilité d'un régime de changes flexibles avec cette structure financière. Le modèle prend la forme d'un jeu qui oppose des générations successives d'investisseurs, amenés à décider de renouveler ou non leurs engagements. Le taux de change est soumis à des chocs aléatoires, qui rendent incertaine la solvabilité du secteur privé. Nous démontrons qu'un faible risque d'insolvabilité peut provoquer un risque d'illiquidité très important. Un équilibre à anticipations rationnelles sans défaut peut être mis en évidence seulement dans le cas peu probable où la monnaie nationale est fortement surévaluée. Il semblerait que les changes flexibles sont loin de répondre aux attentes des pays en voie de développement."
"en" => "At the end of the nineties, many developing countries featured an open capital market and relied heavily on dollar-debt financing of their economy. This paper analyses whether, in this context, clean floating can be a sustainable policy choice. The model is cast as a game between successive generations of investors who decide whether they buy or not the debt of a representative firm. The exchange rate is subject to random shocks, which makes uncertain the private sector's solvency. We show that a small risk of insolvency would bring about a much larger risk of illiquidity. A rational expectation equilibrium without default can be put forward only in the highly improbable case when the currency is extremely overvalued. The case against flexible exchange rates may be stronger than usually thought."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
44 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8053"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8053"
"slug" => "four-myths-and-a-financial-crisis"
"yearMonth" => "2009-09"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Four Myths and a Financial Crisis"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Four Myths and a Financial Crisis</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Banque"
1 => "Confiance"
2 => "Crise financière"
3 => "Equilibres multiples"
4 => "Mythes économiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article retrace les moments critiques de la crise financière 2007-2009, étudie les mécanismes de propagation des chocs, évalue les politiques économiques mises en œuvre pour faire face à cette crise."
"en" => "The main driving force of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a rapid deterioration of the trust of private agents in the quality of financial institutions. In turn, this loss of confidence entailed the collapse of several key asset markets and a sharp decline in the other asset prices. This paper surveys the critical moments of the crisis, puts forward some of the shock amplifying mechanisms and comments on the effectiveness of various policy measures. The conclusion opens the debate on what structural changes in the existing financial architecture are required to contain such crises in the future."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
45 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8058"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8058"
"slug" => "gender-interaction-in-teams-experimental-evidence-on-performance-and-punishment-behavior"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper reports results from a real-effort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-effort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fine. We manipulate th teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze\n
whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change.
"""
"en" => """
This paper reports results from a real-effort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-effort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fine. We manipulate th teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze\n
whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
46 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8062"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8062"
"slug" => "globalisation-and-growth-new-evidence-from-central-and-eastern-europe"
"yearMonth" => "2001-04"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Globalisation and Growth: New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe"
"description" => "CERNAT, L. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Globalisation and Growth: New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "CERNAT L."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 16:23:45"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Durant la dernière décennie, les pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale ont largement ouvert leurs frontières aux échanges de marchandises et capitaux. Cet article propose une estimation empirique de l'impact de changement sur le secteur réel. Par une analyse de données de panel nous montrons que l'intégration plus poussée avec l'UE, la réduction des tarifs douaniers et l'accroissement de l'investissement étranger direct favorisent le développement économique."
"en" => "To various degrees, Central and Eastern European countries increased over the last ten years their participation to the world economy, in particular, they accepted the challenge of trade openness and attracted significant foreign direct investment. This paper aims to asses to what extent this major change had a favourable contribution to output growth in this region. Results of a panel data analysis suggest that increased EU integration, reduced import duties and FDI were favourable to development."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
47 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8063"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8063"
"slug" => "group-gender-composition-and-economic-decision-making-evidence-from-the-kallystee-business-game"
"yearMonth" => "2015-09"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Group Gender Composition and Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from the Kallystée Business Game"
"description" => "LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Group Gender Composition and Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from the Kallystée Business Game</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
"bid" => "B00278040"
"slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by groups of five students selected at random. We manipulate the gender composition of the management teams to allow for all possible gender combinations. We show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the “residual” economic performance of mixed-gender teams with a majority of women is still positive and strong. Further analysis of “actual” risk-taking behavior shows that in these mixed-gender teams a “risk shift” mechanism is at play, as they take risks beyond what their total tolerance to risk as a group would suggest."
"en" => "This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by groups of five students selected at random. We manipulate the gender composition of the management teams to allow for all possible gender combinations. We show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the “residual” economic performance of mixed-gender teams with a majority of women is still positive and strong. Further analysis of “actual” risk-taking behavior shows that in these mixed-gender teams a “risk shift” mechanism is at play, as they take risks beyond what their total tolerance to risk as a group would suggest."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
48 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8075"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8075"
"slug" => "incertitude-bien-etre-et-distribution-des-salaires-dans-un-modele-de-recherche-demploi"
"yearMonth" => "2001-10"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Incertitude, bien-être et distribution des salaires dans un modèle de recherche d'emploi"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Incertitude, bien-être et distribution des salaires dans un modèle de recherche d'emploi</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans une économie décentralisée avec coûts de recherche, le paradoxe de Diamond permet de montrer que les firmes peuvent proposer des salaires de monopsone et s'accaparer le surplus des travailleurs. Par opposition, cet article vérifie que l'introduction d'une incertitude supplémentaire sur la qualité du travail proposé peut produire une amélioration au sens de Pareto de l'allocation d'équilibre. Si les travailleurs divergent dans leur mesure de la pénibilité associée à des tâches identiques, ils adopteront des salaires de réservation différents. Comme certaines firmes peuvent être tentées de proposerun salaire élevé afin de maximiser leur recrutement, les travailleurs peu exigeants embauchés par ces firmes verront leur satisfaction augmenter."
