Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190
#_id: "B00000177"
#_source: array:38 [
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
"fullName" => "Fouad EL OUARDIGHI"
"lastName" => "EL OUARDIGHI"
"firstName" => "Fouad"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"email" => "elouardighi@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+33 (0)1 34 43 33 20"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "2036"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/en/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=hYxor-kAAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4072-0750"
"career" => array:26 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2210
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1998-09-01"
"endDate" => "2004-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2211
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2004-09-01"
"endDate" => "2009-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2212
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2009-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2213
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1991-09-01"
"endDate" => "1992-07-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Assistant de Recherche, Département Stratégie et Gestion"
"en" => "Research assistant, Strategy and Management Department"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2214
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2020-01-01"
"endDate" => "2020-03-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur Invité, Département de Gestion des Opérations"
"en" => "Visiting scholar, Department of Operations Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "HEC Paris"
"en" => "HEC Paris"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2215
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2012-04-01"
"endDate" => "2012-06-30"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur Invité, Département de Gestion des Opérations"
"en" => "Visiting professor, Department of Operations Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "HEC Montréal"
"en" => "HEC Montréal"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2216
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2012-04-01"
"endDate" => "2012-06-30"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur Invité, Département d'Economie"
"en" => "Visiting scholar, Department of Economics"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "McGill University"
"en" => "McGill University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2217
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2012-01-01"
"endDate" => "2012-03-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur Invité, Département de Marketing"
"en" => "Visiting scholar, Department of Marketing"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of Washington"
"en" => "University of Washington"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2218
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2005-09-01"
"endDate" => "2011-07-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chargé de Cours"
"en" => "Lecturer"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Institut de Commerce et d'Administration des Entreprises (ISCAE)"
"en" => "Institut de Commerce et d'Administration des Entreprises (ISCAE)"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Maroc"
"en" => "Morocco"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2219
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1997-09-01"
"endDate" => "1998-10-01"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur Assistant, Département de Décisions et Systèmes d'Information"
"en" => "Assistant professor, Decision and Information Systems Department"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Audencia Business School"
"en" => "Audencia Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2220
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1996-09-01"
"endDate" => "1997-07-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur Visitant, Département Logistique et Production"
"en" => "Visiting professor, Logistics and Production Department"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2221
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1994-09-01"
"endDate" => "1998-07-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chargé de Cours, Faculté de Gestion"
"en" => "Lecturer, Faculty of Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2222
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1994-09-01"
"endDate" => "1995-07-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chargé de cours, Département de Gestion"
"en" => "Lecturer, Management Department"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "École des Mines de Nantes"
"en" => "École des Mines de Nantes"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2223
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1992-01-01"
"endDate" => "1994-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Assistant/Titulaire de bourse, Faculté de Gestion"
"en" => "Scholarship holder/assistant, Faculty of Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2224
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1999-01-01"
"endDate" => "2000-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directeur Académique du Programme d'Intrapreneuriat"
"en" => "Academic director of the In-Company Projects Program"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2225
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "1999-01-01"
"endDate" => "2001-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Academic director of the Executive Specialized Programs of Logistics and Production"
"en" => "Academic director of the Executive Specialized Programs of Logistics and Production"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2226
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2004-01-01"
"endDate" => "2006-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Créateur de la filière Gestion des Opération et Sciences de Décision du Programme Ph.D."
