Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206
#_id: "B00000524"
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"academId" => "2092"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
"fullName" => "Radu VRANCEANU"
"lastName" => "VRANCEANU"
"firstName" => "Radu"
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]
"email" => "vranceanu@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+33 (0)1 34 43 31 83"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "2092"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/vranceanu-radu/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tEKz0_sAAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2050-8269"
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2228
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]
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]
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2229
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2230
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2231
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4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2232
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5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2233
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6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2234
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7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2235
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8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2236
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9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2237
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2208
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2210
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2207
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2211
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"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => "<p>Radu Vranceanu est professeur d'économie à l'ESSEC et chercheur associé au THEMA (CNRS). Docteur en économie de l'Université de Paris 2, HDR, il a développé une expertise dans l'analyse des inefficacités informationnelles et la formation des anticipations. Il a réalisé des études appliquées aux problèmes aussi variés que les crises financières et de change, politiques monétaire et de dette publique, gestion de la recherche, le contrat de travail, économie de la santé, etc. Il est également engagé dans la recherche en économie expérimentale. Radu Vranceanu a une expérience de fonctionnaire international auprès de la Commission Economique pour l'Europe des Nations Unies. Il a dirigé la recherche à l'ESSEC pendant des nombreuses années. Il est à présent le Référent à l'Intégrité Scientifique de l'ESSEC.</p>\n"
"en" => "<p>Radu Vranceanu is Professor of Economics at ESSEC Business School and a research fellow with THEMA (CNRS) research center. He holds a Doctorate in Economics from the University of Paris II, HDR, and is widely recognized as having special expertise in the theory of expectations and the analysis of informational inefficiencies, which he has applied to various fields including financial and banking crises, monetary and public debt policies, research management, labor contracts, defense and health economics. He is also a contributor to research in experimental economics. In 2000-2001 Radu Vranceanu worked for the UN Economic Commission for Europe; he also served as a Dean for Research of ESSEC Business School for many years. Since 2020, he has been the ESSEC representative for scientific integrity (RIS).</p>\n"
]
"department" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Economics"
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"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2050-8269"
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"en" => "Economics of information - Economic modelling - Experimental economics - Work - macro and general economic analysis"
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2222
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1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2224
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2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2225
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3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2227
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4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2226
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5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2223
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"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2216
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2002-01-01"
"endDate" => "2002-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Professional activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet financé par l'IER et l'UE : Deregulating International Movements of Capital in Romania"
"en" => "IER and EU financed project: Deregulating International Movements of Capital in Romania"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2217
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2003-01-01"
"endDate" => "2004-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Professional activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Projet financé par l'IER et l'UE : "Romanian monetary policy and institutions: Meeting the EU challenge""
"en" => "IER and EU financed project: "Romanian monetary policy and institutions: Meeting the EU challenge""
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2218
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2005-01-01"
"endDate" => "2005-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Professional activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Financing defense firms in France (and Europe), une étude sous la coordination de M. Guille et J. Belin, Université Paris 2, financée par le Ministère Français de la Défense"
"en" => "Financing defense firms in France (and Europe), a study under the coordination of M. Guille et J. Belin, Paris 2 University, financed by the French Ministry of Defense"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2219
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2006-01-01"
"endDate" => "2006-12-31"
"year" => null
"uuid" => "502"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités professionnelles"
"en" => "Professional activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Consulting"
"en" => "Consulting"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Expert Indépendant pour la Commission Européenne et OSB Consulting (Autriche) - Peer Review de "Incentives for indefinite contracts in Spain""
"en" => "Independent Expert for the European Commission and the OSB Consulting (Austria) - Peer Review on "Incentives for indefinite contracts in Spain""
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2220
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2002-01-01"
"endDate" => "2003-12-31"
"year" => "2002"
"uuid" => "103"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Research activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture"
"en" => "Editorial Board Membership"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre du comité de lecture - Economic Systems"
"en" => "Editorial board membership - Economic Systems"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2221
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"startDate" => "2007-01-01"
"endDate" => null
"year" => null
"uuid" => "103"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
"en" => "Research activities"
]
"subType" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture"
"en" => "Editorial Board Membership"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre d'un comité de lecture - Global Economy Journal"
"en" => "Board of the journal - Global Economy Journal"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
]
"theses" => array:6 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2238
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2005"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2005"
"student" => "BEN LAKHDAR C."
"firstJob" => "Professor, University of Lille"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
"en" => "Efficacité des relations contractuelles face aux défaillances du système de brevet biotechnologique"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2239
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2007"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2007"
"student" => "MANGOT M."
"firstJob" => "Free-lance consultant"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
"en" => "Choix intertemporels : un modèle comportemental d'escompte quasi-hyperbolique"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2240
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2009"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2009"
"student" => "NAIDITCH C."
"firstJob" => "Lecturer, University of Lille"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
"en" => "Trois essais sur les tranferts de fonds des migrants"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2241
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2016"
"startDate" => "2011"
"endDate" => "2016"
"student" => "PEIA Oana"
"firstJob" => "Assistant Professor - University College Dublin School of Economics"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
"en" => "Four essays on finance and the real economy"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2242
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2004"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2004"
"student" => "ROMANIUK K."
"firstJob" => "Professor, China"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
"en" => "Economic and financial analyses of pension funds"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2243
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2012"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2012"
"student" => "VALAT E."
"firstJob" => "Researcher, INED"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
"en" => "Social contacts and matching in the labour market: theoretical and empirical essays"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
"en" => "Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2206}
}
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:23.000Z"
"contributions" => array:396 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2245
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "515"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "515"
"slug" => "facta-non-verba-an-experiment-on-pledging-and-giving"
"yearMonth" => "2018-04"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "‘‘Facta Non Verba”: An Experiment on Pledging and Giving"
"description" => "SUTAN, A., GROLLEAU, G., MATEU, G. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). ‘‘Facta Non Verba”: An Experiment on Pledging and Giving. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 65, pp. 1-15."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "MATEU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Donations"
1 => "Experimentation"
2 => "Jeu du Dictateur"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:35:42"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322948553_Facta_Non_Verba_an_experiment_on_pledging_and_giving"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-15"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge."
"en" => "We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2247
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "758"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "758"
"slug" => "capitalisme-2018-le-changement-dans-la-continuite"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Capitalisme 2018 : le changement dans la continuité"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2009). Capitalisme 2018 : le changement dans la continuité. <i>Entreprises 2018</i>, pp. 67."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Capitalisme"
1 => "Prospective"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "67"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une perspective économique sur l'évolution à long terme des sociétés occidentales."
"en" => "An economic perspective about the long-run evolution of Western societies."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2249
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "550"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "550"
"slug" => "a-matching-model-of-the-academic-publication-market"
"yearMonth" => "2011-12"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 167(4), pp. 708-725."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Appariement"
1 => "Éditeur"
2 => "Information imparfaite"
3 => "Publications académiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/41474931"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "708-725"
"volume" => "167"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article proposé un modèle d'appariement pour décrire le fonctionnement du marché des publications académiques. Nous étudions la détermination des frais de soumission d'articles, la tension sur le marché et le taux de rejets d'articles."
"en" => "This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals' editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2246
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "554"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "554"
"slug" => "a-model-of-scholarly-publishing-with-hybrid-economic-journals"
"yearMonth" => "2017-01"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "A Model of Scholarly Publishing with Hybrid Economic Journals"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). A Model of Scholarly Publishing with Hybrid Economic Journals. <i>Theory and Decision</i>, 82(1), pp. 131-150."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Diffusion des connaissances"
1 => "Open access"
2 => "Secteur de la publication académique"
3 => "Signalisation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281185445_A_model_of_scholarly_publishing_with_hybrid_academic_journals"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "131-150"
"volume" => "82"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le nouveau modèle économique mis en place par les grandes maisons d'édition académique en 2013, consistant à proposer aux choix des auteurs de soumettre leurs articles en regime "accès libre ouvert à tous sur Internet" (open access) moyennant un paiement substantiel, ou dans le regime ancien dont l’accès est reservé aux abonnés de la revue. Nous étudions le problème de signalisation des auteurs, et la maximisation du profit par les éditeurs (screening)."
"en" => "In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access (OA) track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might now use a publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors and readers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house should choose an open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals' accessibility and quality profiles."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2250
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "556"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "556"
"slug" => "a-model-of-working-time-under-utility-competition-in-the-labor-market"
"yearMonth" => "1998-01"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "A Model of Working Time under Utility Competition in the Labor Market"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1998). A Model of Working Time under Utility Competition in the Labor Market. <i>Journal of Economics</i>."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose un modèle explicatif de la durée du travail et du taux de salaire dans une économie décentralisée avec une population de travailleurs homogènes. L'analyse néoclassique de l'horaire optimal est généralisée par l'introduction de fonctions de production fondées sur l'efficacité du travail et d'une structure de coûts complexe. Le modèle permet d'étudier l'impact d'une contrainte d'horaire sur l'effectif du travail et sur le niveau d'activité."
"en" => "The article offers a model of wage and working-time setting by profit-maximizing firms in a competitive labor market with homogeneous workers. Emphasis is placed on the role played by both fixed costs of labor and workers' varying effectiveness in time. Competition among firms implies a constraint on the utility level associated to the labor contract. The model contributes to explain insiders' rationing and other contemporary stylized facts, and lends itself to a particular approach to the problem of evaluating the consequences of mandatory working-time reductions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2244
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "567"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "567"
"slug" => "a-note-on-cooperative-strategies-in-gladiators-games"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "A Note on Cooperative Strategies in Gladiators’ Games"
"description" => "BALLET, J., BAZIN, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). A Note on Cooperative Strategies in Gladiators’ Games. <i>Games</i>, 4(2), pp. 200-207."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BALLET J."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BAZIN D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Sustainable competition"
1 => "Cooperation rule"
2 => "Gladiatorial combat"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-28 01:00:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/2/200"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "200-207"
"volume" => "4"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie les stratégies coopératives dans les combats de gladiateurs de la Rome Antique, sous la forme d'un jeu non-coopératif. Nous étudions les conditions qui grantissent la soutenabilité du spectacle."