"en" => "In a decentralized economy where homogeneous workers search for the best job offers, mirror Diamond's paradox hold: firms dispose of monopsonistic power allowing them to post a low wage such as to reap all worker surplus. This paper shows that additional uncertainty on job qualify favors the emergence of a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. If some firms want to attract those workers who perceive on-the-job taks as extremely tough, they will post higher whages, to the benefit of the more enthusiastic workers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
49 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6282
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8090"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8090"
"slug" => "international-remittances-and-residents-labour-supply-in-a-signaling-model"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "International Remittances and Residents' Labour Supply in a Signaling Model"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). <i>International Remittances and Residents' Labour Supply in a Signaling Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Naiditch C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:9 [
0 => "Altruisme"
1 => "Développement"
2 => "Economie du travail"
3 => "Economie internationale"
4 => "Emigrants"
5 => "Migrants"
6 => "Offre de travail"
7 => "Signalisation"
8 => "Transferts"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie l'impact des transferts monétaires effectués par les migrants vers les pays d'origine sur l'offre de travail des résidents. Si les derniers ont la possibilité de manipuler les anticipations des migrants, les migrants peuvent réduire le montant du transfert, pénalisant ainsi les résidents les plus démunis."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with asymmetric information about the residents' real economic situation. The optimal transfer depends on wages of both the donor and the recipient. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the transferred amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
50 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6283
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8094"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8094"
"slug" => "investment-through-retained-earnings-and-employment-in-transitional-economies"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Investment through Retained Earnings and Employment in Transitional Economies"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Investment through Retained Earnings and Employment in Transitional Economies</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Plusieurs études du marché du travail dans les économies en transition ont utilisé des modèles statiques ou quasi-dynamiques pour expliquer le comportement d'emploi des grandes entreprises. Celles-ci financent une partie significative des investissements par leurs profits. Ce texte analyse les conséquences de ce mécanisme pour les décisions économiques du syndicat et de l'entreprise en perspective intertemporelle. Les revendications salariales peuvent être modérées et l'emploi favorisé. Un tel mécanisme est toujours avantageux pour le syndicat. Quant à la firme, sa décision dépend du revenu alternatif des travailleurs."
"en" => "Several studies of the labor market in transitional economies use static or quasi-dynamic trade union models to explain the employment behavior of large firms. One interesting feature of these firms is the massive financing of investment through retained earnings. This paper investigates the consequences of this mechanism on the economic decisions of the union and the firm in a two-period setting. Wage claims may be moderated and employment pushed up. While the union always supports the scheme, the attitude of the firm depends on the workers' alternative income."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
51 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6284
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8099"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8099"
"slug" => "is-the-ecb-so-special-a-qualitative-and-quantitative-analysis"
"yearMonth" => "2006-03"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Is the ECB So Special? A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). <i>Is the ECB So Special? A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "BCE et Fed "
1 => "Politique monétaire "
2 => "Règle de Taylor"
3 => "VAR"
4 => "Zone euro"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 17:22:47"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie la politique monétaire de la BCE sur la période 1999-2005 en s'appuyant sur une analyse qualitative basée sur l'interprétation des messages du Président de la banque centrale ainsi qu'une analyse empirique des principales décisions. Cette dernière analyse propose plusieurs estimations de la règle de Taylor de la BCE et développe un modèle vectoriel autorégressif de la zone euro, afin d'étudier l'impact des chocs du taux d'intérêt. Ces résultats sont mis en perspective avec la politique monétaire de la Fed."
"en" => "This paper analyses the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy over the period 1999-2005, both from a qualitative and a quantitative perspective, and compares it with the Federal Reserve Bank. The qualitative approach builds on information conveyed by various speeches of the central bank officers, mainly the President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet. The quantitative analysis provides several estimates of what could have been the ECB and Fed interest rate rules. It also develops a VAR model of both the Euro zone and the US economy so as to analyze dynamic effects of an interest rate shock. Both the qualitative and quantitative analyses point to the difficult task of the ECB, which must build credibility while managing monetary policy under major uncertainty about the structure of the new Euro area. They also suggest that, apart from the ECB's credibility building, differences between the observed behaviour of the ECB and the Fed over the time period under investigation should be accounted for by differences in the economic outlook of the two areas, rather than in the goals of the central bankers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
52 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6285
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8109"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8109"
"slug" => "knowledge-in-economics-and-economic-reform-an-analysis-of-french-survey-data"
"yearMonth" => "2011-04"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Knowledge in Economics and Economic Reform: An Analysis of French Survey Data"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BARTHELEMY, J. (2011). <i>Knowledge in Economics and Economic Reform: An Analysis of French Survey Data</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "BARTHELEMY Jérôme"
"bid" => "B00013767"
"slug" => "barthelemy-jerome"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Building on survey data collected by Vranceanu, Laot and Dubart (2010), we study how personal characteristics, general and economics education, occupation and personal interest in economics affect knowledge in economics. We then apply factor analysis in order to build an aggregate indicator of opinion on promarket reforms. This opinion indicator becomes the dependent variable in a second multiple regression model; it turns out that knowledge in economics contributes by 3.5% to explain the favorable opinion on pro-market reforms."
"en" => "Building on survey data collected by Vranceanu, Laot and Dubart (2010), we study how personal characteristics, general and economics education, occupation and personal interest in economics affect knowledge in economics. We then apply factor analysis in order to build an aggregate indicator of opinion on promarket reforms. This opinion indicator becomes the dependent variable in a second multiple regression model; it turns out that knowledge in economics contributes by 3.5% to explain the favorable opinion on pro-market reforms."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
53 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6286
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8141"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8141"
"slug" => "la-reduction-des-budgets-de-la-defense-en-europe-economie-budgetaire-ou-concurrence-budgetaire"
"yearMonth" => "1999-02"
"year" => "1999"
"title" => "La réduction des budgets de la défense en Europe : économie budgétaire ou concurrence budgétaire ?"
"description" => "GUYOT, M. et VRANCEANU, R. (1999). <i>La réduction des budgets de la défense en Europe : économie budgétaire ou concurrence budgétaire ?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GUYOT Marc"
"bid" => "B00000236"
"slug" => "guyot-marc"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Pendant les années 90, on a assisté à une extension du processus d'unification européenne vers les domaines de la défense commune et à la construction d'une authentique base industrielle de défense. Dans le même temps, on a pu observer une forte baisse des dépenses militaires et une moindre capacité des pays européens à gérer les aspects militaires des crises extérieures. Ce papier propose une explication de ce paradoxe basée sur un modèle de production décentralisée d'un bien public en présence d'effets de débordement spécifiques"
"en" => "In the last decade, European defense has been submitted to impressive changes. Military alliances between the EU member countries have strengthened, and an European defense industrial base is being built up. But in a paradoxical way, European countries look today less capable to cope with important military crisis, and their defense budgets are plunging. The paper proposes an explanation for this paradox, considering the case of the decentralized production of a public good with cross-border spillin effects."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
54 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6287
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8163"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8163"
"slug" => "le-financement-public-du-secteur-de-la-defense-une-source-dinefficacite"
"yearMonth" => "2005-09"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "Le financement public du secteur de la défense, une source d'inefficacité ?"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2005). <i>Le financement public du secteur de la défense, une source d'inefficacité ?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Besancenot D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Traditionnellement les pays d'Europe continentale financent leur secteur de la défense par l'argent public. Actuellement, le mouvement de désengagement des Etats par rapport à la production d'armes pose le problème d'un plus grand recours au financement privé. Cette étude montre que l'absence des relations de long terme entre prêteurs privés et firmes de la défense pourrait bloquer cette transition."
