Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8359"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8359"
    "slug" => "quality-leaps-and-price-distribution-in-an-equilibrium-search-model"
    "yearMonth" => "2001-09"
    "year" => "2001"
    "title" => "Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article étudie les conséquences d'un choc de productivité dans une économie de type "search". Les entreprises produisent un bien et décident de sa qualité et du prix de vente. Les consommateurs cherchent la meilleure offre. Une partie des consommateurs ne connaît pas la qualité du bien qu'ils achètent. Le modèle présente plusieurs équilibres de Nash, en fonction de la proportion d'agents informés dans la population totale de consommateurs. Par exemple, si cette proportion n'est pas trop forte, ni trop faible, à l'équilibre toutes les firmes offrent un bien de haute qualité à un prix bas. Un équilibre en stratégie mixte peut aussi se manifester. Dans ces deux situations, le surplus des consommateurs est positif."
      "en" => "This paper analyses the impact of a quality improving technological shock on terms of trade in a search economy. Firms produce a unit good and decide on both its quality and price. Consumers search for the best offer. Some of them can assess the product quality before buying it, the other cannot. Several types of Nash equilibria are put forward, in keeping with the proportion of experts in the population of consumers. For instance, if the proportion of experts is not too small, nor too large, in equilibrium firms may decide to produce high quality goods, but post the pre-shock low price. A mixed strategy equilibrium, where all firms produce high quality goods, but some of them post the low price while the other post a higher price, may also emerge. In both these configurations, consumers reap a positive surplus."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T10:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2001</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model</b><br><span>2001-09 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Quality Leaps and Price Distribution in an Equilibrium Search Model</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.064929
  +"parent": null
}