"en" => "Founder of the Ph.D. program track in Operations Management and Decision Sciences"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2227
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2006-09-01"
"endDate" => "2007-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directeur Académique du Master Spécialisé en Gestion des Services Publics"
"en" => "Academic director of the Specialized Master of Public Services Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2228
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2000-09-01"
"endDate" => "2009-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directeur Académique du Master Spécialisé en Logistique et Gestion de la Chaîne d'Approvisionnement (Supply Chain Management)"
"en" => "Academic director of the Specialized Master of Logistics and Supply Chain Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2229
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2001-09-01"
"endDate" => "2009-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Président du Département de Management des Opérations"
"en" => "Chairperson of the Department of Logistics, Production and Service"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2230
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2003-09-01"
"endDate" => "2009-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Créateur et Directeur académique du Master Spécialisé en Gestion des Projets Technologiques"
"en" => "Founder and academic director of the Specialized Master of Technological Projects Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2231
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2007-09-01"
"endDate" => "2010-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Coordinateur de Programme Ph.D. pour la filière Gestion des Opérations et Sciences de Décision"
"en" => "Coordinator of the Ph.D. program track in Operations Management and Decision Sciences"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2232
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2010-01-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chargé de cours en gestion de la chaîne d'approvisionnement"
"en" => "Lecturer in Supply Chain Management"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bar-Ilan University"
"en" => "Bar-Ilan University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Israël"
"en" => "Israel"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2233
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2021-09-01"
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"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Coordination concentration de Phd Operations Management and Operations Research"
"en" => "Coordinator Phd concentration in Operations Management and Operations Research"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2234
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
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"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur invité"
"en" => "Visiting scholar"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "HEC Paris"
"en" => "HEC Paris"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2235
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2022-04-01"
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"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur invité"
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]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "TU Wien"
"en" => "TU Wien"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Autriche"
"en" => "Austria"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:7 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2192
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "2001"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "PhD en Sciences de Gestion"
"en" => "PhD en Sciences de Gestion"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2194
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1996"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Doctorat en Sciences de Gestion"
"en" => "Doctorat en Sciences de Gestion"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2191
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1991"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "DEA (major de promotion), sciences de gestion, HEC-ESSEC-Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "DEA (major de promotion), sciences de gestion, HEC-ESSEC-Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "en"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2195
#_index: null
#_id: null
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"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1989"
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"en" => "DEA, dynamique des systèmes productifs et économie mondiale"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2189
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1988"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Maîtrise, économie de l'entreprise"
"en" => "Maîtrise, économie de l'entreprise"
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"institution" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2193
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"year" => "1984"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Baccalauréat, série B"
"en" => "Baccalauréat, série B"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Lycée Descartes"
"en" => "Lycée Descartes"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Maroc"
"en" => "Morocco"
]
]
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}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2196
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:5 [
"diplome" => "CERT"
"year" => "2003"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "International Teacher Program (ITP)"
"en" => "International Teacher Program (ITP)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Alliance Manchester Business School"
"en" => "Alliance Manchester Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Royaume-Uni"
"en" => "United Kingdom"
]
]
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}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
<p>Fouad El Ouardighi teaches supply chain management, project management and the management of quality and its control in the MSc and the Advanced Masters programs. He also teaches supply chain management, optimal control theory and continuous-time dynamic games in the PhD program.</p>\n
\n
<p>His research aims to develop an interdisciplinary approach in areas such as the interface of operations and marketing management, environmental economics and sustainable operations management, R&D competition and pandemic control etc, and more generally to promoting the use of dynamic methods in economics and management science. He visited many foreign academic institutions as University of Washington in Seattle, HEC-Montreal, McGill University, Bar-Ilan University, HEC-Paris, Technical University of Vienna, etc. He has written several articles that have been published in Automatica, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Economic Theory, Annals of Operations Research, European Journal of Operational Research, Naval Research Logistics, OMEGA, Production and Operations Management, etc. He is Associate Editor for International Game Theory Review.</p>\n
\n
<p>Fouad was former academic director of various Advanced Masters programs in Operations Management, as well as coordinator of the Operations Management and Decision Sciences concentration of the PhD program. He also consults for international organizations.</p>\n
"""
"en" => """
<p>Fouad El Ouardighi teaches supply chain management, project management and the management of quality and its control in the MSc and the Advanced Masters programs. He also teaches supply chain management, optimal control theory and continuous-time dynamic games in the PhD program.</p>\n
\n
<p>His research aims to develop an interdisciplinary approach in areas such as the interface of operations and marketing management, environmental economics and sustainable operations management, R&D competition and pandemic control etc, and more generally to promoting the use of dynamic methods in economics and management science. He visited many foreign academic institutions as University of Washington in Seattle, HEC-Montreal, McGill University, Bar-Ilan University, HEC-Paris, Technical University of Vienna, etc. He has written several articles that have been published in Automatica, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Economic Theory, Annals of Operations Research, European Journal of Operational Research, Naval Research Logistics, OMEGA, Production and Operations Management, etc. He is Associate Editor for International Game Theory Review.</p>\n