"en" => "Continental European countries used to finance defence firms with public money. In the last few years, many governments aimed at implementing a hands-off policy towards the defence sector, which implies a gradual transition from public to private funding. This paper argues that the absence of long term relationships between defense firms and private investors may block this change."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
55 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6288
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8219"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8219"
"slug" => "les-syndicats-francais-une-formalisation-elementaire"
"yearMonth" => "1996-09"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Les syndicats français, une formalisation élémentaire"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). <i>Les syndicats français, une formalisation élémentaire</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous étudions les caractéristiques d'un syndicat représentatif dans une économie intégrant des agents strictement rationnels. Le modèle repose sur trois hypothèses : l'entreprise accepte de payer une prime pour éviter le risque de grève, les agents maximisent leur espérance de revenu et le dirigeant syndical cherche la taille optimale du syndicat compte tenu des avantages liés à une forte représentativité mais aussi des coûts de gestion croissants avec le nombre d'adhérents. Sous ces hypothèses, on vérifie l'existence d'un équilibre non-walrasien dans lequel taux de salaire, emploi, taille et représentativité du syndicat sont simultanément déterminés."
"en" => "In this paper, we examine the emergence of trade unions in a hypothetical economy hosting strictly rational workers. The model is founded on three main assumptions : firms accept to pay a premium in order to avoid a strike, private agents wish to join the union in order to maximise their expected income and union leaders seek to maximise their net benefits. It will be shown that a non-Walrasian equilibrium exists in which employment, wages, union size and agressivity are jointly determined."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
56 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6289
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8239"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8239"
"slug" => "lying-about-delegation"
"yearMonth" => "2015-01"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Lying about Delegation"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>Lying about Delegation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SUTAN A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer\n
can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder\n
with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is\n
effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role while the decision is made by the\n
Proposer himself. In this imperfect information setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable\n
message declaring his delegation strategy. The most interesting strategy is “false delegation”, in\n
which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse\n
to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in\n
the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse\n
to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers\n
in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest\n
when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role.
"""
"en" => """
This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer\n
can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder\n
with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is\n
effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role while the decision is made by the\n
Proposer himself. In this imperfect information setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable\n
message declaring his delegation strategy. The most interesting strategy is “false delegation”, in\n
which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse\n
to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in\n
the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse\n
to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers\n
in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest\n
when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
57 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6290
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8266"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8266"
"slug" => "migratory-equilibria-with-invested-remittances"
"yearMonth" => "2009-04"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Migratory Equilibria with Invested Remittances"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Migratory Equilibria with Invested Remittances</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Migration"
1 => "Motif d'investissement"
2 => "Politique migrante"
3 => "Transfert des migrants"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la migration économique dans le cadre d'un modèle où les migrants peuvent investir une partie de leur épargne dans le pays d'origine. En particulier, un équilibre avec migration partielle est faisable. Dans ce cas, on démontre et teste empiriquement une relation positive entre nombre de migrants et le montant du transfert par migrant."
"en" => "This paper analyzes international migrations when migrants invest part of their income in their origin country. This investment contributes to increase capital intensity and wages in the origin country, thus reducing the scope for migrating. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium can exist if the foreign wage is not too high, and/or migratory and transfer costs are not too low. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in the foreign wage, lead to an increase in optimal remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the origin country. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, optimal remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 in order to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates put forward a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to remittances per migrant. Policy implications follow."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
58 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6291
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8267"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8267"
"slug" => "migratory-policy-in-developing-countries-how-to-bring-best-people-back"
"yearMonth" => "2008-11"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Migration temporaire"
1 => "Retour des migrants"
2 => "Signalisation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la décision des migrants de revenir au pays d'origine dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation à la spence. Le jeu à information imparfaite décrit le comportement des migrants, et celui des firmes, sous l'hypothèse d'information imparfaite quant à la productivité des migrants.L'article étudie la décision des migrants de revenir au pays d'origine dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation à la spence. Le jeu à information imparfaite décrit le comportement des migrants, et celui des firmes, sous l'hypothèse d'information imparfaite quant à la productivité des migrants."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
59 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6292
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8278"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8278"
"slug" => "money-in-the-inflation-equation-the-euro-area-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2008-05"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Money in the Inflation Equation: The Euro Area Evidence"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Money in the Inflation Equation: The Euro Area Evidence</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "BCE"
1 => "Inflation"
2 => "Monnaie"
3 => "Politique monétaire"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'étude montre que dans la Zone Euro une croissance de l'agrégat monétaire M3 avoisinant les 10% sur une longue période est responsable d'une inflation de 2.5%. L'output gap peut influencer l'inflation dans le court-terme.L'étude montre que dans la Zone Euro une croissance de l'agrégat monétaire M3 avoisinant les 10% sur une longue période est responsable d'une inflation de 2.5%. L'output gap peut influencer l'inflation dans le court-terme."
"en" => "The ECB is the only major central bank that still emphasizes the role of money in monetary policy management. In this paper, we bring some support to this approach. Taking into account Euro area data from the period between 1999 and 2007, we demonstrate that a steady 10 per cent increase in M3 may result in an inflation rate of approximately 2½ percentage points. A negative output gap would have a short term offsetting effect, and vice versa."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
60 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6293
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8284"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8284"
"slug" => "multiple-equilibria-in-a-firing-game-with-impartial-justice"
"yearMonth" => "2007-11"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). <i>Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Coût de licenciement"
1 => "Equilibres multiples"
2 => "Juges du travail"
3 => "Motif de licenciement"
4 => "Protection légale de l'emploi"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans de nombreux pays d'Europe, les employés sont couverts par des contrats de travail qui encadrent de manière stricte la possibilité de licenciement. Par ailleurs, les employés licenciés peuvent contester en justice le motif du licenciement. L'article étudie l'interaction entre entreprises, employés et système juridique, dans le contexte spécifique aux pays du Sud de l'Europe. Si la marge d'erreur des juges augmente avec le nombre de cas à traiter, nous montrons que le jeu présente des équilibres multiples qui diffèrent dans la fréquence de travailleurs virés de manière abusive pour motif personnel."
"en" => "In many European countries, a majority of employees are hired under very protective labor contracts that restrict the ability of the employer to dismiss them. In particular, employees can take to courts the firm's layoff motive. This paper analyses the interaction between firms, employees and the labor judicial system specific to South European countries. If judges' error margin increases when the judicial system is subject to congestion, the game presents multiple equilibria which differ in the frequency of workers abusively fired for personal motives. Policy implications can be inferred."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
61 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6294
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8313"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8313"
"slug" => "optimal-return-in-a-model-of-bank-small-business-financing"
"yearMonth" => "2014-02"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing"
"description" => "PEIA, O. et VRANCEANU, R. (2014). <i>Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEIA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions le financement des PME par les banques dans un modèle de type "global games". Il apparait que le taux d'intérêt d’équilibre dans une économie décentralisée avec secteur bancaire concurrentiel est supérieur au taux d'intérêt qui assure le plus grand taux de réussite des projets."