"en" => "Gladiatorial combat was in reality a lot less lethal than it is depicted in the cinema. This short paper highlights how cooperative strategies could have prevailed in the arenas, which is generally what happened during the Games. Cooperation in the arena corresponded to a situation of the professionalization of gladiators, who had been trained in gladiatorial schools. This case provides an analogy of the conditions under which cooperation occurs in a context of competition between rival companies."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2248
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "585"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "585"
"slug" => "a-trade-union-model-with-endogeneous-militancy-interpreting-the-french-case"
"yearMonth" => "1999-01"
"year" => "1999"
"title" => "A Trade Union Model with Endogeneous Militancy: Interpreting the French Case"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1999). A Trade Union Model with Endogeneous Militancy: Interpreting the French Case. <i>Labour Economics</i>, pp. 355-373."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "355-373"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose un modèle du marché du travail avec des syndicats, qui met en évidence certaines caractéristiques du contexte institutionnel français. Le modèle repose sur trois hypothèses : l'entreprise accepte de payer une prime pour éviter le risque de grève, les agents maximisent leur espérance de revenu et le dirigeant syndical cherche la taille optimale du syndicat compte tenu de gains associés à une forte représentatitivité mais aussi de coûts de gestion croissants avec le nombre d'adhérents. Sous ces hypothèses, on vérifie l'existence d'un équilibre non-walrasien dans lequel taux de salaire, emploi, taille et agressivité du syndicat sont simultanément déterminés."
"en" => "This paper aims to provide a simple trade union model which highlights some of the distinctive institutional features of French unionism. The model focuses on the determinants of militancy and membership in a frictionless economy. It is shown that a non-Walrasian labour market equilibrium exists wherein real wages, employment, union size and militancy are jointly determined. In comparative statics, the model predicts a negative relationship between militancy and membership."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2251
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "621"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "621"
"slug" => "an-attitude-model-of-environmental-action-evidence-from-developing-and-developed-countries"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "An Attitude Model of Environmental Action: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries"
"description" => "DAVINO, C., ESPOSITO VINZI, V., SANTACREU VASUT, E. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). An Attitude Model of Environmental Action: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries. <i>Social Indicators Research</i>, 143(2), pp. 811-838."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "ESPOSITO VINZI Vincenzo"
"bid" => "B00067049"
"slug" => "esposito-vinzi-vincenzo"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SANTACREU VASUT Estefania"
"bid" => "B00318975"
"slug" => "santacreu-vasut-estefania"
]
2 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAVINO Cristina"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Environmental attitudes"
1 => "Development"
2 => "Culture"
3 => "Multivariate analysis"
4 => "Partial least squares"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11205-018-1983-3"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "811-838"
"volume" => "143"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes the determinants of stated individual support towards environmental action. The analysis is realized by means of an original Partial Least Squares Path model of Environmental Awareness-Social Capital-Action and it is based on survey data provided in the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2009) regarding 34.612 individuals from 42 different countries. Besides the global estimates obtained on the whole set of countries, the paper proposes a subsample analysis for developed and developing countries, as well as country analyses for four major economies: China, India, Germany and the United States. We find that environmental awareness and trust in not-for-profit organizations are important determinants of individual action in support of environmentally friendly policies. In general, trust in science and technology does not crowd-out individual support towards the environment."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the determinants of stated individual support towards environmental action. The analysis is realized by means of an original Partial Least Squares Path model of Environmental Awareness-Social Capital-Action and it is based on survey data provided in the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2009) regarding 34.612 individuals from 42 different countries. Besides the global estimates obtained on the whole set of countries, the paper proposes a subsample analysis for developed and developing countries, as well as country analyses for four major economies: China, India, Germany and the United States. We find that environmental awareness and trust in not-for-profit organizations are important determinants of individual action in support of environmentally friendly policies. In general, trust in science and technology does not crowd-out individual support towards the environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2252
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "709"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "709"
"slug" => "banks-risk-race-a-signaling-explanation"
"yearMonth" => "2011-05"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Banks' Risk Race: A Signaling Explanation. <i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i>, 20(4), pp. 784-791."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Banking sector"
1 => "Risk strategy"
2 => "Signaling"
3 => "Imperfect information"
4 => "The Great Recession"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1059056011000219"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "784-791"
"volume" => "20"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la course au risque dans laquelle les banques étaient engagées avant la Grande Récession, à travers un jeu de signalisation en information imparfaite."
"en" => "Many observers argue that one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 recession was the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks. This paper provides a signaling explanation for this race for risk. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, the less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the more efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2253
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "750"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "750"
"slug" => "can-incentives-for-research-harm-research-a-business-schools-tale"
"yearMonth" => "2008-05"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools' Tale"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools' Tale. <i>Journal of Socio-Economics</i>, 37(3), pp. 1248-1265."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Classement"
1 => "Incitation"
2 => "Marchés des puiblications"
3 => "Revues académiques"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1248-1265"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article met en avant quelques effets négatifs qui peuvent se manifester lorsque les incitations à la publication dans les revues d'excellence sont renforcées."
"en" => "This paper develops a simple model of the market for the academic publications in economics and business administration. We put forward several unpleasant consequences that may come with more powerful incentives for publication in top-tier journals"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "780"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "780"
"slug" => "chomage-structurel-et-emploi-dans-les-economies-en-transition"
"yearMonth" => "1996-03"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Chômage structurel et emploi dans les économies en transition"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). Chômage structurel et emploi dans les économies en transition. <i>Revue française d'économie</i>, pp. 3-28."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "3-28"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les économies en transition ont entrepris une formidable transformation organisationnelle dont l'impact sur le marché du travail est non moins formidable. Le modèle que nous proposons analyse les facteurs structurels qui influent sur le taux de chômage, mais aussi sur l'emploi et le salaire dans les trois secteurs qui constituent notre vision de ces économies. Sont ainsi étudiés l'impact de la privatisation et de la réforme des entreprises, des indemnités de chômage et du salaire minimum. Les implications de politique économique qui peuvent en découler sont ensuite discutées."
"en" => "Transitional economies undertake an outstanding transformation of their organizational system which leads to significant changes in their labor market. The proposed model analyses the structural factors that affect total unemployment, but also employment and wages in three different economic sub-sectors. The impact of privatization and company reform, of unemployment benefits and minimum wage laws are thus analysed. Conclusions are finally drawn about the economic policy that results from these changes."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2810"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2810"
"slug" => "une-crise-de-confiance"
"yearMonth" => "2009-05"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Une crise de confiance"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2009). Une crise de confiance. <i>Sociétal</i>, 64(2), pp. 11-26."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Confiance"
1 => "Crise financière"
2 => "Politique économique"
3 => "Système bancaire"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:03"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "11-26"
"volume" => "64"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article décrit les moments critiques de la crise de 2007-2009, présente les politiques mises en oeuvre pour lutter contre cette crise, et popose quelques pistes d'explication de ce phénomène."
"en" => "The paper presents the critical moments of the 2007-2009 crisis, the counter-cylcical policies and provides some clues for an explanation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "841"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "841"
"slug" => "competitive-compensation-and-subjective-well-being-the-effect-of-culture-and-gender"
"yearMonth" => "2019-01"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Competitive Compensation and Subjective Well-being: The Effect of Culture and Gender"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Competitive Compensation and Subjective Well-being: The Effect of Culture and Gender. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 70, pp. 90-108."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG SeEun"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Experiments"
1 => "Tournament"
2 => "Subjective well-being"
3 => "Productivity"
4 => "Culture; Gender"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167487017306396?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "90-108"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper uses a controlled experiment to investigate how subjects exposed to competition in the workplace react in terms of well-being, and how this translates into productivity. The experiment was performed in Korea, a country with an interdependent culture, and France, a country with an independent culture. Exposure to the tournament slightly improves well-being in the Korean sample and decreases it in France. This different response is driven primarily by the opposite response of female subjects, with Korean women liking and French women disliking to compete. Finally, an improvement in well-being is associated with ex-post higher productivity in France, and this positive effect is most salient in the French male population; in Korea, a similar positive effect can be observed only in the female population."
"en" => "This paper uses a controlled experiment to investigate how subjects exposed to competition in the workplace react in terms of well-being, and how this translates into productivity. The experiment was performed in Korea, a country with an interdependent culture, and France, a country with an independent culture. Exposure to the tournament slightly improves well-being in the Korean sample and decreases it in France. This different response is driven primarily by the opposite response of female subjects, with Korean women liking and French women disliking to compete. Finally, an improvement in well-being is associated with ex-post higher productivity in France, and this positive effect is most salient in the French male population; in Korea, a similar positive effect can be observed only in the female population."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "886"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "886"
"slug" => "corporate-profit-entrepreneurship-theory-and-business-ethics"
"yearMonth" => "2014-01"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Corporate Profit, Entrepreneurship Theory and Business Ethics"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2014). Corporate Profit, Entrepreneurship Theory and Business Ethics. <i>Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility</i>, 23(1), pp. 50-68."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Entrepreneurs"
1 => "Éthique des affaires"
2 => "Intérêt général"
3 => "Profit"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/beer.12037"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "50-68"
"volume" => "23"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article s'interroge si la poursuite du profit est on objectif compatible avec la "bonne action" des firmes dans la société."
"en" => "Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. Many large capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so, thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of increasing economic profit is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "901"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "901"
"slug" => "credibility-costs-in-the-monetary-integration-game"
"yearMonth" => "2003-01"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2003). Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game. <i>The Economics of Transition</i>, pp. 727-741."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:07"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "727-741"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article met en relief les coûts de crédibilité engendrés par la procédure actuelle d'admission de nouveaux membres dans l'UEM. Le modèle représente un jeuséquentiel entre le gouvernement et les agents privés. En présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur les priorités du gouvernement, un équilibre Bayesien parfait de type mélangeant peut apparaître. Dans ce cas la politique de monnaie forte ne signale pas le type du gouvernement. Une prime de risque de dévaluation augmente inévitablement le taux d'intérêt."
"en" => "Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two-stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a 'last devaluation', a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "951"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "951"
"slug" => "deceitful-communication-in-a-sender-receiver-experiment-does-everyone-have-a-price"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Deceitful Communication in a Sender-Receiver Experiment: Does Everyone Have a Price?"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et DUBART, D. (2019). Deceitful Communication in a Sender-Receiver Experiment: Does Everyone Have a Price? <i>Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics</i>, 79, pp. 43-52."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Deception"
1 => "Communication strategy"
2 => "Cost of lying"
3 => "Inequality aversion"
4 => "Multiple price list"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-11-09 17:14:32"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214804318303902?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "43-52"
"volume" => "79"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, based on a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384–395: 2005). A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the deception premium asked by an individual to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The results show that, depending on payoffs, 71% of the subjects will switch at most once. Among them, 40% appear to be either ”ethical” or ”spiteful”. The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this deception premium is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for behaving well."