\n
<p>Fouad was former academic director of various Advanced Masters programs in Operations Management, as well as coordinator of the Operations Management and Decision Sciences concentration of the PhD program. He also consults for international organizations.</p>\n
"""
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management des opérations"
"en" => "Operations Management"
]
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"en" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/fr-el-ouardighi-fouad/"
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"en" => "Supply chain management, Quality management, R&D management - Pollution control, Deforestation, Recycling - Epidemic control, Pandemic control"
]
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"en" => "Operations Management - Operations Research"
]
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2236
#_index: null
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#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "1991-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Major de promotion, DEA es-sciences de gestion, HEC-ESSEC-Université Paris X Nanterre"
"en" => "Top of the Class, DEA es-sciences de gestion, HEC-ESSEC-Université Paris X Nanterre"
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"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2237
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]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2190}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2238
#_index: null
#_id: null
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"date" => "1992-09-01"
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"en" => "Université Paris X Nanterre"
]
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]
]
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}
]
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2209
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"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
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}
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}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2202
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}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2203
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"en" => null
]
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2204
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8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2205
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9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2206
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10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2207
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11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2208
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2239
#_index: null
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#_source: array:9 [
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2240
#_index: "academ_contributions"
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"slug" => "commitment-based-equilibrium-environmental-strategies-under-time-dependent-absorption-efficiency"
"yearMonth" => "2018-04"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Commitment-Based Equilibrium Environmental Strategies under Time-Dependent Absorption Efficiency"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K., GNECCO, G. et SANGUINETI, M. (2018). Commitment-Based Equilibrium Environmental Strategies under Time-Dependent Absorption Efficiency. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, 27(2), pp. 235-249."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
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1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
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2 => array:1 [
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3 => array:1 [
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"keywords" => array:4 [
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1 => "Environmental absorption efficiency"
2 => "Cooperative solution"
3 => "Commitment-based strategies"
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"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
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"en" => "This paper investigates how current and future generations are affected by commitment-based Nash equilibrium environmental strategies when the environmental absorption efficiency is susceptible to switch from a pollution sink to a source."
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}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2242
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#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "867"
"slug" => "contracts-and-information-structure-in-a-supply-chain-with-operations-and-marketing-interaction"
"yearMonth" => "2016-12"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., ERICKSON, G., GRASS, D. et JØRGENSEN, S. (2016). Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, 18(4), pp. 1-36."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "JØRGENSEN S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
1 => "Wholesale price contract"
2 => "Revenue sharing contract"
3 => "Information structure"
4 => "Operations"
5 => "Marketing"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198916500146"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-36"
"volume" => "18"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures."
"en" => "The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2244
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "869"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "869"
"slug" => "contrat-a-prix-de-transfert-et-contrat-a-partage-de-revenu-dans-une-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2008-01"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Contrat à prix de transfert et contrat à partage de revenu dans une supply chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., JORGENSEN, S. et PASIN, F. (2008). Contrat à prix de transfert et contrat à partage de revenu dans une supply chain. <i>Revue Française de Gestion</i>, 186(6), pp. 134-147."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JORGENSEN S."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "134-147"
"volume" => "186"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article a pour objectif d'analyser les différences fondamentales entre un contrat à prix de transfert et un contrat de partage de revenu au sein d'une supply chain décentralisée constituée d'un producteur et d'un distributeur."
"en" => "The aim of the paper is to study some important differences between wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts in a decentralized supply chain."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2241
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "874"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "874"
"slug" => "controlling-pollution-and-environmental-absorption-capacity"
"yearMonth" => "2014-09"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Controlling Pollution and Environmental Absorption Capacity"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., BENCHEKROUN, H. et GRASS, D. (2014). Controlling Pollution and Environmental Absorption Capacity. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 220(1), pp. 111-133."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BENCHEKROUN H."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Pollution"
1 => "Environmental absorption capacity"
2 => "Production rate"
3 => "Emissions reduction effort"
4 => "Absorption development effort"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-011-0982-4"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "111-133"
"volume" => "220"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This pollution accumulation model shows that the environmental absorption capacity is impacted by economic activity. The resulting optimal control problem has two inter-related state variables: the stock of pollution and the absorption capacity of the environment. The stock of pollution decreases with environmental absorption capacity and increases with the rate of current emissions, which is controlled by a production level as well as an emissions reduction effort. However, the environmental absorption capacity is positively affected by an absorption development effort, and negatively impacted by the stock of pollution. Under specific conditions, it is shown that an optimal path, which can be either monotonic or following transient oscillations, leads to a (nontrivial) saddle-point characterized by a positive environmental absorption capacity."