"en" => "This paper develops a simple model showing how banks can increase the access to finance of small, risky firms by mitigating coordination problems among investors. If investors observe a biased signal about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a switching equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that the socially optimal interest rate that maximizes the probability of success of the firm is higher than the risk-free rate. Yet if banks maximize investors' expected return, they would choose an interest higher than the socially optimal one. This gives rise to a form of credit rationing, which stems from the funding constraints of the banks."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
62 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6295
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8317"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8317"
"slug" => "output-density-and-the-foundations-of-generalized-production-functions"
"yearMonth" => "1996-11"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Output Density and the Foundations of Generalized Production Functions"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). <i>Output Density and the Foundations of Generalized Production Functions</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Ce texte vise à explorer les fondements des fonctions de production généralisées utilisées dans les analyses consacrées à l'explication de la durée du travail et de l'emploi dans les systèmes économiques décentralisés. Le processus de production est représenté par une notion originale : la fonction de densité productive. Il en développe les applications les plus directes : demande bidimensionnelle de travail, impact des contraintes d'horaire et interprétation de la notion Hicksienne de "journée optimale de travail"."
"en" => "This text examines the foundations and properties of the Generalized Production Functions frequently used in the literature devoted to the analysis of employment and duration of work in decentralized competitive economies. In order to improve the representation of the productive process, it introduces the concept of Output Density Function, then sketches some of its most direct applications : analyzing the determination of a two dimensional labor demand, explaining the impact of legally enforced working hour limits on employment and interpreting the Hicksian notion of "optimal working day"."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
63 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6296
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8353"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8353"
"slug" => "public-debt-from-insolvency-to-illiquidity-default"
"yearMonth" => "2001-05"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "La plupart des analyses des situations de défaut sur les dettes publiques prennent en compte le comportement opportuniste des gouvernement ou l'absence accidentelle de revenus. Dans cet article, le défaut est essentiellement provoqué par le refus des investisseurs de prêter au gouvernement, bien que sa solvabilité ne soit par directement mise en cause. Le modèle est résolu en répétant plusieurs fois le jeu du défaut entre gouvernement et investisseurs. Il apparaît que le seuil d'illiquidité est nettement inférieur au seuil d'insolvabilité. Ce résultat devrait être incorporé dans les modèles actuels d'évaluation des politiques fiscales."
"en" => "Most studies explain default on public debt either as the discretionary decision of a short-sighted government, or as the consequence of an accidental increase in public deficits. In this paper, default is brought about by the refusal of rational private investors to roll over the debty of a seemingly solvent government. True, default may occur after a long sequence of adverse shocks because the ballooning debt is no longer consistent with the going fiscal rule. But this rather small risk of insolvency brings about a much more severe illiquidity risk, as investors would refuse to lend to a government whose debt exceeds a critical threshold. Central to this analysis is the expectations upgrading process, and the recursive calculation of critical threstholds, until convergence is achived. It comes out that the debt level insulating the government from illiquidity default is much lower thatn the insolvency threshold. This result would ask for a more cautious evaluation of contemporary fiscal policies, which, so far, has focused almost exclusively on solvency criteria."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
64 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6297
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8354"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8354"
"slug" => "publish-or-teach-analysis-of-the-professors-optimal-career-path"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution."
"en" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
65 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6298
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8359"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8359"
"slug" => "quality-leaps-and-price-distribution-in-an-equilibrium-search-model"
"yearMonth" => "2001-09"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie les conséquences d'un choc de productivité dans une économie de type "search". Les entreprises produisent un bien et décident de sa qualité et du prix de vente. Les consommateurs cherchent la meilleure offre. Une partie des consommateurs ne connaît pas la qualité du bien qu'ils achètent. Le modèle présente plusieurs équilibres de Nash, en fonction de la proportion d'agents informés dans la population totale de consommateurs. Par exemple, si cette proportion n'est pas trop forte, ni trop faible, à l'équilibre toutes les firmes offrent un bien de haute qualité à un prix bas. Un équilibre en stratégie mixte peut aussi se manifester. Dans ces deux situations, le surplus des consommateurs est positif."
"en" => "This paper analyses the impact of a quality improving technological shock on terms of trade in a search economy. Firms produce a unit good and decide on both its quality and price. Consumers search for the best offer. Some of them can assess the product quality before buying it, the other cannot. Several types of Nash equilibria are put forward, in keeping with the proportion of experts in the population of consumers. For instance, if the proportion of experts is not too small, nor too large, in equilibrium firms may decide to produce high quality goods, but post the pre-shock low price. A mixed strategy equilibrium, where all firms produce high quality goods, but some of them post the low price while the other post a higher price, may also emerge. In both these configurations, consumers reap a positive surplus."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
66 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6299
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8360"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8360"
"slug" => "quality-uncertainty-and-welfare-in-a-search-economy"
"yearMonth" => "2001-10"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Quality Uncertainty and Welfare in a Search Economy"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Quality Uncertainty and Welfare in a Search Economy</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les modèles de recherche représentent de manière explicite les coûts subis par les consommateurs pour acquérir de l'information sur les prix. Peter Diamond a démontré qu'une telle économie ne peut pas atteindre spontanément l'équilibre walrassien , au contraire, les firmes affichent le prix de monopole et prélèvent l'intégralité du suplus du consommateur. Nous montrons que, dans ce contexte, plus d'incertitude sur la qualité du produit peut engendrer une amélioration du bien-être."
"en" => "Equilibrium search models carried a step further the neoclassical analysis of decentralized economies, by formalizing the acquisition of price information a costly activity. In a classical study, Peter Diamond proved that a search economy hosting homogeneous agents cannot reach spontaneously the Walrasian equilibrium: to the contrary, the resulting equilibrium has rather dramatic implications in terms of welfare, as firms post a single monopoly price and reap all consumers' surplus. In this paper, we show that additional uncertainty on product quality may bring about a Pareto-improved allocation in search economy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
67 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6300
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8370"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8370"
"slug" => "reduction-de-la-duree-du-travail-et-complementarite-des-niveaux-de-qualification"
"yearMonth" => "1998-10"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "Réduction de la durée du travail et complémentarité des niveaux de qualification"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1998). <i>Réduction de la durée du travail et complémentarité des niveaux de qualification</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Le modèle étudie les conséquences en termes d'emploi d'une politique de réduction de la durée légale du travail lorsque le marché des services productifs est fortement segmenté, les travailleurs qualifiés et non qualifiés étant complémentaires dans les techniques de production mises en oeuvre. Si la substitution hommes-heures semble améliorer la situation de chômeurs qualifiés, l'accroissement du coût d'une unité de services productif du travail provoque une réduction de la demande de travailleurs non-qualifiés, touchant donc le segment de population le plus affecté par le chômage."