"en" => "This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, based on a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384–395: 2005). A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the deception premium asked by an individual to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The results show that, depending on payoffs, 71% of the subjects will switch at most once. Among them, 40% appear to be either ”ethical” or ”spiteful”. The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this deception premium is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for behaving well."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "957"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "957"
"slug" => "default-on-sustainable-public-debt-illiquidity-suspect-convicted"
"yearMonth" => "2004-01"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => "Default on Sustainable Public Debt: Illiquidity Suspect Convicted"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNK, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2004). Default on Sustainable Public Debt: Illiquidity Suspect Convicted. <i>Economics Letters</i>, pp. 205-211."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNK K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "205-211"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une dette publique est réputée soutenable si sa valeur ne dépasse pas le flux de revenus futurs actualisés. Nous montrons que ce principe ne s'applique pas si le gouvernement ne dispose que d'un contrôle imparfait de ses revenus. En présence d'incertitude, un faible risque d'insoutenabilité engendre un fort risque d'illiquidité. Le seuil d'endettement compatible avec l'absence de défaut est bien plus bas que le seuil communément admis."
"en" => "According to a well-established economic principle, any public debt that does not exceed the discounted stream of future primary surpluses should find buyers. This paper argues why this principle may not hold if the government has only imperfect control over its net income flow. A small risk of unsustainability appears to be at the origin of a much larger risk of illiquidity. Solving the model for the rational expectations equilibrium, we find that the maximum debt level that investors are willing to hold may be much lower than the commonly used sustainable level,"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "980"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "980"
"slug" => "dette-publique-du-risque-dinsoutenabilite-au-risque-dilliquidite"
"yearMonth" => "2003-07"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Dette publique : du risque d'insoutenabilité au risque d'illiquidité"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2003). Dette publique : du risque d'insoutenabilité au risque d'illiquidité. <i>Revue Economique</i>, pp. 773-784."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "773-784"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie le risque de défaut associé à la dette publique comme la conséquence de l'interaction entre l'Etat et les prêteurs privés. Dans ce modèle, l'Etat ne dispose que d'un contrôle imparfait des finances publiques. Une suite de chocs budgétaires peut alors porter la dette au-delà du seuil de soutenabilité, seuil communément défini par la valeur actualisée au taux sans risque des excédents futurs. Ce risque d'insoutenabilité génère en retour un important risque d'illiquidité associé au refus des investisseurs de renouveler leurs engagements. Au terme de cette étude, le niveau maximal d'endettement acceptable par les investisseurs se révèle potentiellement très inférieur au seuil de soutenabilité."
"en" => "This paper analyses public debt sustainability in a stochastic environment. The model is cast as a repeated game between the government and private investors. A small risk of unsustainability may bring about a much larger risk of illiquidity. The main conclusion calls for as a redefinition of what can be seen as a "sound" fiscal stance."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1015"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1015"
"slug" => "do-people-contribute-more-to-intra-temporal-or-inter-temporal-public-goods"
"yearMonth" => "2016-03"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2016). Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods? <i>Research in Economics</i>, 70(1), pp. 186-195."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dynamic public goods"
1 => "Inter-temporal transfers"
2 => "Voluntary contribution mechanism"
3 => "Contribution vs. investment"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:37:37"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944315000290?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "186-195"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous présentons les résultats d'une expérience réalisée autour d'un jeu du bien public dynamique, où les transfers augmentent la consommation des generations suivantes, que nous comparons avec un jeu repeté du bien public classique. Les contributions au bien public sont plus importantes dans le contexte dynamique que dans le contexte classique."
"en" => "We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a given round provides benefits to other individuals in the next round, and the individual himself benefits from investments in the public good made by his current group members in the previous round. Subjects turn out to be more generous in this inter-temporal context, than in a standard public goods experiment where contributions and transfers are exchanged at the same period. Furthermore, when known, benefits from the past investment are positively related to the individual's current investment in the public good."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1022"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1022"
"slug" => "dollar-debt-in-developing-countries-too-much-of-a-good-thing"
"yearMonth" => "2006-01"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Dollar Debt in Developing Countries: Too Much of a Good Thing?"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). Dollar Debt in Developing Countries: Too Much of a Good Thing? <i>Global Economy Journal</i>, pp. 1-18."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dette privée"
1 => "Dollarisation des créances"
2 => "Economies émergentes"
3 => "Signalisation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:11"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-18"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie la dollarization des créances du secteur privé dans les économies émergentes dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation. Les bonnes firmes seraient tentées de subir un coût administratif élevé associé à l'endettement en devises uniquement pour signaler leur type. Malheureusement, si la baisse du taux d'intérêt qui s'ensuit est significative, les mauvaises firmes ont intérêt à adopter la même stratégie , la dollarisation devient complète et l'efficacité du signal disparaît."
"en" => "In the early 2000s, many developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia presented substantial corporate dollar debts. This paper suggests an explanation for this worrisome phenomenon, which builds on the traditional signalling approach. If lenders have no direct possibility to infer a firm's financial status, solid firms might want to borrow dollars and bear a high clearance cost just in order to signal their type. When dollar borrowing clearance costs are relatively small with respect to the clearance cost of borrowing in the local currency, fragile firm would adopt the same strategy and the whole corporate sector would opt for liability dollarization. The signalling effect vanishes."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1056"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1056"
"slug" => "economies-emergentes-lincompatibilite-entre-changes-flexibles-et-dettes-en-devises"
"yearMonth" => "2006-07"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Economies émergentes : l'incompatibilité entre changes flexibles et dettes en devises"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). Economies émergentes : l'incompatibilité entre changes flexibles et dettes en devises. <i>Revue d'économie politique</i>, pp. 556-574."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Anticipations rationnelles"
1 => "Changes flexibles"
2 => "Dette en dollars"
3 => "Economie internationale"
4 => "Rational Expectations"
5 => "Taux de change"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "556-574"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article s'intéresse à l'adoption d'un régime de changes flexibles par un pays émergent dont le secteur qui produit des biens non-échangeables est fortement endetté en dollars. On démontre qu'un faible risque d'insolvabilité peut engendrer un risque d'illiquidité très significatif."
"en" => "Many developing countries consider the case for increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates, while they hold substantial corporate dollar debts. We argue that, in this context, a small risk of insolvency may bring about a much larger risk of illiquidity."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1090"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1090"
"slug" => "emu-optimal-fiscal-strategy-and-the-punishment-effectiveness"
"yearMonth" => "2001-08"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et WARIN, T. (2001). EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness. <i>Review of International Economics</i>, pp. 494-504."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "WARIN T."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "494-504"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous nous interrogeons sur la capacité du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance à bloquer de manière efficace les dérapages budgétaires des pays membres de l'UME. La réponse est négative si le problème est posé dans le cadre d'un jeu à une période. Cependant, dans le cadre d'un jeu à plusieurs périodes, le pacte apparaît comme inutile."
"en" => "This paper investigates the ability of the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent governments in the "euro zone" from running excessive budget deficits. It is shown that in a static two-country game, the Pareto-optimal strategy of no excess deficits cannot be systematically enforced, whatever the toughness of the sanction under the Pact. However, in a multiperiod setting, the Pareto-optimal configuration of no excess deficits would prevail even if no sanctions were applied to deviant governments. In this case, neither a heavily punitive SGP, nor a centralized budget appears to be helpful in the EMU context."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1104"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1104"
"slug" => "equilibrium-dishonesty"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "Equilibrium (dis)honesty"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). Equilibrium (dis)honesty. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, pp. 232-249."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Comportement des managers"
1 => "Fraude"
2 => "Information comptable"
3 => "PCAOB"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "232-249"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la production de rapports financièrs frauduleux dans un modèle qui présente les caractéristiques essentielles du marché US de l'information financière des entreprises cotées. On montre que, à l'équilibre, non seulement les managers qui dirigent des firmes de moins bonne qualité, mais aussi ceux qui dirigent des firmes performantes ont intérêt à produire des rapport faux."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the production of fraudulent financial statements in a model featuring the main characteristics of the US corporate information market. It is shown that, in equilbrium, not only managers at the head of bad firms, but also some of those running good firms may resort to dishonest reporting."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1105"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1105"
"slug" => "equilibrium-migration-with-invested-remittances-the-eeca-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2010-12"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Equilibrium migration with invested remittances: The EECA evidence"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2010). Equilibrium migration with invested remittances: The EECA evidence. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>, 26(4), pp. 454-474."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Migration"
1 => "Remittances"
2 => "Investment motive"
3 => "Migration policy"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268010000315"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "454-474"
"volume" => "26"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes international migration when migrants invest part of their income in their country of origin. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium exists. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in migrant income, lead to an increase in optimal invested remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the country of origin. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, emigrants' optimal invested remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates reveal a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to estimated invested remittances per migrant in the range of [0.3; 0.7]."
"en" => "This paper analyzes international migration when migrants invest part of their income in their country of origin. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium exists. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in migrant income, lead to an increase in optimal invested remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the country of origin. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, emigrants' optimal invested remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates reveal a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to estimated invested remittances per migrant in the range of [0.3; 0.7]."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2268
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1142"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1142"
"slug" => "european-defence-firms-the-information-barrier-on-private-finance"
"yearMonth" => "2006-02"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "European Defence Firms: The Information Barrier on Private Finance"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2006). European Defence Firms: The Information Barrier on Private Finance. <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>, pp. 23-36."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Equilibre Bayesian"
1 => "Financement privé"
2 => "Firme de défense européenne"
3 => "Information asymétrique"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "23-36"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Après la chute du mur de Berlin, les gouvernements européens ont décidé d'augmenter l'autonomie du secteur industriel de la défense. Dans ce contexte, il devient essentiel de stimuler l'accès des firmes de la défense au financement privé. Cet article étudie ce problème sous la forme d'un jeu à information incomplète entre firmes de la défense et investisseurs privés."
"en" => "After the fall of the Berlin wall, European governments adopted a hands-off policy towards the defense industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector's efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. In the paper, the problem is analyzed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2269
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1143"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1143"
"slug" => "european-defence-the-cost-of-partial-integration"
"yearMonth" => "2001-01"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "European Defence: The Cost of Partial Integration"
"description" => "GUYOT, M. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). European Defence: The Cost of Partial Integration. <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>, pp. 157-174."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GUYOT Marc"
"bid" => "B00000236"
"slug" => "guyot-marc"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "157-174"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la production du service de défense nationale en présence d'externalités trans-frontalières. L'accroissement de la confiance dans ses alliés peut pousser un pays à réduire son propre effort de défense. A l'équilibre non-coopératif, l'effort global de défense est sous-optimal. En absence d'un système de défense européen, une solution pragmatique consiste à assigner des limites de dépense militaire minimales aux pays membres de l'UE."