"en" => "This pollution accumulation model shows that the environmental absorption capacity is impacted by economic activity. The resulting optimal control problem has two inter-related state variables: the stock of pollution and the absorption capacity of the environment. The stock of pollution decreases with environmental absorption capacity and increases with the rate of current emissions, which is controlled by a production level as well as an emissions reduction effort. However, the environmental absorption capacity is positively affected by an absorption development effort, and negatively impacted by the stock of pollution. Under specific conditions, it is shown that an optimal path, which can be either monotonic or following transient oscillations, leads to a (nontrivial) saddle-point characterized by a positive environmental absorption capacity."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2245
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1041"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1041"
"slug" => "dynamic-conformance-and-design-quality-in-a-supply-chain-an-assessment-of-contracts-coordinating-power"
"yearMonth" => "2013-07"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Dynamic Conformance and Design Quality in a Supply Chain: An Assessment Of Contracts’ Coordinating Power"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et KOGAN, K. (2013). Dynamic Conformance and Design Quality in a Supply Chain: An Assessment Of Contracts’ Coordinating Power. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 211(1), pp. 137-166."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Design quality"
1 => "Conformance quality"
2 => "Supply chain coordination"
3 => "Dynamic games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-013-1414-4"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "137-166"
"volume" => "211"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality."
"en" => "We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#1845
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1044"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1044"
"slug" => "optimal-dynamics-of-technology-and-price-in-a-duopoly-market"
"yearMonth" => "2012-09"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Optimal Dynamics of Technology and Price in a Duopoly Market"
"description" => "KIM, B., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PARK, S. (2012). Optimal Dynamics of Technology and Price in a Duopoly Market. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, 19(11), pp. 1017-1022."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KIM B."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PARK S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "New product innovation"
1 => "Technology"
2 => "Price"
3 => "Differential game"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:11"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504851.2011.610737?journalCode=rael20"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1017-1022"
"volume" => "19"
"number" => "11"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article analyse un marché de duopole dynamique, où la demande de chaque produit est décrite par un processus de diffusion influencé par des effets de différentiels de prix et d'innovation technologique, et la taille du marché potentiel dépend du niveau de technologie des produits en concurrence."
"en" => "This article examines a dynamic duopoly case, where the demand of a new product follows a diffusion model influenced by innovation and price differential effects, and the potential market size expands as the technology level embodied in the product advances."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2243
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1053"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1053"
"slug" => "economic-and-environmental-impact-of-vertical-and-horizontal-competition-and-integration"
"yearMonth" => "2019-03"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical and Horizontal Competition and Integration"
"description" => "SIM, J.E., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et KIM, B. (2019). Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical and Horizontal Competition and Integration. <i>Naval Research Logistics Quarterly</i>, 66(2), pp. 133-153."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SIM J.E."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KIM B."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Economic competitiveness"
1 => "Market structure"
2 => "Polluting emissions"
3 => "Sustainability"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/nav.21832"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "133-153"
"volume" => "66"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We explore the economic and environmental impact of market structure, i.e., competition or integration at vertical and horizontal levels. We consider a bilateral duopoly consisting of two manufacturers and two retailers in which each manufacturer offers a wholesale price contract to the respective retailer. The manufacturers decide wholesale prices and abatement efforts concerning pollution emissions related to manufacturing processes, whereas the retailers compete in quantities in the consumer market."
"en" => "We explore the economic and environmental impact of market structure, i.e., competition or integration at vertical and horizontal levels. We consider a bilateral duopoly consisting of two manufacturers and two retailers in which each manufacturer offers a wholesale price contract to the respective retailer. The manufacturers decide wholesale prices and abatement efforts concerning pollution emissions related to manufacturing processes, whereas the retailers compete in quantities in the consumer market."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2246
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1750"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1750"
"slug" => "learning-by-doing-with-spillovers-strategic-complementarity-versus-strategic-substitutability"
"yearMonth" => "2016-05"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Learning by Doing with Spillovers: Strategic Complementarity Versus Strategic Substitutability"
"description" => "KOGAN, K., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et CHERNONG, T. (2016). Learning by Doing with Spillovers: Strategic Complementarity Versus Strategic Substitutability. <i>Automatica</i>, 67, pp. 282-294."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "CHERNONG T."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0005109816000339"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "282-294"
"volume" => "67"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper we consider two competing firms that produce fully substitutable products and whose experience levels have a linear effect on their unit production costs. We assume that production experience is affected by random causes, and that the learning process may involve spillovers of experience from the competing firm. As in the Cournot competition, in this differential game the firms compete by choosing the quantities of products that they will produce. In contrast to the Cournot assumption, according to which firms maximize their profits by taking as given the quantity produced by the competitor, we assume that a firm may not be able to determine its competitor’s reaction to a change in its output and instead may conjecture the competitor’s response. We find that, in contrast to the case of a steady state, an open-loop equilibrium over a finite planning horizon may result in greater output (more competitive behavior) compared with a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We show that this result is due to the fact that strategic behavior in feedback Nash equilibrium depends on the relationship between the level of proprietary learning by doing (which encourages strategic complementarity) and the level of spillovers (which involves strategic substitutability)."
