Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "4561"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "4561"
    "slug" => "endogenous-corruption-risk-and-foreign-investment-in-developing-countries"
    "yearMonth" => "2000-05"
    "year" => "2000"
    "title" => "Endogenous Corruption Risk and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Endogenous Corruption Risk and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries. Dans: <i>Proceedings of the Globalization in the 21st Century Conference: International Business Volume II</i>. International Trade and Finance Association (ITFA), pp. 415-429."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "Proceedings of the Globalization in the 21st Century Conference: International Business Volume II"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "415-429"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
      "en" => "Conference Proceedings"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'IDE dans les PVD est parfois limité par le risque de rencontrer des gestionnaires corrompus. L'article étudie en quoi la réputation individuelle influence le comportement des gestionnaires et le degré d'attractivité d'un pays. Nous montrons que la durée de la relation entre investisseurs et gestionnaires est une donnée fondamentale, qui influence l'ampleur de la corruption et le niveau de développement."
      "en" => "The possibility of facing corrupt managers is an important factor explaining foreigners' hesitations about investing in developing countries. This paper aims at investigating how reputation concerns influence managers' behavior and country attractiveness. It is shown that in a dynamic framework with incomplete information a rational equilibrium exists where the manager's best choice is related to the weights he respectively assigns to reputation and illegal income. Economy-wide corruption, development prospects and global profitability appear to depend on the duration of the relationship between investors and managers."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T16:21:43.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Endogenous Corruption Risk and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries"
    "docSurtitle" => "Actes d'une conférence"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2000</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Endogenous Corruption Risk and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries</b><br><span>2000-05 | Actes d'une conférence </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Endogenous Corruption Risk and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.269113
  +"parent": null
}