Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "7871"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "7871"
    "slug" => "a-model-of-manager-corruption-in-developing-countries-with-macroeconomic-implications"
    "yearMonth" => "1998-04"
    "year" => "1998"
    "title" => "A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1998). <i>A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article étudie l'influence sur l'investissement international de l'anticipation d'une corruption des managers dans les pays en voie de développement. Une première partie souligne l'influence micro-économique d'une quête de réputation sur le comportement des managers. Dans un second temps, deux extensions montrent les conséquences macro-économiques de l'effet de réputation. Suivant la nature des engagements entre investisseurs et managers, des situations d'équilibres multiples favorables ou défavorables à l'économie émergente vont apparaître."
      "en" => "The possibility of facing corrupt managers is an important factor explaining foreigners' hesitations about investing in developing countries. This paper aims at investigating how reputation concerns influence managers' behavior and country-specific attractiveness. The first part of the text analyzes the optimal decision rule of a manager who is able to transfer in his own hands a fraction of the firm's income. The macroeconomic implications of this simple model are investigated in the second part of the paper, where analysis is cast in an overlapping generation framework. Economy-wide corruption, development prospects and global profitability appear to depend on the duration of the relationship between investors and managers."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T10:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1998</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications</b><br><span>1998-04 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">A Model of Manager Corruption in Developing Countries with Macroeconomic Implications</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.0310545
  +"parent": null
}