"en" => "In this paper we consider two competing firms that produce fully substitutable products and whose experience levels have a linear effect on their unit production costs. We assume that production experience is affected by random causes, and that the learning process may involve spillovers of experience from the competing firm. As in the Cournot competition, in this differential game the firms compete by choosing the quantities of products that they will produce. In contrast to the Cournot assumption, according to which firms maximize their profits by taking as given the quantity produced by the competitor, we assume that a firm may not be able to determine its competitor’s reaction to a change in its output and instead may conjecture the competitor’s response. We find that, in contrast to the case of a steady state, an open-loop equilibrium over a finite planning horizon may result in greater output (more competitive behavior) compared with a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We show that this result is due to the fact that strategic behavior in feedback Nash equilibrium depends on the relationship between the level of proprietary learning by doing (which encourages strategic complementarity) and the level of spillovers (which involves strategic substitutability)."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2247
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1920"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1920"
"slug" => "lexperience-francaise-du-supply-chain-management"
"yearMonth" => "2008-01"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "L'expérience Française du Supply Chain Management"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., DE GIOVANNI, P. et TARONDEAU, J.C. (2008). L'expérience Française du Supply Chain Management. <i>Revue Française de Gestion</i>, 186(6), pp. 90-116."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "TARONDEAU Jean-Claude"
"bid" => "B00000491"
"slug" => "tarondeau-jean-claude"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "de GIOVANNI Pietro"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "90-116"
"volume" => "186"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article expose les principaux résultats d'une étude empirique relative à l4expérience du supply chain management en France."
"en" => "This paper summarizes the results of an empirical investigation about the French experiences of supply chain management."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2248
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2067"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2067"
"slug" => "modeles-de-diffusion-en-marketing"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Modèles de diffusion en marketing"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1997). Modèles de diffusion en marketing. <i>Recherche et Applications en Marketing</i>, pp. 15-40."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tapiero C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "15-40"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous exposons les fondements analytiques des principaux modèles de représentation de la diffusion des innovations. Dans un second temps, nous proposons une confrontation économétrique de ces modèles à partir de données relatives à l'évolution des ventes de différents terminaux téléphoniques. Dans un dernier temps, nous passons en revue les conclusions fondamentales associées au problème du contrôle optimal de la diffusion des innovations."
"en" => "This paper presents the essential analytical models of innovation and diffusion. Subsequently econometric models and tests are proposed using data on the evolution of sales of new telephone equipments. Finally, the models considered are treated by an application of optimal techniques."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2249
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2154"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2154"
"slug" => "optimal-career-strategies-and-brain-drain-in-academia"
"yearMonth" => "2016-01"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Optimal Career Strategies and Brain Drain in Academia"
"description" => "SEIDL, A., WRZACZEK, S., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et FEICHTINGER, G. (2016). Optimal Career Strategies and Brain Drain in Academia. <i>Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications</i>, 168(1), pp. 268-295."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SEIDL A."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "WRZACZEK S."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "FEICHTINGER G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Optimal control"
1 => "Academic career"
2 => "History dependence"
3 => "Human capital"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10957-015-0747-3"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "268-295"
"volume" => "168"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The present paper investigates by means of an optimal control model how the reward of competencies in research and teaching in the private sector affects investments into these skills as well as the decision on whether and when to optimally leave academia. As the decision between academia and industry is obvious if a scientist has strong preference for either, we focus on scenarios where this is not the case."
"en" => "The present paper investigates by means of an optimal control model how the reward of competencies in research and teaching in the private sector affects investments into these skills as well as the decision on whether and when to optimally leave academia. As the decision between academia and industry is obvious if a scientist has strong preference for either, we focus on scenarios where this is not the case."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2250
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2247"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2247"
"slug" => "pollution-accumulation-and-abatement-policies-in-two-supply-chains-under-vertical-and-horizontal-competition-and-strategy-types"
"yearMonth" => "2021-01"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Pollution accumulation and abatement policies in two supply chains under vertical and horizontal competition and strategy types"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., SIM, J. et KIM, B. (2021). Pollution accumulation and abatement policies in two supply chains under vertical and horizontal competition and strategy types. <i>Omega</i>, 98(102108), pp. 1-19."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SIM Jeongeun"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KIM Bowon"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Pollution accumulation"
1 => "Price competition"
2 => "Double marginalization"
3 => "Supply chains"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048318314221?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-19"
"volume" => "98"
"number" => "102108"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This research investigates the impact of both horizontal and vertical competition, on the one hand, and strategy types (commitment-based versus contingent-based equilibrium strategies), on the other hand, on the pollution accumulated by two supply chains over time. We consider a two-stage game model where two manufacturers and two retailers are involved in a wholesale price contract, in order to supply the demand over a finite time horizon. In the first stage of the game, the manufacturers set their respective optimal transfer prices. During the second stage, polluting emissions are created over time in proportion with demand, which is controlled by the retailers’ respective consumer prices. In this stage, the manufacturers are involved in emissions abatement. In this setup, we seek to identify the combination of market structure and strategy type that leads the two supply chains to generate the lowest pollution intensity and the highest level of abatement intensity.\n
\n
Pollution accumulation; Price competition; Double marginalization; Supply chains.