"en" => "This paper analyses the decentralized production of defence services when cross-border spillin effects are at work. Citizens would welcome an increase in defence production, but this outcome might be achieved only with a centralized production of defence services. A temporary pragmatic solution would consist in assigning appropriate minimum defence spending targets."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2270
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1171"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1171"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-bank-runs-with-uncertain-deposit-coverage"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Bank Runs with Uncertain Deposit Coverage"
"description" => "PEIA, O. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Experimental Evidence on Bank Runs with Uncertain Deposit Coverage. <i>Journal of Banking & Finance</i>, 106(3), pp. 214-226."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEIA Oana"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Bank runs"
1 => "Deposit insurance"
2 => "Coordination games"
3 => "Global games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426619301475"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "214-226"
"volume" => "106"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies depositor behavior in a bank run experiment with partial deposit insurance. In the experiment, depositors face two forms of uncertainty regarding their deposit coverage in the event of a bank run: (i) “intrinsic” uncertainty related to the size of the deposit insurance fund, and (ii) “strategic” uncertainty, as the actual coverage depends on the number of depositors who run on the bank. We consider three scenarios that differ in the way the deposit insurance scheme reimburses depositors. The results show that intrinsic uncertainty on its own has a negligible effect on the number of bank runs. However, when combined, the two forms of uncertainty exert a significant impact on the propensity to withdraw and result in a large number of bank runs. Moreover, runs are more frequent when leaving funds in the bank is an increasingly costly strategy."
"en" => "This paper studies depositor behavior in a bank run experiment with partial deposit insurance. In the experiment, depositors face two forms of uncertainty regarding their deposit coverage in the event of a bank run: (i) “intrinsic” uncertainty related to the size of the deposit insurance fund, and (ii) “strategic” uncertainty, as the actual coverage depends on the number of depositors who run on the bank. We consider three scenarios that differ in the way the deposit insurance scheme reimburses depositors. The results show that intrinsic uncertainty on its own has a negligible effect on the number of bank runs. However, when combined, the two forms of uncertainty exert a significant impact on the propensity to withdraw and result in a large number of bank runs. Moreover, runs are more frequent when leaving funds in the bank is an increasingly costly strategy."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2271
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1172"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1172"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-gender-differences-in-lying-behaviour"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Gender Differences in Lying Behaviour"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). Experimental Evidence on Gender Differences in Lying Behaviour. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 68(5), pp. 859-873."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-06 16:19:05"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2017-5-page-859.htm"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "859-873"
"volume" => "68"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article présente des résultats issus d’un jeu de l’ultimatum avec information asymétrique, dans lequel les offreurs peuvent transmettre aux receveurs des messages non vérifiables quant à leur dotation initiale. Les sujets sont repartis pour former soit des groupes mixtes, soit des groupes homogènes en termes de genre. Dans chaque paire, les individus prennent connaissance du genre de leur partenaire. Dans les faits, la plupart des offreurs mentent, pour communiquer une dotation inférieure à la dotation réelle. Le genre du partenaire ne semble pas avoir un impact significatif sur la fréquence du recours au mensonge. Cependant, lorsqu’ils mentent, les hommes recourent à de plus grands mensonges que les femmes, et cette déviation entre dotation réelle et dotation déclarée est la plus forte lorsque les hommes sont appariés avec des femmes. Dans le partage concret de la dotation, les offres des hommes s’avèrent supérieures à celles des femmes. Enfin, dans le rôle de receveurs, les hommes présentent un taux moyen d’acceptation des offres inférieur à celui des femmes."
"en" => "The paper reports the results of an ultimatum game experiment with asymmetric information where proposers can send responders misleading information about their endowments. We allow all possible gender combinations in the proposer-responder pairs. In the pairs, the players’ genders are common knowledge. Proposers’ messages that underestimate the actual amount are widespread. Gender interaction has little impact on the frequency of lying. However, men tend to state bigger lies than women, and state the largest lies when paired with a woman. On average, men make higher offers than women, and also have lower acceptance rates, particularly when they are paired with women."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2272
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1173"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1173"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-the-insidious-illiquidity-risk"
"yearMonth" => "2014-12"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2014). Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk. <i>Research in Economics</i>, 68(4), pp. 315-323."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Coordination game"
1 => "Illiquidity risk"
2 => "Threshold strategy"
3 => "Overconfidence"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944313000525"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "315-323"
"volume" => "68"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une expérience dans laquelle un groupe d'investisseurs doivent se coordonner pour participer à un projet risqué. Au risque intrinsèque du projet s'ajoute donc le risque stratégique. Nous montrons que dans un premier temps les investisseurs ont tendance à sous-évaluer le risque stratégique."
"en" => "This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place. Hence strategic uncertainty compounds its effect with the "intrinsic risk" of the project. Results confirm the insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a first collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects. After a first default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on a relatively low intrinsic risk above which they refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2273
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5257"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5257"
"slug" => "inflation-targeting-between-rhetoric-and-reality-the-case-of-transition-economies"
"yearMonth" => "2004-09"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => ""Inflation Targeting" Between Rhetoric and Reality. The Case of Transition Economies"
"description" => "DAIANU, D., LUNGU, L. et VRANCEANU, R. (2004). "Inflation Targeting" Between Rhetoric and Reality. The Case of Transition Economies."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "LUNGU L."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1206"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1206"
"slug" => "fear-of-novelty-a-model-of-scientific-discovery-with-strategic-uncertainty"
"yearMonth" => "2015-01"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty. <i>Economic Inquiry</i>, 53(2), pp. 1132-1139."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Economie des sciences"
1 => "Global games"
2 => "Jeu de coordinnation"
3 => "Recherche"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12200"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1132-1139"
"volume" => "53"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une étude sur l'adoption des nouvelles idées scientifiques, qui fait apparaître une logique de conformisme. Le problème est étudié sous la forme d'un « global game »."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1216"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1216"
"slug" => "financial-architecture-and-manager-dishonesty-lessons-from-us-corporate-scandals"
"yearMonth" => "2005-01"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "Financial Architecture and Manager Dishonesty: Lessons from US Corporate Scandals"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2005). Financial Architecture and Manager Dishonesty: Lessons from US Corporate Scandals. <i>Acta Oeconomica</i>, pp. 1-22."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:16"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-22"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une analyse des facteurs économiques qui ont contribué à la prolifération des comportements managériaux non éthiques pendant la bulle Internet aux Etats-Unis. Il contient un commentaire sur la loi Sarbanes-Oxley et les mesures adoptées par l'Administration Américaine pour contrecarrer cette tendance."
"en" => "During the US Internet bubble (1995-2001), several top executives dismissed both the law and ethical norms transferring large chunks of company wealth into their own hands. This paper investigates the key economic factors that brought about the proliferation of dishonest managerial behaviour, focussing on the weak internal control, perverse incentives related to managers' compensation schemes and conflicts of interest in the banking and auditing sectors."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1218"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1218"
"slug" => "financial-distress-and-bank-communication-policy-in-crisis-times"
"yearMonth" => "2010-04"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2010). Financial Distress and Bank Communication Policy in Crisis Times. <i>Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting</i>, (1), pp. 5-20."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Financial distress"
1 => "Financial crisis"
2 => "Banks"
3 => "Disclosure"
4 => "Transparency"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-28 01:00:14"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227489745_Financial_Distress_And_Banks'communication_Policy_In_Crisis_Times"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "5-20"
"volume" => ""
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la communication bancaire en temps de crise sous la forme d'un jeu à information imparfaite. Nous montrons qu'une transparence excessive en temps de crise peut augmenter le risque de defaillance des banques."
"en" => "This paper analyzes banks communication policies in crisis times and the role of imperfect information in enhancing banks' financial distress. If banks differ in their exposure to dubious assets, fragile banks may claim to be sound only in order to manipulate investors' expectations. Then sound banks must pay a larger interest rate than in a perfect information set-up. A stronger sanction for false information would improve the situation of the low-risk banks but would deteriorate the situation of the high-risk banks. The total effect on the economy-wide frequency of default of credit institutions is ambiguous. It can be shown that, in some cases, the optimal sanction is lower than the sanction that rules out any manipulatory behavior."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
33 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1219"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1219"
"slug" => "financial-instability-under-a-flexible-exchange-rate"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "Financial Instability under a Flexible Exchange Rate"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). Financial Instability under a Flexible Exchange Rate. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, pp. 291-302."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Anticipations rationnelles"
1 => "Crises financières"
2 => "Dette en dollars"
3 => "PVDs"
4 => "Rational Expectations"
5 => "Taux de change"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "291-302"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article met en relief un risque spécifique qui peut toucher les pays dont les entreprises sont fortement endettées en dollars, lorsque la flexibilité du taux de change augmente. On montre comment un très faible risque d'insolvabilité peut engendrer une crise d'illiquidité."
"en" => "Many governments in developing countries contemplate the possibility of increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates despite having accumulated substantial dollar-denominated debt. Using a model of corporate dollar debt in which the future exchange rate is uncertain, this paper studies the financial risks that might arise as a consequence of increased exchange rate flexibility."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
34 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5315"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5315"
"slug" => "a-model-of-hospital-congestion-in-developing-countries"
"yearMonth" => "2018-12"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "A Model of Hospital Congestion in Developing Countries"
"description" => "BESSANCENOT, D., SIRVEN, N. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). A Model of Hospital Congestion in Developing Countries. Dans: 40ème Journée d'Economie de la Santé Française 2018."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESSANCENOT Damien"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SIRVEN Nicolas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "40ème Journée d'Economie de la Santé Française 2018"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
35 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1242"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1242"
"slug" => "four-myths-and-a-financial-crisis"
"yearMonth" => "2011-03"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Four Myths and a Financial Crisis"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Four Myths and a Financial Crisis. <i>Thunderbird International Business Review</i>, 53(2), pp. 151-171."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Crise financière"
1 => "La Grande Recession"
2 => "Politiques anti-crise"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/tie.20398"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "151-171"
"volume" => "53"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Le récit des faits marquants de la Grande Récession, une étude des politiques et des principaux mécanismes de transmission des chocs."
"en" => "The paper presents the key economic facts, shock propagation mechanisms and policies during the Great Recession."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
36 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5347"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5347"
"slug" => "a-two-country-model-of-high-skill-migration-with-public-education"
"yearMonth" => "2013-06"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "A Two Country Model of High Skill Migration with Public Education"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). A Two Country Model of High Skill Migration with Public Education. Dans: 23rd International Conference of the International Trade and Finance Association."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "23rd International Conference of the International Trade and Finance Association"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
37 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1258"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1258"
"slug" => "gender-interaction-in-teams-experimental-evidence-on-performance-and-punishment-behavior"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior"
"description" => "JUNG, S. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior. <i>Korean Economic Review</i>, 33(1), pp. 95-126."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Gender studies"
1 => "Real-effort task"
2 => "Team production"
3 => "Performance"
4 => "Punishment"
5 => "Discrimination"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-06 16:21:08"
"publicationUrl" => "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2626327"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "95-126"
"volume" => "33"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper reports the results from an experiment where men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a counting task. An individual’s payoff is proportional to the joint production of right answers. Participants who perform better than their partner in the task can punish him or her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the pairs’ gender compositions to analyze whether an individual’s performance and sanctioning behavior depend on his or her gender and the gender of his or her partner, which is revealed to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment. The data show that, conditional on underperformance, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; however, if they are sanctioned, men tend to improve their performances, while women’s performances do not change."
