Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "5206"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "5206"
    "slug" => "union-membership-real-wage-stickiness-and-unemployment"
    "yearMonth" => "1996-09"
    "year" => "1996"
    "title" => "Union Membership, Real Wage Stickiness and Unemployment"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1996). Union Membership, Real Wage Stickiness and Unemployment. Dans: <i>Eighth EALE Annual Conference</i>. KEPE (Centre of Planning and Economic Research), pp. 1-20."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "Eighth EALE Annual Conference"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "1-20"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Actes d'une conférence"
      "en" => "Conference Proceedings"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article propose une explication de l'émergence des syndicats dans une économie composée d'agents strictement rationnels. L'entreprise est prête à payer une prime salariale pour éviter la grève. Le travailleur représentatif cherche à maximiser l'espérance du revenu. Nous montrons qu'un équilibre de long terme peut apparaître, dans lequel taux de syndicalisation, emploi, rémunération réelle et agressivité syndicale sont déterminés simultanément."
      "en" => "In this paper we examine the emergence of trade unions in a hypothetical economy hosting strictly rational workers. The basic tool is a no-tradeoff condition : organized workers may claim a wage premium equal to a share of the profit loss of the firm in the event of a strike. The representative worker seeks to maximize his expected income. It is shown that, for stable institutional settings and constant union activism, an optimal membership rate emerges, as well as a wage premium. In the long run, union leadership is free to set militancy at a level consistent with thespecific objectives , should it be membership building, this may entail full unionization."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T15:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Union Membership, Real Wage Stickiness and Unemployment"
    "docSurtitle" => "Actes d'une conférence"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1996</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Union Membership, Real Wage Stickiness and Unemployment</b><br><span>1996-09 | Actes d'une conférence </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Union Membership, Real Wage Stickiness and Unemployment</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.83707
  +"parent": null
}