"""
"en" => """
This research investigates the impact of both horizontal and vertical competition, on the one hand, and strategy types (commitment-based versus contingent-based equilibrium strategies), on the other hand, on the pollution accumulated by two supply chains over time. We consider a two-stage game model where two manufacturers and two retailers are involved in a wholesale price contract, in order to supply the demand over a finite time horizon. In the first stage of the game, the manufacturers set their respective optimal transfer prices. During the second stage, polluting emissions are created over time in proportion with demand, which is controlled by the retailers’ respective consumer prices. In this stage, the manufacturers are involved in emissions abatement. In this setup, we seek to identify the combination of market structure and strategy type that leads the two supply chains to generate the lowest pollution intensity and the highest level of abatement intensity.\n
\n
Pollution accumulation; Price competition; Double marginalization; Supply chains.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2251
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2248"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2248"
"slug" => "pollution-accumulation-and-abatement-policy-in-a-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Pollution Accumulation and Abatement Policy in a Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., SIMB, J.E. et KIM, B. (2016). Pollution Accumulation and Abatement Policy in a Supply Chain. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, 248(3), pp. 982-996."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SIMB J. E."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KIM B."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Double marginalization"
1 => "Pollution accumulation"
2 => "Abatement efforts"
3 => "Supply chain"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0377221715007262?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "982-996"
"volume" => "248"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer."
"en" => "This paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2252
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "533"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "533"
"slug" => "a-dynamic-game-of-operations-and-marketing-management-in-a-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2008-12"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "A Dynamic Game of Operations and Marketing Management in a Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., JORGENSEN, S. et PASIN, F. (2008). A Dynamic Game of Operations and Marketing Management in a Supply Chain. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, 10(4), pp. 373-397."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JORGENSEN S."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Jeux dynamiques"
1 => "Marketing"
2 => "Opérations"
3 => "Supply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "373-397"
"volume" => "10"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article analyse les différences essentielles entre le supply chain management dans des contextes non-coopératifs et coopératifs."
"en" => "The aim of the paper is to study some important differences between (classical) non-cooperative and (modern) cooperative supply chain management. For this purpose, the paper develops a differential game model involving operations and marketing activities that are performed by a manufacturer and a retailer in a simple two-member supply chain."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2253
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "534"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "534"
"slug" => "a-dynamic-game-with-monopolist-manufacturer-and-price-competing-duopolist-retailers"
"yearMonth" => "2013-11"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "A Dynamic Game with Monopolist Manufacturer and Price-Competing Duopolist Retailers"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., JORGENSEN, S. et PASIN, F. (2013). A Dynamic Game with Monopolist Manufacturer and Price-Competing Duopolist Retailers. <i>OR Spectrum</i>, 35(4), pp. 1059-1084."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "JORGENSEN S."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Operations management"
1 => "Marketing"
2 => "Supply chain management"
3 => "Differential games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00291-012-0300-9"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1059-1084"
"volume" => "35"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The paper considers a dynamic game with a single manufacturer who supplies two retailers. The manufacturer determines his production rate of a specific product, the rate of quality improvement efforts as well as the rate of advertising for the product. Each retailer controls her purchasing rate and the consumer sales price. Payments from a retailer to the manufacturer are determined by a wholesale price or a revenue-sharing scheme. The retailers operate in the same consumer market in which they compete in prices for the consumer demand. Nash equilibrium conditions are derived and numerical methods are employed to characterize equilibrium behavior of the players in a differential game of fixed and finite duration."