"en" => "This paper reports the results from an experiment where men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a counting task. An individual’s payoff is proportional to the joint production of right answers. Participants who perform better than their partner in the task can punish him or her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the pairs’ gender compositions to analyze whether an individual’s performance and sanctioning behavior depend on his or her gender and the gender of his or her partner, which is revealed to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment. The data show that, conditional on underperformance, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; however, if they are sanctioned, men tend to improve their performances, while women’s performances do not change."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
38 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2282
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1284"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1284"
"slug" => "globalization-and-development-new-evidence-from-central-and-eastern-europe"
"yearMonth" => "2002-01"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Globalization and Development: New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe"
"description" => "CERNAT, L. et VRANCEANU, R. (2002). Globalization and Development: New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. <i>Comparative Economic Studies</i>, pp. 119-136."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "CERNAT L."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "119-136"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Durant les dernières années, les pays d'Europe Centrale et de l'Est ont déréglementé leurs échanges internationaux et ont attiré un volume important d'investissements étrangers. Cet article étudie l'impact de cette ouverture à l'international sur leur croissance économique. L'estimation d'un modèle économétrique avec des données portant sur dix pays et sur dix années montre que l'intégration croissante avec l'UE et la libéralisation des échanges joue un rôle favorable sur le développement. Dans une moindre mesure, l'IDE est aussi favorablement associé au développement."
"en" => "To various degress, Central and Eastern European countries increased their participation to world economy over the last years. In particular, they accepted the challenge of trade openness and attracted significant foreign direct investment. This paper assesses the impact of these major changes on output growth in this region. Results of a panel data analysis suggest that increased EU integration and openness as well as reduced import duties were favourable to development. There is also evidence that increased FDI inflows may be associated with better outpup performances."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
39 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2283
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5403"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5403"
"slug" => "an-experimental-test-of-illiquidity-in-a-random-coordination-game"
"yearMonth" => "2011-08"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "An Experimental Test of Illiquidity in a Random Coordination Game"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). An Experimental Test of Illiquidity in a Random Coordination Game. Dans: Singapore Economic Review Conference 2011."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Singapore Economic Review Conference 2011"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
40 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2284
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1295"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1295"
"slug" => "group-gender-composition-and-economic-decision-making-evidence-from-the-kallystee-business-game"
"yearMonth" => "2018-01"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Group gender composition and economic decision-making: Evidence from the Kallystée business game"
"description" => "LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). Group gender composition and economic decision-making: Evidence from the Kallystée business game. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, 145, pp. 294-305."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
"bid" => "B00278040"
"slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Team decision"
1 => "Gender studies"
2 => "Risk-taking"
3 => "Business game"
4 => "Performance"
5 => "Governance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-19 18:21:58"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268117302615?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "294-305"
"volume" => "145"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by teams of five students selected at random. The design manipulates the gender composition of the boards to allow for all possible gender combinations. Data show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk score of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the team-specific economic performance of teams with four women is still positive and strong. Teams with four women take more risks than the team tolerance to risk score would predict, which suggests some form of team specific action bias or risk-shift."
"en" => "This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by teams of five students selected at random. The design manipulates the gender composition of the boards to allow for all possible gender combinations. Data show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk score of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the team-specific economic performance of teams with four women is still positive and strong. Teams with four women take more risks than the team tolerance to risk score would predict, which suggests some form of team specific action bias or risk-shift."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
41 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2285
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1297"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1297"
"slug" => "growth-patterns-under-imitation-in-the-investment-decision"
"yearMonth" => "2001-01"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Growth Patterns under Imitation in the Investment Decision"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K.V. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). Growth Patterns under Imitation in the Investment Decision. <i>Economic Systems</i>, pp. 51-64."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K.V."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "51-64"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article explique les trajectoires de développement divergentes des pays en voie de développement par les comportements d'imitation des investisseurs étrangers. Sont étudiés différents types de mimétisme et les trajectoires de croissance qui en résultent."
"en" => "Experience shows that developing countries or regions that vary little with respect to their fundamentals sometimes follow different growth paths. Such puzzling facts may occur if less informed international investors imitate those who are well informed about profit opportunities instead of acquiring the relevant information themselves. This paper analyses how the type of mimetic behavior influences the development pattern of an economy where the lack of infrastructure is the main constraint on development. Possible outcomes may be stationary growth, divergent growth or cycles in development."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
42 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2286
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5480"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5480"
"slug" => "bad-equilibria-in-transition-economies-the-role-of-institutions"
"yearMonth" => "2000-09"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Bad Equilibria in Transition Economies. The Role of Institutions"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et DAIANU, D. (2000). Bad Equilibria in Transition Economies. The Role of Institutions."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
43 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2287
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5481"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5481"
"slug" => "balance-billing-as-a-signaling-device"
"yearMonth" => "2019-05"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Balance Billing as a Signaling Device"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., LAMIRAUD, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Balance Billing as a Signaling Device. Dans: 20th European Health Economic Workshop 2019."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
"bid" => "B00278040"
"slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "20th European Health Economic Workshop 2019"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
44 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2288
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1370"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1370"
"slug" => "inflation-and-employment-fluctuations-in-transitional-economics"
"yearMonth" => "1995-01"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Inflation and Employment Fluctuations in Transitional Economics"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). Inflation and Employment Fluctuations in Transitional Economics. <i>Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice</i>, pp. 189-199."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "189-199"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Le modèle proposé analyse l'impact des facteurs structurels ainsi que l'impact des fluctuations de la demande globale sur l'emploi dans les économies en transition. Il est démontré que les gouvernements peuvent rechercher un taux d'inflation "optimal" , ce taux est d'autant plus faible que la réforme des entreprises et la privatisation sont rapides. Dans ces conditions la stabilisation macroéconomique et la privatisation sont des objectifs mutuellement compatibles."
"en" => "The proposed model analyses the structural factors determining employment as well as the aggregate demand influence on employment fluctuations in transitional economies. It is shown that governments can seek an "optimal" target inflation rate , this rate is lower the more rapid are enterprise reform and privatisation. Therefore, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization appear like mutually consistent goals."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
45 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2289
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1443"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1443"
"slug" => "knowledge-in-economics-and-economic-reform-an-analysis-of-survey-data-from-a-french-business-school"
"yearMonth" => "2012-11"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Knowledge in Economics and Economic Reform: An Analysis of Survey Data from a French Business School"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BARTHELEMY, J. (2012). Knowledge in Economics and Economic Reform: An Analysis of Survey Data from a French Business School. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 63(6), pp. 1193-1208."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "BARTHELEMY Jérôme"
"bid" => "B00013767"
"slug" => "barthelemy-jerome"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Enseignement en économie"
1 => "France"
2 => "Réforme"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "http://www.jstor.org/stable/23324350"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1193-1208"
"volume" => "63"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Un modèle de régression (IV) permet d’expliquer l’opinion sur les réformes pro-marchées, tout en prenant en compte le caractère endogène des connaissances en économie et les caractéristiques des répondants. Les résultats suggèrent que les connaissances économiques influencent effectivement l’opinion sur les réformes pro-marchées."
"en" => "An instrumental variable model of opinion on pro-market reforms was estimated, taking into account the endogenous nature of knowledge in economics, while controlling for the characteristics of the respondents. Empirical results indicate that knowledge in economics contributes significantly to explain favorable opinion on pro-market reforms."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
46 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2290
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1582"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1582"
"slug" => "la-theorie-economique-au-debut-du-xxieme-siecle"
"yearMonth" => "2006-01"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "La théorie économique au début du XXIème siècle"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2006). La théorie économique au début du XXIème siècle. <i>Sociétal</i>, pp. 28-35."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Anticipations rationnelles"
1 => "Economie"
2 => "Méthodologie"
3 => "Rational Expectations"
4 => "Théorie économique"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:28"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "28-35"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Après un bref rappel de l'objet de la théorie économique, l'article presente le recentrage de l'analyse économique contemporaine autour des questions informationnelles, en insistant sur la nouvelle théorie des anticipations."
"en" => "This paper presents the recent evolution of economics, focusing on the contribution of the new theory of expectations."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
47 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2291
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1662"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1662"
"slug" => "le-jeu-des-gladiatores-un-spectacle-de-qualite"
"yearMonth" => "2011-12"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Le jeu des gladiatores : Un spectacle de qualité"
"description" => "BALLET, J., BAZIN, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Le jeu des gladiatores : Un spectacle de qualité. <i>Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines</i>, 195(3), pp. 75-85."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BALLET J."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BAZIN D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Arbitrage"
1 => "Économie du sport"
2 => "Gladiature"
3 => "Qualité du spectacle"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-28 01:00:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266595528_Le_jeu_des_Gladiators_un_spectacle_de_qualite"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "75-85"
"volume" => "195"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les jeux de gladiateurs ont constitué un élément majeur sous l’influence romaine et ce jusqu’à la fin du IVe siècle. L’organisation de ces jeux provoquait un coût considérable et les gladiateurs étaient eux-mêmes pour une bonne partie des professionnels issus d’écoles de gladiature qu’il fallait entretenir. Le recouvrement de l’ensemble de ces coûts était assuré par les Magistrats qui les organisaient. Pour attirer les spectateurs, la qualité du spectacle était indispensable. De ce point de vue, la personne clé dans la perpétration des jeux était le Président qui arbitrait les affrontements. Par le pouvoir de sanction qui lui était conféré sur la vie ou la mort des combattants, il exerçait une incitation à la qualité du spectacle."
