Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2007"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2007"
    "slug" => "manager-honesty-and-foregin-investment-in-developing-countries"
    "yearMonth" => "2002-09"
    "year" => "2002"
    "title" => "Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2002). Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries. <i>Research in Economics</i>, pp. 231-250."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "231-250"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "La première partie de l'article étudie la décision optimale d'un gestionnaire capable de s'approprier une partie du résultat d'une firme créé avec du capital étranger. Nous montrons qu'un équilibre à anticipations rationnelles peut apparaître dans lequel le comportement du manager et les anticipations des investissements sont mutuellement compatibles. Un manager peut être honnête lors de la première période, puis changer d'attitude. La seconde partie de l'article étudie le fonctionnement global de l'économie ainsi que le lien entre la durée de l'engagement des investisseurs et l'état de corruption."
      "en" => "The first part of the paper analyses the optimal decision rule of manager who is able to transfer into his own hands a part of the output of a firm set up with foreign capital. It is shown that in a two-period framework with incomplete information about the nature of the manager, a rational expectation equilibrium exists where managers' behaviour and investors' expectations are mutually consistent. In particular, some yound managers may aim at building a reputation of an honest person, then behave dishonestly when getting old. The global performance of an economy hosting a large number of managers is investigated in the second part of the paper."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T10:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2002</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries</b><br><span>2002-09 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Manager Honesty and Foregin Investment in Developing Countries</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.064929
  +"parent": null
}