Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8353"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8353"
    "slug" => "public-debt-from-insolvency-to-illiquidity-default"
    "yearMonth" => "2001-05"
    "year" => "2001"
    "title" => "Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). <i>Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "HUYNH K."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "La plupart des analyses des situations de défaut sur les dettes publiques prennent en compte le comportement opportuniste des gouvernement ou l'absence accidentelle de revenus. Dans cet article, le défaut est essentiellement provoqué par le refus des investisseurs de prêter au gouvernement, bien que sa solvabilité ne soit par directement mise en cause. Le modèle est résolu en répétant plusieurs fois le jeu du défaut entre gouvernement et investisseurs. Il apparaît que le seuil d'illiquidité est nettement inférieur au seuil d'insolvabilité. Ce résultat devrait être incorporé dans les modèles actuels d'évaluation des politiques fiscales."
      "en" => "Most studies explain default on public debt either as the discretionary decision of a short-sighted government, or as the consequence of an accidental increase in public deficits. In this paper, default is brought about by the refusal of rational private investors to roll over the debty of a seemingly solvent government. True, default may occur after a long sequence of adverse shocks because the ballooning debt is no longer consistent with the going fiscal rule. But this rather small risk of insolvency brings about a much more severe illiquidity risk, as investors would refuse to lend to a government whose debt exceeds a critical threshold. Central to this analysis is the expectations upgrading process, and the recursive calculation of critical threstholds, until convergence is achived. It comes out that the debt level insulating the government from illiquidity default is much lower thatn the insolvency threshold. This result would ask for a more cautious evaluation of contemporary fiscal policies, which, so far, has focused almost exclusively on solvency criteria."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T10:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default"
    "docSurtitle" => "Documents de travail"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D., HUYNH K."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D., HUYNH K.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2001</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default</b><br><span>2001-05 | Documents de travail </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Public Debt: From Insolvency to Illiquidity Default</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.0310545
  +"parent": null
}