"en" => "Gladiator games constituted a major element under roman influence, which lingered on until the fourth century AD. The organization of these games was very expensive, and gladiators were to a large extent professionals, trained in gladiator schools. The overall costs were covered by fees paid by the Roman Magistrates who organized these shows. In order to attract them, the quality of the show was essential. From this point of view, the key person in the process of preparation of the show was the President who was granted the right to decide over life and death of the defeated gladiator. The judge’s strategy had a major impact on the quality of the show."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
48 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2292
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5942"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5942"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-deceitful-communication-does-everyone-have-a-price"
"yearMonth" => "2018-06"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et DUBART, D. (2018). Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price. Dans: 9th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "9th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
49 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2293
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5943"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5943"
"slug" => "experimental-evidence-on-the-insiduous-illiquidity-risk"
"yearMonth" => "2012-05"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insiduous' Illiquidity Risk"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BESANCOURT, D. (2012). Experimental Evidence on the 'Insiduous' Illiquidity Risk. Dans: International Trade and Finance Assocation's 22nd International Conference."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCOURT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "International Trade and Finance Assocation's 22nd International Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
50 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2294
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6040"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6040"
"slug" => "gender-interactions-in-team-production"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Gender Interactions in Team Production"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et JUNG, S. (2015). Gender Interactions in Team Production. Dans: 6th Conference of the French Experimental Economics Association (ASFEE)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JUNG S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "6th Conference of the French Experimental Economics Association (ASFEE)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
51 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2295
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6086"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6086"
"slug" => "growth-patterns-under-imitation-in-the-investment-decision"
"yearMonth" => "2000-06"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Growth Patterns under Imitation in the Investment Decision"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Growth Patterns under Imitation in the Investment Decision. Dans: 10th Conference of the IT & FA."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "10th Conference of the IT & FA"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
52 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2296
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6136"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6136"
"slug" => "how-serious-is-the-measurement-error-problem-in-a-popular-risk-aversion-task"
"yearMonth" => "2019-09"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "How Serious is the Measurement Error Problem in a Popular Risk-Aversion Task?"
"description" => "PEREZ, F., HOLLARD, G., VRANCEANU, R. et DUBART, D. (2019). How Serious is the Measurement Error Problem in a Popular Risk-Aversion Task? Dans: 2019 Economic Science Association Annual Conference (ESA)."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEREZ Fabien"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HOLLARD Guillaume"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Economic Science Association Annual Conference (ESA)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
53 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2297
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1985"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1985"
"slug" => "lying-about-delegation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Lying about Delegation"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2016). Lying about Delegation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, 121, pp. 29-40."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Delegation of responsibility"
1 => "Uncertain attribution"
2 => "Communications strategy"
3 => "Ultimatum game"
4 => "Dishonesty"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:45:00"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268115002905?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "29-40"
"volume" => "121"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une expérience pour tester si les décideurs peuvent mentir sur la délégation afin de transferer le blame de la responsabilité sur une tierce personne, et dans quelle mesure les délégués peuvent accepter le rôle de "bouc émissaire" où ils font tout simplement semblant de décider sans agir réellement."
"en" => "This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role, while the decision is made by the Proposer himself. In this uncertain attribution setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. One possible strategy is “false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
54 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2298
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1989"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1989"
"slug" => "macroeconomic-implications-of-voucher-privatization-in-a-model-with-incomplete-information"
"yearMonth" => "2000-01"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information. <i>Journal of Economic Policy Reform</i>, pp. 147-164."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:40"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "147-164"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "La privatisation de masse dans les pays de l'Est s'accompagne d'un accroissement de la richesse des agents privés qui devraient augmenter leur consommation. L'article étudie les conséquences macroéconomiques que cet effet de richesse peut engendrer dans une économie caractérisée par un taux de chômage élevé lorsque les priorités de l'Etat ne sont pas bien identifiées. Le modèle est basé sur un jeu à deux périodes entre le gouvernement et les agents privés. Nous mettons en évidence la possibilité d'occurrence d'un équilibre Bayesien mélangeant. Celui-ci s'accompagne d'un coût pour les gouvernements qui souhaitent une privatisation rapide."
"en" => "Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from the state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in an economy with a high unemployment rate.The model builds a two-stage game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling bayesian equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogeneous probability of privatization slowdown. As a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an "undue" credibility cost in terms of employment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
55 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2299
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2007"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2007"
"slug" => "manager-honesty-and-foregin-investment-in-developing-countries"
"yearMonth" => "2002-09"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2002). Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries. <i>Research in Economics</i>, pp. 231-250."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "231-250"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "La première partie de l'article étudie la décision optimale d'un gestionnaire capable de s'approprier une partie du résultat d'une firme créé avec du capital étranger. Nous montrons qu'un équilibre à anticipations rationnelles peut apparaître dans lequel le comportement du manager et les anticipations des investissements sont mutuellement compatibles. Un manager peut être honnête lors de la première période, puis changer d'attitude. La seconde partie de l'article étudie le fonctionnement global de l'économie ainsi que le lien entre la durée de l'engagement des investisseurs et l'état de corruption."
"en" => "The first part of the paper analyses the optimal decision rule of manager who is able to transfer into his own hands a part of the output of a firm set up with foreign capital. It is shown that in a two-period framework with incomplete information about the nature of the manager, a rational expectation equilibrium exists where managers' behaviour and investors' expectations are mutually consistent. In particular, some yound managers may aim at building a reputation of an honest person, then behave dishonestly when getting old. The global performance of an economy hosting a large number of managers is investigated in the second part of the paper."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
56 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2300
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2059"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2059"
"slug" => "migrant-wages-remittances-and-recipient-labour-supply-in-a-moral-hazard-model"
"yearMonth" => "2009-03"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Migrant Wages, Remittances and Recipient Labour Supply in a Moral Hazard Model"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). Migrant Wages, Remittances and Recipient Labour Supply in a Moral Hazard Model. <i>Economic Systems</i>, 33(1), pp. 60-82."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Information imparfaite"
1 => "Offre de travail"
2 => "Transferts internationaux"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "60-82"
"volume" => "33"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie la relation entre le salaire d'un migrant et le niveau des transferts d'une part, et celle qui s'établit entre le niveau des transferts et l'offre de travail des résidents, d'une autre part. Le modèle prends la forme d'un jeu à deux périodes avec information imparfaite sur la situation économique des résidents."
"en" => "The paper analyses the relationship between a migrant's wage and the amount of remittances sent back home on the one hand, and the relationship between remittances and resident's labor supply on the other hand. The model is cast as a two period imperfect infomation game."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
57 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2301
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2086"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2086"
"slug" => "multiple-equilibria-in-firing-game-with-impartial-justice"
"yearMonth" => "2009-06"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Multiple Equilibria in Firing Game with Impartial Justice"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). Multiple Equilibria in Firing Game with Impartial Justice. <i>Labour Economics</i>, 16(3), pp. 262-271."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Congestion"
1 => "Droit du travail"
2 => "Licenciement"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "262-271"
"volume" => "16"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Une étude de l'interaction entre le système juridique en droit du travail et la performance du marché du travail dans les pays du Sud de l'Europe."
"en" => "The paper analyses the interaction between the judicial labor system and the labor market performance in Southern European countries."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
58 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2302
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2131"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2131"
"slug" => "on-the-dynamic-consistency-of-economy-wide-privatization-a-theoretical-approach"
"yearMonth" => "1997-06"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "On the Dynamic Consistency of Economy-Wide Privatization: A Theoretical Approach"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). On the Dynamic Consistency of Economy-Wide Privatization: A Theoretical Approach. <i>Economic Systems</i>, pp. 151-164."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-08 09:29:44"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "151-164"
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'objet de cet article est d'étudier la cohérence interne d'une politique de privatisation généralisée. Le développement du secteur privé permet un accroissement de la production totale mais entraîne également une réduction du suremploi et un accroissement peu souhaitable du chômage. Par une approche dynamique, et en supposant une formation rationnelle des anticipations, il est montré qu'un Etat ayant comme objectif prioritaire la protection de l'emploi peut néanmoins mener une première phase de privatisation rapide. Cette étape initiale, dont l'objectif consiste à influencer les anticipations, est suivie d'un ralentissement du rythme de privatisation, en apparente contradiction avec la politique antérieure."
"en" => "This paper investigates the macroeconomic behaviour of an economy shifting from state to private ownership. In the model, privatization not only fosters growth, but also entails a fall in labour hoarding and an increase in unemployment. Governments may balance these two conflicting objectives by choosing either a fast or a slow privatization policy. We analyse how incomplete information about the type of government influences policy choices. It is shown that an employment-oriented government may start by undertaking a fast privatization policy and reveal its true nature by adopting a slow pace in a second phase."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
59 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2303
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2147"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2147"
"slug" => "opening-the-capital-account-of-developing-countries-some-policy-issues"
"yearMonth" => "2003-01"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Opening the Capital Account of Developing Countries: Some Policy Issues"
"description" => "DAIANU, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2003). Opening the Capital Account of Developing Countries: Some Policy Issues. <i>Acta Oeconomica</i>, pp. 245-270."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:44"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "245-270"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article présente les conséquences des politiques d'ouverture des balances des capitaux mises en place par un grand nombre de pays en voie de développement à la fin des années 1980. Les auteurs défendent le projet d'une libéralisation "séquentielle" des mouvements de capitaux, en opposition à la stratégie de libéralisation globale et non-différenciée. Une section spéciale est consacrée à l'ouverture des balances des capitaux dans les économies en transition."
"en" => "In the late eighties, many developing countries followed the example of the most advanced countries and opened their capital account (K.A.) in an attempt to reap new gains from increased integration with the world economy. This paper points to some risks that might be associated with undifferentiated deregulation of international movement of capital in connection with developing economies. It argues in favor of proper sequencing: liberalization should proceed in parallel with progress when it comes to macroeconomic stability, building market competition and the creation of a sound, internal financial system. A separate section analyzes this issue in the special context of transition economies."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
60 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2304
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2205"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2205"
"slug" => "pays-de-lest-le-cout-dune-candidature-a-lunion-europeenne-monetaire"
"yearMonth" => "2000-09"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Pays de l'Est : le coût d'une candidature à l'Union Européenne Monétaire"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., VRANCEANU, R. et WARIN, T. (2000). Pays de l'Est : le coût d'une candidature à l'Union Européenne Monétaire. <i>Économie Internationale / International Economics</i>, pp. 65-76."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "WARIN T."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "65-76"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article étudie les conséquences macroéconomiques qui devraient accompagner la décision des pays de l'Est d'adopter l'euro. Durant une période de transition, elles s'engagent à maintenir le taux de change dans des normes préétablies. Le modèle développe un jeu à deux périodes en information incomplète. Nous montrons dans quelles circonstances l'équilibre mélangeant peut apparaître. Dans cette configuration, le taux d'intérêt dans le pays candidat incorpore une prime de risque de dévaluation, ce qui pénalise l'activité économique."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the macroeconomic consequences of joining the EMU for transition economies It emphasizes a hidden cost that may occur during the probationary period, where the applicant country must keep the euro exchange rate within a narrow fluctuation band. The model builds a two-period game with incomplete information. It is shown that, under certain circumstances, the suboptimal pooling equilibrium may occur. In this configuration, interest rates include a devaluation risk premium, and the economic activity is depressed."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
61 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2305
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2234"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2234"
"slug" => "pitfalls-of-taxation-policy-in-transition-economies"
"yearMonth" => "2001-01"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "Pitfalls of Taxation Policy in Transition Economies"
"description" => "DAIANU, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). Pitfalls of Taxation Policy in Transition Economies. <i>Acta Oeconomica</i>, pp. 3-15."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DAIANU D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:47"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "3-15"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose deux modèles élémentaires qui mettent en question l'orthodoxie des réformes fiscales dans les pays en transition. Dans un premier modèle, l'absence des institutions explique l'émergence d'un équilibre non coopératif, dans lequel les entreprises refusent de payer les impôts et la production s'effondre par absence d'infrastructures. Le deuxième modèle s'interroge sur le concept de fiscalité optimale dans un contexte où les entreprises sont fortement dépendantes d'une filière de production véritable."