"en" => "The paper considers a dynamic game with a single manufacturer who supplies two retailers. The manufacturer determines his production rate of a specific product, the rate of quality improvement efforts as well as the rate of advertising for the product. Each retailer controls her purchasing rate and the consumer sales price. Payments from a retailer to the manufacturer are determined by a wholesale price or a revenue-sharing scheme. The retailers operate in the same consumer market in which they compete in prices for the consumer demand. Nash equilibrium conditions are derived and numerical methods are employed to characterize equilibrium behavior of the players in a differential game of fixed and finite duration."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "592"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "592"
"slug" => "accelerating-the-diffusion-of-innovations-under-mixed-word-of-mouth-through-marketing-operations-interaction"
"yearMonth" => "2018-05"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Accelerating the Diffusion of Innovations Under Mixed Word of Mouth Through Marketing–Operations Interaction"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., FEICHTINGER, G. et FRUCHTER, G.E. (2018). Accelerating the Diffusion of Innovations Under Mixed Word of Mouth Through Marketing–Operations Interaction. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 264(1-2), pp. 435-458."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FEICHTINGER G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FRUCHTER G. E."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Diffusion process"
1 => "Word-of-mouth"
2 => "Conformance quality"
3 => "Design quality"
4 => "Price"
5 => "Advertising effort"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-017-2649-2"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "435-458"
"volume" => "264"
"number" => "1-2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, an extension of the Bass model is suggested that accounts for the influence of conformance quality on mixed (i.e., positive and negative) word-of-mouth in the diffusion of a new product. A primary goal is to determine how an active operational policy seeking to continuously improve conformance quality affects the optimal leveraging of marketing instruments used to diffuse new products, and the resulting sales and profits. To do so, an optimal tradeoff by a monopolistic firm between advertising effort and price, on the one hand, and conformance quality, on the other hand, is analyzed, along with the implications for word of mouth effectiveness. Our results can be summarized as follows. Price and advertising levels are respectively lower and higher under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only. As a result, themarket potential and the innovation effect are higher under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only, as is the imitation effect due to conformance quality improvements over time. Also, greater cumulative sales and cumulative profits are obtained. However, higher design quality results in a lower price and greater advertising effort under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only. Finally, for lower design quality, the two policies result in different patterns (non-monotonic vs. monotonic) for price and advertising yet cumulative sales and profits are of quite similar magnitude."
"en" => "In this paper, an extension of the Bass model is suggested that accounts for the influence of conformance quality on mixed (i.e., positive and negative) word-of-mouth in the diffusion of a new product. A primary goal is to determine how an active operational policy seeking to continuously improve conformance quality affects the optimal leveraging of marketing instruments used to diffuse new products, and the resulting sales and profits. To do so, an optimal tradeoff by a monopolistic firm between advertising effort and price, on the one hand, and conformance quality, on the other hand, is analyzed, along with the implications for word of mouth effectiveness. Our results can be summarized as follows. Price and advertising levels are respectively lower and higher under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only. As a result, themarket potential and the innovation effect are higher under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only, as is the imitation effect due to conformance quality improvements over time. Also, greater cumulative sales and cumulative profits are obtained. However, higher design quality results in a lower price and greater advertising effort under an operations–marketing policy than under a marketing policy only. Finally, for lower design quality, the two policies result in different patterns (non-monotonic vs. monotonic) for price and advertising yet cumulative sales and profits are of quite similar magnitude."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "610"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "610"
"slug" => "advertising-and-quality-dependent-word-of-mouth-in-a-contagion-sales-model"
"yearMonth" => "2016-01"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Advertising and Quality-Dependent Word of Mouth in a Contagion Sales Model"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., FEICHTINGER, G., GRASS, D., HARTL, R.F. et KORT, P.M. (2016). Advertising and Quality-Dependent Word of Mouth in a Contagion Sales Model. <i>Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications</i>, 170(1), pp. 323-342."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FEICHTINGER G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "HARTL R. F."
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "KORT P. M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Sales"
1 => "Word-of-mouth"
2 => "Advertising effort"
3 => "Conformance quality"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10957-015-0855-0"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "323-342"
"volume" => "170"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In the literature on marketing models, the assumption of mixed word-of-mouth has been limited to the Bass diffusion model. Yet explicit leveraging of the originating factors of such assumption is lacking. Apart from that example, mixed word-of-mouth has been disregarded in contagion sales models. This paper bridges the gap by suggesting a sales model where both positive and negative word-of-mouth affect the attraction rate of new customers, along with advertising."
"en" => "In the literature on marketing models, the assumption of mixed word-of-mouth has been limited to the Bass diffusion model. Yet explicit leveraging of the originating factors of such assumption is lacking. Apart from that example, mixed word-of-mouth has been disregarded in contagion sales models. This paper bridges the gap by suggesting a sales model where both positive and negative word-of-mouth affect the attraction rate of new customers, along with advertising."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "700"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "700"
"slug" => "autonomous-and-advertising-dependent-word-of-mouth-under-costly-dynamic-pricing"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Autonomous and Advertising-Dependent Word of Mouth under Costly Dynamic Pricing"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., FEICHTINGER, G., GRASS, D., HARTL, R. et KORT, P.M. (2016). Autonomous and Advertising-Dependent Word of Mouth under Costly Dynamic Pricing. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, 251(3), pp. 860-872."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FEICHTINGER G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "HARTL R."