"en" => "This paper builds on a model with qualified and non-qualified workers to investigate the employment consequences of a work-sharing policy. The two types of workers are perfect complements in the production of labor services. They differ with respect to their hour effectiveness, which entails longer working hours for the qualified. A not too strong legal constraint on working time would affect only qualified workers. In this case, as the cost of one unit of labor services increases, the demand for less qualified workers goes down. An undifferentiated policy of working time reduction may harm low qualified workers, which are also the most exposed to unemployment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
68 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6301
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8375"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8375"
"slug" => "remittances-as-a-social-status-signaling-device"
"yearMonth" => "2009-12"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). <i>Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Information imparfaite"
1 => "Pauvreté"
2 => "Signal"
3 => "Transferts des migrants"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie les transferts des migrants en tant que moyen pour signaler leur situation économique aux yeux des résidents. En information imparfaite, les migrants pauvres peuvent transférer plus que normal, pour se faire passer pour des migrants ayant réussi. Les migrants riches peuvent adopter des stratégies de signalisation plus agressives encore."
"en" => "Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
69 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6302
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8378"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8378"
"slug" => "reputation-in-a-model-of-economy-wide-privatization"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Le texte étudie la politique de privatisation dans les économies en transition sous la forme d'un jeu séquentiel en information incomplète. Il met en évidence le potentiel d'incohérence temporelle de cette réforme. Les Etats ont deux objectifs prioritaires : la privatisation et la protection des emplois, dont les agents ignorent le poids dans la fonction objectif de l'Etat. Il sera démontré que deux types d'équilibres Bayesiens parfaits, l'un séparateur, l'autre "pooling", peuvent se manifester selon la nature de l'Etat. Si certains Etats orientés-emploi peuvent signaler leur priorité, les Etats orientés-privatisation ne peuvent pas. De ce fait, d'autres Etats orientés-emploi peuvent agir pour construire une réputation de "privatisation rapide"."
"en" => "This paper analyzes economy-wide privatization as a two-period sequential game with incomplete information, focusing on the potential for dynamic inconsistency of this reform. Governments have two main conflicting objectives: privatization and preservation of jobs. At the outset of the game, private agents do not know the weights attached to each objective by their government. It is shown that the game may present either a separating or a pooling Bayesian equilibrium, contingent upon the type of government. While some slow privatizers may successfully signal themselves in the eyes of private agents, others may attempt to build a reputation of "fast privatizers"."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
70 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6303
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8379"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8379"
"slug" => "reputation-in-a-model-of-exchange-rate-policy-with-incomplete-information"
"yearMonth" => "1997-03"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Inspiré par le contexte européen, le modèle étudie la politique de change en tant que jeu séquentiel à horizon fini entre l'Etat et les agents privés dans l'hypothèse d'information incomplète sur les priorités de l'Etat. Celui-ci poursuit deux objectifs contradictoires : préserver la parité de sa monnaie et stimuler la production. La dévaluation permet une amélioration temporaire de la production mais aussi favorise les anticipations de dévaluation future, d'où l'émergence d'une prime de risque sur les taux d'intérêt. Il est démontré que le jeu présente un équilibre parfait Bayesien. Sous certaines conditions, l'équilibre qui apparaît est de type "mélangeur". Dans ce cas, la politique de non-dévaluation ne permet pas de signaler le type d'Etat et la prime de risque persiste. Plusieurs pays européens qui envisagent le passage à la monnaie unique pourraient se trouver dans une telle situation."
"en" => "Inspired by the contemporary process of European monetary integration, this paper analyzes exchange rate policy as a finite horizon sequential game under incomplete information of the private agents over the priorities of the central bank. The policymaker has two conflicting objectives: stimulating activity and preserving the parity of the currency. It will be shown that the game presents a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the most interesting case deals with the pooling situation, where in the central bank undertakes a policy of strong currency during an introductory period, and devaluates in the very few moments before the transfer of its functions to the supra-national central bank. The model suggests a rationale for the persistent risk premium on interest rates in the countries applying for the European Monetary Union."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
71 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6304
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8399"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8399"
"slug" => "socially-efficient-managerial-dishonesty"
"yearMonth" => "2005-05"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2005). <i>Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Besancenot D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Au début des années 2000, l'Administration américaine a renforcé de manière significative les sanctions contre les directeurs de grandes entreprises qui, de manière mal intentionnée, communiquent des fausses informations financières. A partir d'un jeu séquentiel entre gestionnaires et fournisseurs en présence d'information asymétrique, l'article démontre qu'un renforcement de la sanction peut provoquer - dans certains cas - un accroissement de la fréquence de faillites."
"en" => "As a reaction to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, the US Administration dramatically tightened sanctions against managers who disclose misleading financial information. This paper argues that such a reform might come with some unpleasant macroeconomic effects. The model is cast as a game between the manager of a publicly listed company and the supplier of an essential input, under asymmetric information about the type of the firm. The analysis focuses on the Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium where at least some managers choose to communicate a false information about the true type of the firm. We show that by dissuading "virtuous lies", whereby a manager strives to win time for a financially distressed company, a tougher sanction brings about a higher frequency of default."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
72 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6305
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8417"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8417"
"slug" => "structural-unemployment-in-eastern-european-reforming-countries"
"yearMonth" => "1994-08"
"year" => "1994"
"title" => "Structural Unemployment in Eastern European Reforming Countries"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1994). <i>Structural Unemployment in Eastern European Reforming Countries</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article développe un modèle théorique du chômage structurel dans les économies en transition. Le modèle comporte deux secteurs (le "secteur d'Etat" et le "secteur privé") avec des comportements d'emploi différents. Chaque secteur est analysé en équilibre partiel puis en équilibre général pour tenir compte de leurs interactions. Deux types d'analyse sont effectuées : statistique et dynamique."