"en" => "This paper develops two stylized models of the transition economy that challenge, to some extent, the conventional approach to policy reforms. In the first model, the absence of market-oriented institutions is responsible for the occurrence of a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the amount of public services provided by the state is too low, which, in turn, adversely affects the global performance of the economy. In the second model, a benevolent government will choose a taxation level that pushes too many firms out of the market, hence global supply falls below its optimal level."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
62 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2306
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6684"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6684"
"slug" => "migration-and-coordination-a-global-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2015-05"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Migration and Coordination: A Global Approach"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). Migration and Coordination: A Global Approach. Dans: 25th Annual Conference of the International Trade & Finance Association."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "25th Annual Conference of the International Trade & Finance Association"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
63 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2307
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2313"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2313"
"slug" => "publish-or-teach-analysis-of-the-professors-optimal-career-path"
"yearMonth" => "2013-10"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path. <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i>, 37(10), pp. 1995-2009."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Enseignement"
1 => "Externalités de compétence"
2 => "Management du corps professoral"
3 => "Recherche"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.05.007"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1995-2009"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "10"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le programme d'allocation optimale de l'effort d'un professeur qui a le choix entre développer ses compétences en recherche ou en pédagogie. On étudie comment le chemin de croissance des compétences dépend de la structure organisationnelle, notamment des éventuelles externalités croisées entre les deux compétences."
"en" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
64 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2308
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2320"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2320"
"slug" => "quality-and-price-dispersion-in-an-equilibrium-search-model"
"yearMonth" => "2004-03"
"year" => "2004"
"title" => "Quality and Price Dispersion in an Equilibrium Search Model"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BESANCENOT, D. (2004). Quality and Price Dispersion in an Equilibrium Search Model. <i>Journal of Economics and Business</i>, pp. 99-116."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "99-116"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Parfois les biens homogènes sont vendus à des prix différents, certaines fois, différentes qualités sont échangées au même prix. Cet article étudie ces déviations de la "Loi d'une qualité-un prix" dans le cadre d'un modèle d'équilibre avec processus de recherche. A l'équilibre, la stratégie de recherche de la meilleure offre par les consommateurs et la stratégie prix-qualité des firmes sont compatibles réciproquement. Sont mises en évidence des distributions non dégénérées de prix et/ou de qualités, en fonction de la proportion des consommateurs qui recherchent la qualité."
"en" => "Sometimes homogenous goods trade at different qualities trade at the same price. This paper analyses such deviations from the "Law of One Quality-One Price" within the framework of an equilibrium search model. In equilibrium, consumers' searching strategy and firms' price-quality optimal choice are mutually consistent. Non-degenerated equilibrium price and/or quality distributions emerge, in keeping with the proportion of expert consumers in total consumer population."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
65 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2309
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2344"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2344"
"slug" => "quelle-confiance-dans-la-regulation-economique"
"yearMonth" => "2008-07"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Quelle confiance dans la régulation économique ?"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2008). Quelle confiance dans la régulation économique ? <i>Foi & Culture</i>, pp. 21-25."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Ethique des affaires"
1 => "Profit"
2 => "Régulation"
3 => "Signal"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "21-25"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans l'économie décentralisée, le profit joue non seulement un rôle d'incitation, mais aussi de signal du travail bien fait. De ce fait, éthique des affaires et profit normal sont compatibles."
"en" => "In the market economy, the profit does not only provide the needed incentive, but is also a signal of good industrial strategy. Hence, normal profit and business ethics are mutualy compatible."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
66 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2310
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2346"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2346"
"slug" => "quelle-reglementation-pour-le-secteur-de-la-defense-lexperience-americaine"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Quelle règlementation pour le secteur de la Défense : l'expérience américaine"
"description" => "GUYOT, M. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). Quelle règlementation pour le secteur de la Défense : l'expérience américaine. <i>Revue française d'économie</i>, pp. 167-194."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "GUYOT Marc"
"bid" => "B00000236"
"slug" => "guyot-marc"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "167-194"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Depuis 1984, les Etats-Unis ont décidé de réformer le processus d'acquisition de biens et de services destinés à la défense nationale par l'introduction de mécanismes incitatifs à l'efficacité, similaires à ceux existant naturellement dans un environnement concurrentiel. L'objet de cet article est d'étudier l'impact de ce changement organisationnel sur les performances économiques des firmes composant la base industrielle de la défense américaine."
"en" => "Since 1984, the United States have decided to allow competition-like forces to drive the defence procurement process. The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of this organizational change on the economic performances of the firms composing the industrial base of American defence."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
67 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2311
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2410"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2410"
"slug" => "remittances-as-a-social-status-signaling-device"
"yearMonth" => "2011-09"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device. <i>Research in Economics</i>, 65(3), pp. 305-318."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Migration"
1 => "Signalisation"
2 => "Statut"
3 => "Transferts"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2011.01.001"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "305-318"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les migrants transfèrent chaque année des montants significatifs vers les pays d'origine pour des motifs multiples et variés. Dans cet article nous étudions le transfert en tant que moyen de signaler le statut social du migrant. Le problème prend la forme d'un jeu en information imparfaite."
"en" => "Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left-home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount. The game presents various equilibria that differ with respect to the proportion and nature of the migrants who sacrifice consumption opportunities to status revealing actions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
68 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2312
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6892"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6892"
"slug" => "pledges-as-a-social-influence-device-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence. Dans: 10th Annual Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics 2019 (ASFEE)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "10th Annual Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics 2019 (ASFEE)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
69 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2313
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6893"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6893"
"slug" => "pledges-as-a-social-influence-device-theory-and-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Theory and Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Dans: 2019 Meditari Accountancy Research Accounting Forum (MedAR/AF)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT Damien"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Meditari Accountancy Research Accounting Forum (MedAR/AF)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
70 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2314
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2473"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2473"
"slug" => "search-price-illusion-and-welfare"
"yearMonth" => "2000-01"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "Search, Price Illusion and Welfare"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., ROCHETEAU, G. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Search, Price Illusion and Welfare. <i>Journal of Macroeconomics</i>, pp. 109-124."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ROCHETEAU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "109-124"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie l'impact d'une illusion monétaire dans une économie décentralisée à la Diamond (1971). Après un choc nominal, une partie de la population de consommateurs est victime d'une illusion monétaire, i.e. rencontre des difficultés à estimer, correctement, le prix du bien. Si les firmes décident de discriminer les différents types de consommateurs, il en résulte une distribution des prix objective. Il y a trois types d'équilibre possible dans ce jeu, en fonction du degré de confusion des agents. L'un correspond à une distribution des prix non-dégénérée. Nous démontrons que le comportement sous-optimal de certains consommateurs, non seulement modifie les termes de l'échange dans cette économie, mais, dans certains cas, engendre une amélioration du bien-être collectif."
"en" => "We analyze the effects of price illusion in a decentralized economy à la Diamond (1971) where trade coordination is achieved through costly consumer search. Following a nominal shock, a fraction of the consuming public is subject to price illusion attributable to computing difficulties or lack of information. Firms adapt their pricing strategies in order to discriminate against various consumer types. Three types of equilibria can occur depending on the degree of consumer confusion: one of them yields a non-degenerated distribution of prices. In this model, suboptimal behavior of some consumers alters the terms of trade for the entire economy and may entail a welfare improvement."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
71 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2315
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2522"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2522"
"slug" => "strategic-managerial-dishonesty-and-financial-distress"
"yearMonth" => "2009-03"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Strategic Managerial Dishonesty and Financial Distress"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). Strategic Managerial Dishonesty and Financial Distress. <i>Research in Economics</i>, 63(1), pp. 11-21."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Comportement des gestionnaires"
1 => "Coût de faillite"
2 => "Transparence"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "11-21"
"volume" => "63"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous montrons qu'une trop forte sanction pour les managers qui cherchent à présenter leur entreprise dans une lumière plus favorable que la réalité pourrait augmenter la fréquence de faillites."
"en" => "In an economy where commercial lenders have imperfect information about the borrower, an excessive sanction for false financial statements could bring about more company defaults and a higher default premium."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
72 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2316
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2547"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2547"
"slug" => "structure-de-cout-generalisee-et-horaire-optimal"
"yearMonth" => "1996-01"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Structure de coût généralisée et horaire optimal"
"description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). Structure de coût généralisée et horaire optimal. <i>Economie et Prévision (articles académiques)</i>, pp. 37-51."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CONTENSOU François"
"bid" => "B00000121"
"slug" => "contensou-francois"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "37-51"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'étude s'efforce de mettre en évidence le rôle que les coûts indirects du travail pourraient jouer dans l'explication de la durée du travail formée spontanément dans une économie décentralisée. Le premier stade du texte considère la production comme prédéterminée par une contrainte de débouchés. Le modèle est ensuite généralisé en considérant le niveau d'activité des firmes comme endogène. L'analyse révèle la formation systématique d'un conflit portant sur l'horaire de travail et en élucide les déterminants. Il est également possible dans ce cadre de représenter les effets des réductions légales de l'horaire, préconisées comme instrument de lutte contre le chômage."
