Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2578"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "2578"
"slug" => "team-production-with-punishment-option-insights-from-a-real-effort-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2015-09"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2015). Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 36(3), pp. 408-420."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Économie expérimentale"
1 => "Expérience à effort réel"
2 => "Performance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262528770_Team_Production_with_Punishment_Option_Insights_from_a_Real-Effort_Experiment"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "408-420"
"volume" => "36"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article présente les résultats d'une expérience à effort réel de production en équipe, avec et sans possibilité de sanction. Si la performance globale demeure inchangée, les comportements du producteur plus (moins) efficace change."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real-effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques"
"en" => "Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T16:21:43.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment"
"docSurtitle" => "Articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, <a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, DUBART Delphine"
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, DUBART Delphine</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2015</span>"
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">Économie expérimentale</a>, <a href="#">Expérience à effort réel</a>, <a href="#">Performance</a>"
"docPreview" => "<b>Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment</b><br><span>2015-09 | Articles </span>"
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262528770_Team_Production_with_Punishment_Option_Insights_from_a_Real-Effort_Experiment" target="_blank">Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment</a>"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.421813
+"parent": null
}