"en" => "This article develops a theoretical model of structural unemployment in transitional economies. The model includes two sectors (the "State sector" and the "private sector") with different approaches as to their employment behavior. The analysis is conducted first in a partial equilibrium then in a general equilibrium framework. Static and dynamic analyses are also presented."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
73 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6306
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8420"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8420"
"slug" => "structure-de-cout-du-travail-et-formation-des-horaires"
"yearMonth" => "1995-05"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Structure de coût du travail et formation des horaires"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). <i>Structure de coût du travail et formation des horaires</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'étude s'efforce de mettre en évidence le rôle que les coûts indirects du travail pourraient jouer dans l'explication de la durée du travail qui se formerait spontanément dans une économie décentralisée. Le premier stade du texte considère la production comme prédéterminée par une contrainte de débouchés. Le niveau d'activité des firmes est ensuite considéré comme endogène. L'étude révèle la formation d'un conflit systématique portant sur l'horaire de travail. Dans ce cadre d'analyse, il est possible de représenter les effets des réductions légales de l'horaire de travail préconisées comme instrument de lutte contre le chômage. Sur des bases très différentes, les résultats tendent à coïncider avec ceux d'autres approches : la réduction de la durée du travail peut avoir sur l'emploi des effets décevants, voire pervers."
"en" => "The text aims at bringing out the role of indirect labour costs in explaining the length of the working day in a decentralized market economy. Starting with a simple model with predetermined output, the analysis is then generalized to the case where the activity of firms is endogeneous. A simple interpretation of the systematic conflict about working time is proposed. In this framework, the effects of the legal limitation of working time, sometimes intended to reduce unemployment, can be examined. Like many other studies, the results confirm, on different grounds, that the result of such interference can be disappointing or paradoxical."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
74 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6307
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8429"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8429"
"slug" => "taking-the-well-being-of-future-generations-seriously-do-people-contribute-more-to-intra-temporal-or-inter-temporal-public-goods"
"yearMonth" => "2013-09"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously: Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously: Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SUTAN A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Jeu du bien public"
1 => "Transferts intergénérationnels"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions un jeu du bien public avec transferts inter temporels. Les résultats indiquent une forme d'altruisme intergénérationnel."
"en" => "We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
75 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6308
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8433"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8433"
"slug" => "technological-change-acquisition-of-skills-and-wages-in-a-search-economy"
"yearMonth" => "2001-09"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Technological Change, Acquisition of Skills and Wages in a Search Economy"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Technological Change, Acquisition of Skills and Wages in a Search Economy</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie l'impact d'un choc technologique sur l'équilibre du marché du travail d'une économie décentralisée où les firmes sont à la recherche des meilleurs employés. Les employés choisissent de manière optimale leur niveau de qualification professionnelle. Le modèle présente plusieurs équilibres de Nash, en fonction de la proportion des firmes ayant adopté la nouvelle technologie. Un de ces équilibres présente une distribution des salaires non dégénérée. La comparaison des profits à travers les équilibres débouche sur une perspective de développement économique à la Schumpeter."
"en" => "This paper analyses the impact of a technological shock on labour market equilibrium in a decentralized economy where firms search for the best workers. Workers choose in an optimal way their training effort and resulting skill level. We put forward several types of Nash equilibria, in keeping with the proportion of firms that have implemented the new technology. One of them implies a non-degenerated distribution of wages. A comparison in the aggregate profits across various equlibria supports the Schumpeterian view on the dynamics of technical progress."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
76 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6309
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8438"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8438"
"slug" => "the-read-or-write-dilemma-in-academic-production-a-european-perspective"
"yearMonth" => "2006-12"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). <i>The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Besancenot D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Huynh K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Effet d'encombrement"
1 => "Incitations à la publication"
2 => "Management de la recherche"
3 => "Publications"
4 => "Qualité"
5 => "Recherche"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la production de recherches en économie et gestion. Le revenu du chercheur est lié à la quantité et qualité de ses travaux. La qualité dépend de son capital humain et de l'environnement externe. Le chercheur doit faire face à un arbitrage entre écrire plus, ou lire plus afin de renforcer son capital humain. Le jeu entre chercheurs présente un équilibre de Nash symétrique. Des implications de politique économique sont envisagées."
"en" => "This paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A scholar's income is positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the quality of a paper depends on the scholar's human capital and the external production of research. The individual scholar is subject to a trade-off between writing more papers or reading in order to upgrade her skills. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity and quality of published papers are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions about the research production process, in equilibrium researchers write too many papers of a too low quality, as compared to the cooperative outcome. Policy implications can be inferred from the model."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
77 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6310
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8452"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8452"
"slug" => "the-ethical-dimension-of-economic-choices"
"yearMonth" => "2005-01"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2005). <i>The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article plaide en faveur d'une meilleure prise en compte de la dimension éthique des choix économiques par les sciences sociales, en tant que moyen d'améliorer le fonctionnement des économies de marché."
"en" => "In general, capitalist countries display sustained growth, dynamism and innovation, and a high adaptability in response to external shocks. Yet in the last twenty years discontent over the notorious drawbacks of capitalism - corporate frauds, corruption, abuses of market power - have grown continually. In this paper, we argue that no remedy to these difficulties can be found if ethical dilemmas are not anticipated and addressed at the individual, firm and economy-wide level."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
78 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6311
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8453"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8453"
"slug" => "the-euro-sovereign-debt-crisis-and-the-built-in-instability-of-the-euro"
"yearMonth" => "2012-12"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "The Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Built-in Instability of the Euro"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2012). <i>The Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Built-in Instability of the Euro</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article de politique économique présente les moments décisifs de la crise des dettes publiques dans la Zone euro. Il s'interroge sur l'efficacité des différentes politiques destinées à réduire le risque d'illiquidité qui pèse sur la dette de certains pays."
"en" => "This policy paper aims at presenting the key facts related to the Euro sovereign debt crisis that occurred in the interval 2010-2012. It points out some main coordination failures that are at the origin of the crisis, and comments on the effectiveness of various stabilization measures undertook by governments and the EU institutions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
79 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6312
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8455"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8455"
"slug" => "the-fiscal-multiplier-in-a-time-of-massive-public-debt-the-euro-area-case"
"yearMonth" => "2012-07"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "The Fiscal Multiplier in a Time of Massive Public Debt: The Euro Area Case"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BESANCENOT, D. (2012). <i>The Fiscal Multiplier in a Time of Massive Public Debt: The Euro Area Case</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dette publique"
1 => "Politique fiscale"
2 => "Risque d'illiquidité"
3 => "Zone euro"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions l'efficacité d'une relance budgétaire en présence d'une forte dette publique. Une étude empirique basée sur l'observation des pays de l'EU sur la période 1996-2011 montre que le multiplicateur des dépenses diminue avec le ratio dette sur PIB."