"en" => "This study endeavours to show the role that indirect labour costs can play in explaining the duration of the working week formed spontaneously in a decentralised economy. The first part of the paper considers production to be predetermined. The model is then generalised by considering the activity endogenous. The analysis reveals the systematic formation of a conflict about working hours and shows its determining factors. It is also possible to use this framework to represent the effects of legal reductions in working hours."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
73 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2317
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2578"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2578"
"slug" => "team-production-with-punishment-option-insights-from-a-real-effort-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2015-09"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2015). Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 36(3), pp. 408-420."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Économie expérimentale"
1 => "Expérience à effort réel"
2 => "Performance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262528770_Team_Production_with_Punishment_Option_Insights_from_a_Real-Effort_Experiment"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "408-420"
"volume" => "36"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article présente les résultats d'une expérience à effort réel de production en équipe, avec et sans possibilité de sanction. Si la performance globale demeure inchangée, les comportements du producteur plus (moins) efficace change."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real-effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
"en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
74 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2318
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2613"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2613"
"slug" => "the-cost-of-capital-in-a-model-of-financial-intermediation-with-coordination-frictions"
"yearMonth" => "2018-01"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "The Cost of Capital in a Model of Financial Intermediation with Coordination Frictions"
"description" => "PEIA, O. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). The Cost of Capital in a Model of Financial Intermediation with Coordination Frictions. <i>Oxford Economic Papers</i>, 70(1), pp. 266-285."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PEIA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Coût du capital"
1 => "Financement projets infrastructure"
2 => "Jeu de coordination"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx037"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "266-285"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes how coordination frictions in the financial intermediation sector impact the cost of capital. In the model, capital belongs to a large number of small investors. A financial intermediary seeks to raise funds to finance a risky capital-intensive project and earns a fee-based income. The more investors participate to the project, the higher its probability of success. Investors observe noisy signals about the true implementation cost of the project. This problem can be analyzed as a typical global game featuring a single threshold equilibrium. It can be shown that the relationship between the probability of success of the project and the rate of return on capital is non-monotonic. We determine the "socially optimal interest rate" that maximizes the probability of success of the project. However, fee-maximizing intermediaries will generally set an interest rate higher than the former, thus bringing about a form of allocative inefficiency"
"en" => "This paper analyzes how coordination frictions in the financial intermediation sector impact the cost of capital. In the model, capital belongs to a large number of small investors. A financial intermediary seeks to raise funds to finance a risky capital-intensive project and earns a fee-based income. The more investors participate to the project, the higher its probability of success. Investors observe noisy signals about the true implementation cost of the project. This problem can be analyzed as a typical global game featuring a single threshold equilibrium. It can be shown that the relationship between the probability of success of the project and the rate of return on capital is non-monotonic. We determine the "socially optimal interest rate" that maximizes the probability of success of the project. However, fee-maximizing intermediaries will generally set an interest rate higher than the former, thus bringing about a form of allocative inefficiency"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
75 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2319
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2631"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2631"
"slug" => "the-ecb-monetary-policy-choices-and-challenges"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "The ECB Monetary Policy: Choices and Challenges"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). The ECB Monetary Policy: Choices and Challenges. <i>Journal of Policy Modeling</i>, pp. 181-194."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:7 [
0 => "BCE"
1 => "Euro"
2 => "Monnaie"
3 => "Politique monétaire "
4 => "Règle de Taylor"
5 => "Théorie monétaire"
6 => "Zone euro"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "181-194"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article analyse la politique monétaire de la BCE dans l'intervalle 1999-2006. Nous mettons en relief le comportement forward looking de la banque centrale et un objectif direct d'activité réelle dans sa fonction de réaction. Des recommandations de politique économique sont envisagées."
"en" => "This paper analyses the European central bank (ECB) monetary policy over the period 1999-2006, with a special emphasis on the recent years. We provide several estimates for the ECB's interest rate rule that put foward its forward looking behavior, and the existence of a direct activity goal. Policy implications follow."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
76 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2320
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2651"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2651"
"slug" => "the-ethical-dimension-of-economic-choices"
"yearMonth" => "2005-04"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. (2005). The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices. <i>Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility</i>, pp. 94-107."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "94-107"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "En général, les économies capitalistes font preuve de dynamisme, d'une forte capacité à innover et d'une grande flexibilité. En revanche, pendant ces dernières années, des abus économiques de toutes sortes n'ont pas cessé de s'amplifier. Cet article défend la thèse selon laquelle un remède à ces difficultés ne peut pas être trouvé si la dimension éthique n'est pas prise en compte systématiquement dans les décisions économiques."
"en" => "In general, capitalist countries display sustained growth, dynamism and innovation, and a high adaptability in response to external shocks. Yet in the last 30 years, discontent over the notorious drawbacks of capitalism -corporate frauds, corruption, abuses of market power- has grown continually. In this article, it is argued that no remedy to these difficulties can be found if ethical dilemmas are not anticipated and addressed at the individual, firm and economy-wide levels."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
77 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2321
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2665"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2665"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-enterprise-reform-on-labor-markets-in-transitional-economies-a-multi-sector-model"
"yearMonth" => "1995-12"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "The Impact of Enterprise Reform on Labor Markets in Transitional Economies: A Multi-sector Model"
"description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (1995). The Impact of Enterprise Reform on Labor Markets in Transitional Economies: A Multi-sector Model. <i>Economic Systems</i>, pp. 285-303."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "FOURÇANS André"
"bid" => "B00000199"
"slug" => "fourcans-andre"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-03 12:35:42"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "285-303"
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le fonctionnement du marché du travail dans les économies en transition ainsi que les facteurs institutionnels déterminant l'emploi et les salaires. Il y a deux secteurs ("privé" et "d'Etat") qui interagissent : chômage, emploi et salaires sont la solution d'un système d'équations simultanées."
"en" => "The objective of this paper is to provide a model of the labor market in transitional economies and of the institutional factors determining employment and wages. We consider two sectors : the State Sector and the Private one, each of them being characterized by a specific employment behavior. Their interaction jointly determines wages and employment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
78 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2322
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2685"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2685"
"slug" => "the-legal-grounds-of-irregular-migration-a-global-game-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2017-03"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "The Legal Grounds of Irregular Migration: A Global Game Approach"
"description" => "NAIDITCH, C. et VRANCEANU, R. (2017). The Legal Grounds of Irregular Migration: A Global Game Approach. <i>The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy</i>, 17(2)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "NAIDITCH C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Coordination"
1 => "Effet reséau"
2 => "Migrations"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315415513_The_Legal_Grounds_of_Irregular_Migration_A_Global_Game_Approach"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "17"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyses the relationship between regular and irregular migration taking into account the migration network effect. We assume that migrants can obtain a high payoff only if a critical mass of migrants is reached in the destination country. If candidates to migration receive biased signals about the economic situation of the destination country, the migrants' decision problem can be analyzed as a standard global game. Tying the quota of regular migrants to the economic performance of countries might create large discontinuities in immigration flows, with some countries attracting the bulk of irregular migrants and the other being shunned by the migrants."
"en" => "This paper analyses the relationship between regular and irregular migration taking into account the migration network effect. We assume that migrants can obtain a high payoff only if a critical mass of migrants is reached in the destination country. If candidates to migration receive biased signals about the economic situation of the destination country, the migrants' decision problem can be analyzed as a standard global game. Tying the quota of regular migrants to the economic performance of countries might create large discontinuities in immigration flows, with some countries attracting the bulk of irregular migrants and the other being shunned by the migrants."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
79 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2323
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2703"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2703"
"slug" => "the-read-or-write-dilemma-in-academic-production-a-transatlantic-perspective"
"yearMonth" => "2009-03"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "The 'Read or Write' Dilemma in Academic Production: A Transatlantic Perspective"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2009). The 'Read or Write' Dilemma in Academic Production: A Transatlantic Perspective. <i>American Economist</i>, 53(1), pp. 75-85."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUYNH K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Effet d'encombrement"
1 => "Equilibre de Nash"
2 => "Politique de recherche"
3 => "Qualité des revues"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "75-85"
"volume" => "53"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions l'impact des politiques d'incitation à la recherche dans un environnement où les chercheurs doivent arbitrer entre lire pour se former et écrire des articles. Les stratégies individuelles d'incitation à la publications peuvent aboutir à un résultat socialement inefficace."
"en" => "This paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A scholar's reward is positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the quality of a paper depends on the scholar's ability to internalize new ideas and the overall quality of external research. The individual scholar is subject to a trade-off between writing more papers or reading in order to take in new ideas. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity and quality of published papers are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions about the research production process, in equilibrium researchers write too many papers of too low a quality compared to the cooperative outcome."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
80 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2324
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2724"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2724"
"slug" => "the-spending-multiplier-in-a-time-of-massive-public-debt-the-euro-area-case"
"yearMonth" => "2013-03"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "The Spending Multiplier in a Time of Massive Public Debt: The Euro-Area Case"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et BESANCENOT, D. (2013). The Spending Multiplier in a Time of Massive Public Debt: The Euro-Area Case. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, 20(8), pp. 758-762."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dette publique"
1 => "Éviction financière"
2 => "Multiplicateur fiscal"
3 => "Zone euro"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-28 01:00:28"
"publicationUrl" => "https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00728230/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "758-762"
"volume" => "20"
"number" => "8"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie l'efficacité d'une relance budgétaire dans les pays fortement endettés de la zone Euro, en insistant sur "l'effet d’éviction financière". Pour une dette publique supérieure à 150% du PIB, le multiplicateur fiscal deviendrait négatif."
"en" => "This article argues that in Euro-area economies, where the European Central Bank (ECB) cannot bail out financially distressed governments, the spending multiplier is adversely affected by the amount of public debt. A regression model on a panel of 26 EU countries over the last 16 years shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is connected to a slowdown in annual growth rates of 0.28 percentage point. Furthermore, the effectiveness of fiscal spending is adversely affected by the amount of public debt; in particular, when the public debt exceeds 150% of GDP, the growth impact of the deficit might turn negative."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 3.4097419
+"parent": null
}
81 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2325
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2737"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2737"
"slug" => "the-value-of-lies-in-an-ultimatum-game-with-imperfect-information"
"yearMonth" => "2013-09"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information"
"description" => "BESANCENOT, D., DUBART, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, 93, pp. 239-247."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BESANCENOT D."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Déception"
1 => "Économie expérimentale"
2 => "Jeu de l'ultimatum"
3 => "Mensonge"
4 => "Stratégie de communication"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.029"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "239-247"
"volume" => "93"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions la communication mensongère dans un jeu de l'ultimatum où le receveur n'a qu'une information imparfaite sur la dotation de l'offreur. Une majorité des offreurs vont emmètre des messages faux, qui sous-évaluent le montant de la dotation. Les menteurs proposent des offres réduites."
"en" => "Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game with an informed proposer and an uninformed responder, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about his endowment. A simple message game with heterogenous players with respect to lying costs shows that in equilibrium liars should understate their endowment. The second part of the paper reports on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a 1-euro gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents on average. However, responders’ decision to accept/reject the offer does not depend on the message. It results a net welfare loss specific to such a “free-to-lie” environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-10-09T03:21:45.000Z</ 