"en" => "This paper argues that in Euro-area economies, where the ECB cannot bail-out financially distressed governments, the fiscal multiplier is adversely affected by the amount of public debt. A regression model on a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011 shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is connected to a slowdown in annual growth rates of 0.28 percentage point. Furthermore, the effectiveness of fiscal spending is adversely affected by the amount of public debt; for a debt-to-GDP ratio above 150% the impact on growth of the fiscal stimulus turns negative."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
80 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6313
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8460"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8460"
"slug" => "the-information-limit-to-honest-managerial-behavior"
"yearMonth" => "2004-09"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => "The Information Limit to Honest Managerial Behavior"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2004). <i>The Information Limit to Honest Managerial Behavior</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le recours des gestionnaires à la fraude comptable dans le cadre d'un jeu Bayesien. Les fautes de conduite sont mises en relation avec la précision des rapports honnêtes et la fréquence de firmes financièrement solides."
"en" => "In the last years of the Internet bubble, many managers provided fraudulent financial statements with the aim at inflating the market value of their firms. Is this shortage of honesty an accident or a buit-in feature of shareholder capitalism?This paper argues that in an economy hosting publicly traded companies where investors have only imperfect information about a firm's type and where a honest financial report may be wrong, at least some bad firms managers will provide false statements. Furthermore, in equilibrium some good firm managers may also resort to corrupt auditors which will issue a favorable report without carrying out any investigation. The frequency of dishonest managers is analized in keeping with the precision of the report and the total number of firms."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
81 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6314
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8464"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8464"
"slug" => "the-moral-layer-of-contemporary-economics-a-virtue-ethics-perspective"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "The Moral Layer of Contemporary Economics: A Virtue Ethics Perspective"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2007). <i>The Moral Layer of Contemporary Economics: A Virtue Ethics Perspective</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Economie"
1 => "Efficacité"
2 => "Ethique des vertus"
3 => "Préférences"
4 => "Rationalité"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une analyse critique des fondements éthiques de la théorie économique contemporaine, en adoptant comme perspective l'éthique des vertus."
"en" => "This paper questions whether the contemporary science of economics and its recommendations are built on sound moral foundations as assessed from a virtue-based definition of ethical behaviour. We argue that the model of man underlying economic analyses can correspond to the model of a virtuous person, and that economics, by advocating reasoned choice and careful resource utilization, makes a positive contribution to the moral development of individuals."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
82 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6315
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8471"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8471"
"slug" => "the-risk-of-default-on-public-debts-in-a-monetary-union-the-case-for-a-european-compensation-fund"
"yearMonth" => "1996-04"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "The Risk of Default on Public Debts in a Monetary Union: The Case for a European Compensation Fund"
"description" => "SOUVETON, R. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). <i>The Risk of Default on Public Debts in a Monetary Union: The Case for a European Compensation Fund</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SOUVETON R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-09 09:46:54"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Plusieurs pays membres de l'Union Européenne envisageant l'adoption d'une monnaie unique, souhaitent néanmoins conserver le contrôle national sur les politiques budgétaires. L'article est consacré à l'étude du rôle joué par le risque de répudiation de la dette publique dans ce contexte spécifique. Nous nous préoccupons essentiellement des relations entre la probabilité de défaut et plusieurs variables macroéconomiques, tels que la production, la dette de l'Etat ou le déficit public. Cette analyse nous conduit à suggérer la création d'un Fonds Européen de Compensation et fournit quelques suggestions quant à son design optimal."
"en" => "A core group of European Union members is close to setting up a monetary union, but wish to keep fiscal policies decentralized. In this particular framework, this paper aims at analyzing the role played by the default risk on Treasury bonds. We focus on the interactions between the risk-adjusted interest rate and several main macroeconomic variables like income, public debt and government spending. In particular, our analysis suggests that a "European Compensation Fund" would provide support for countries affected by adverse shocks."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
83 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6316
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8481"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8481"
"slug" => "the-value-of-lies-in-an-ultimatum-game-with-imperfect-information"
"yearMonth" => "2012-04"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., DUBART, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2012). <i>The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions le problème du mensonge dans un jeu de l'ultimatum, dans lequel les receveurs n'ont qu'une information imparfaite quant à la somme d'argent reçue par les offreurs. Les derniers peuvent envoyer un message invérifiable quant au montant reçu. En moyenne, 88.5 des offreurs vont communiquer un montant inférieur à la somme réelle. Le mensonge est associé systématiquement à une offre réelle plus faible."
"en" => "Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about the endowment received at the outset of the game. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders, simply in order to reduce their expected endowment and be able to submit smaller offers. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 19%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections increases. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
84 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6317
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8489"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8489"
"slug" => "transferts-des-migrants-et-offre-de-travail-dans-un-modele-de-signalisation"
"yearMonth" => "2006-04"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). <i>Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Naiditch C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Altruisme"
1 => "Offre de travail"
2 => "Signalisation"
3 => "Transferts des migrants"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie l'effet des transferts de fonds des migrants altruistes sur l'offre de travail des résidents, sous la forme d'un jeu à deux périodes en asymétrie d'information concernant la vraie situation économique des résidents. Le modèle présente le transfert optimal comme une fonction des salaires des deux joueurs. Lorsque le résident bénéficie d'une situation économique favorable, sous certaines conditions, il peut se comporter comme s'il était affecté par une mauvaise situation uniquement pour manipuler les anticipations des donateurs. Ces derniers, conscients de ce risque, réduisent le montant du transfert. De ce fait, à l'équilibre, le résident réellement touché par une mauvaise conjoncture se trouve pénalisé. Il peut alors mettre en œuvre une stratégie de signalisation au prix d'une plus grande précarité."
"en" => "This paper analyses the impact of migrant remittances on the supply of labour of beneficiaries in a developing country. The model is cast as a two period game between a resident and an altruistic migrant, under imperfect information of the latter about the true economic situation of the former. The game presents a Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium where at least some residents subject to a good economic situation would behave as if they were disadvantaged, only to manipulate donor's expectations. In some specific circumstances, the resident affected by the bad state of the world may undertake a costly signalling strategy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
85 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6318
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8492"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8492"
"slug" => "trust-and-financial-trades-lessons-from-an-investment-game-where-reciprocators-can-hide-behind-probabilities"
"yearMonth" => "2010-05"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2010). <i>Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SUTAN A."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Confiance"
1 => "Economie expérimentale"
2 => "Finance"
3 => "Jeu de l'investissement"
4 => "Risk objectif"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une étude expérimentale d'une variante originale du jeu de l'investissement. On introduit une probabilité objective de disparition du lien entre investisseur et récepteur. Le dernier pourra prétexter cet événement objectif pour jouer sa stratégie égoïste, ce que nous appelons "se cacher derrière les probabilités". Ce phénomène pourrait bien caractériser les échanges financiers."
"en" => "In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-building."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
86 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6319
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8497"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8497"
"slug" => "une-echelle-de-mesure-de-la-connaissance-en-raisonnement-economique-et-resultats-dune-enquete-menee-en-decembre-2009"
"yearMonth" => "2010-01"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique et résultats d'une enquête menée en décembre 2009"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., LAOT, M. et DUBART, D. (2010). <i>Une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique et résultats d'une enquête menée en décembre 2009</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LAOT M."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Connaissance en économie"
1 => "Echelle de mesure"
2 => "Politique économique"
3 => "Test de connaissance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cette étude propose une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique avec une orientation macroéconomique et politique économique. Une enquête sur Internet a été effectuée en novembre/décembre 2009. Elle a permis de collecter 1542 questionnaires complets. Le taux moyen de bonnes réponses est relativement élevé, à 71%. Le niveau d'études, une formation en économie, l'utilisation des concepts économiques dans le cadre de l'activité professionnelle ainsi que l'intérêt porté à l'actualité économique semblent être positivement corrélés avec le taux de bonnes réponses."
"en" => "We worked out a scale of economic reasoning skills with a macroeconomic and economic policy orientation. The test was administered via Internet in December 2009, and led to collection of 1542 complete questionnaires. The average rate of correct answers is relatively high, to 71%. The knowledgability of economic principles is positively related to general education, training in economics, personal interest for economics and recourse to economics in professional life."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
87 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6320
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8498"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8498"
"slug" => "une-etude-theorique-de-la-coordination-budgetaire-en-union-monetaire"
"yearMonth" => "1998-05"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "Une étude théorique de la coordination budgétaire en union monétaire"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et WARIN, T. (1998). <i>Une étude théorique de la coordination budgétaire en union monétaire</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "WARIN T."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la question de la coordination des politiques budgétaires au sein de la future Union économique et monétaire. Dans un modèle à deux pays en changes flexibles avec le reste du monde et mobilité parfaite des capitaux, l'expansion budgétaire stimule l'emploi dans le pays qui la pratique mais le détériore dans le second pays. Dans un jeu à horizon fini à une seule période, la non coopération est la stratégie dominante et conduit à un résultat sous-optimal avec déficit budgétaire mais sans relance de l'activité. La règle budgétaire apparaît donc comme une stratégie de coordination inefficace. Cependant, dans un modèle à horizon de décision long, la coopération peut se manifester spontanément sans avoir forcément recours à une harmonisation fiscale voire à une politique budgétaire unique"
"en" => "This paper aims at investigating the coordination of fiscal policies within the European Monetary Union. In a two-country model of monetary union under a flexible exchange rate with the rest of the world and perfect capital mobility, increased public spending would be favourable to employment in the originating country, but would harm the other one via exports crowding out. It is shown that, despite sanctions for spendthrift governments, in a one shot game discretion is the dominant strategy and entails a Pareto inefficient outcome , with no employment gains but with excessive public deficits. The sanction is thus ineffective. However, in a game where policymakers have a multi-period decision horizon, the cooperative outcome may emerge spontaneously, even in the absence of a supranational coercion scheme. The sanction is thus useless."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
88 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6321
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8523"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8523"
"slug" => "why-business-schools-do-so-much-research-a-signaling-explanation"
"yearMonth" => "2008-01"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., FARIA, J.R. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FARIA J.R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Information imparfaite"
1 => "Managment de la recherche"
2 => "Recherche en économie et gestion"
3 => "Signalisation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article explique la montée en puissance de l'activité de recherche dans les business schools en tant que stratégie de signalisation. Certains équilibres s'accompagnent d'un excès de recherche par rapport à la situation d'information parfaite."
"en" => "In the last years business schools have made substantial efforts to enhance their research output. This paper submits the idea according to which this strong research emphasis is an equilibrium signaling strategy, that, in some cases, can be socially inefficient."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
89 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6322
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8529"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8529"
"slug" => "working-time-and-unemployment-in-an-efficiency-wage-model"
"yearMonth" => "1999-11"
"year" => "1999"
"title" => "Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1999). <i>Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Comme l'indique l'analyse de Shapiro et Stiglitz (1984), lorsque la surveillance parfaite des travailleurs est impossible, les entreprises sont incitées à payer un salaire supérieur au salaire walrassien pour inciter ceux-ci à fournir un maximum d'efforts. Ce texte étudie la décision du travailleur en relation avec la compensation salariale et avec la durée du travail. Nous mettons en relief l'existence d'un taux de chômage positif à l'équilibre de cette économie et nous étudions l'impact sur l'emploi d'une contrainte légale sur l'horaire de travail."
"en" => "As put forward by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), when perfect worker monitoring is impossible, firms may pay higher than Walrasian wages in order to motivate workers not to shirk in the workplace. In this model, we analyze the shirking decision in relation with working time and wage compensation set by the firm. The equilibrium unemployment resulting from the incentive constraints is derived and the model is applied to exploring the effects of binding legislated working time on joblessness."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
90 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6323
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8530"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8530"
"slug" => "working-time-in-a-model-of-wage-hours-negotiation"
"yearMonth" => "1998-07"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "Working Time in a Model of Wage-Hours Negotiation"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1998). <i>Working Time in a Model of Wage-Hours Negotiation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "En général, la théorie des syndicats privilégie l'analyse des négociations portant sur l'emploi et le salaire. Le modèle proposé introduit, à côté du salaire, le temps de travail dans le champ de la négociation. Il prend en compte les coûts fixes du travail et la sensibilité de la productivité à l'horaire. Dans une première partie, le modèle nous permet d'analyser les termes du contrat de travail librement négocié. Dans une seconde partie, nous établissons une relation importante entre la contrainte d'horaire et l'emploi effectif."
"en" => "Most bargaining models of the trade union focus on employment and wage determination. In this text, working time is included in the set of negotiated variables, the 'right to manage' of the firm being limited to employment decision. The model allows for time-varying effectiveness of workers and fixed costs of labor. After analyzing the general terms of the labor contract in this economy, the relationship between legal working time and effective employment is brought out."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
91 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6324
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8657"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8657"
"slug" => "why-dont-french-people-trust-free-markets"
"yearMonth" => "2014-04"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Why Don’t French People Trust Free Markets?"
"description" => "GUYOT, M. et VRANCEANU, R. (2014). Why Don’t French People Trust Free Markets? <i>Points of View - ESSEC Knowledge</i>."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GUYOT Marc"
"bid" => "B00000236"
"slug" => "guyot-marc"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles ou vidéos de vulgarisation"
"en" => "Press article, video or other popular media"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Presse"
"en" => "Press"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-11-29T12:22:10.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.5160046
+"parent": null
}
92 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#6325
# 