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "KORT P. M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dynamic pricing"
1 => "Advertising effort"
2 => "Word of mouth"
3 => "Marketing strategy"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S037722171501084X"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "860-872"
"volume" => "251"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Autonomous ‘word of mouth’, as a channel of social influence that is out of firms’ direct control, has acquired particular importance with the development of the Internet. Depending on whether a given product or service is a good or a bad deal, this can significantly contribute to commercial success or failure. Yet the existing dynamic models of sales in marketing still assume that the influence of word of mouth on sales is at best advertising-dependent. This omission can produce ineffective management and therefore misleading marketing policies. This paper seeks to bridge the gap by introducing a contagion sales model of a monopolist firm's product where sales are affected by advertising-dependent as well as autonomous word of mouth. We assume that the firm's attraction rate of new customers is determined by the degree at which the current sales price is advantageous or not compared with the current customers’ reservation price. A primary goal of the paper is to determine the optimal sales price and advertising effort. We show that, despite costly price adjustments, the interactions between sales price, advertising-dependent and autonomous word of mouth can result in complex dynamic pricing policies involving history-dependence or limit cycling consisting of alternating attraction of new customers and attrition of current customers."
"en" => "Autonomous ‘word of mouth’, as a channel of social influence that is out of firms’ direct control, has acquired particular importance with the development of the Internet. Depending on whether a given product or service is a good or a bad deal, this can significantly contribute to commercial success or failure. Yet the existing dynamic models of sales in marketing still assume that the influence of word of mouth on sales is at best advertising-dependent. This omission can produce ineffective management and therefore misleading marketing policies. This paper seeks to bridge the gap by introducing a contagion sales model of a monopolist firm's product where sales are affected by advertising-dependent as well as autonomous word of mouth. We assume that the firm's attraction rate of new customers is determined by the degree at which the current sales price is advantageous or not compared with the current customers’ reservation price. A primary goal of the paper is to determine the optimal sales price and advertising effort. We show that, despite costly price adjustments, the interactions between sales price, advertising-dependent and autonomous word of mouth can result in complex dynamic pricing policies involving history-dependence or limit cycling consisting of alternating attraction of new customers and attrition of current customers."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "701"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "701"
"slug" => "autonomous-and-induced-production-learning-under-price-and-quality-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2019-03"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Autonomous and Induced Production Learning Under Price and Quality Competition"
"description" => "KOGAN, K. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2019). Autonomous and Induced Production Learning Under Price and Quality Competition. <i>Applied Mathematical Modelling</i>, 67, pp. 74-84."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Learning by doing"
1 => "Conformance quality"
2 => "Production dynamics"
3 => "Price and quality competition"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0307904X18305092?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "74-84"
"volume" => "67"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Recent empirical studies indicate that improvements in product conformance quality exhibit learning-by-doing patterns. We address quality improvement in a competitive duopoly market for partially substitutable products characterized by levels of quality that are not necessarily identical. The products’ quality is described with a hazard rate that can be improved both by accumulating production experience (autonomous learning) and quality improvement efforts (induced learning). Given that defective items are fully reimbursable and the demands exhibit increasing returns to scale, we derive Nash equilibrium pricing and induced learning effort dynamic policies. We show that when the effectiveness of autonomous learning prevails over the effectiveness of efforts in induced learning, equilibrium prices gradually grow over time; the trend is quite the opposite when autonomous learning is less effective than induced learning."
"en" => "Recent empirical studies indicate that improvements in product conformance quality exhibit learning-by-doing patterns. We address quality improvement in a competitive duopoly market for partially substitutable products characterized by levels of quality that are not necessarily identical. The products’ quality is described with a hazard rate that can be improved both by accumulating production experience (autonomous learning) and quality improvement efforts (induced learning). Given that defective items are fully reimbursable and the demands exhibit increasing returns to scale, we derive Nash equilibrium pricing and induced learning effort dynamic policies. We show that when the effectiveness of autonomous learning prevails over the effectiveness of efforts in induced learning, equilibrium prices gradually grow over time; the trend is quite the opposite when autonomous learning is less effective than induced learning."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "4185"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "4185"
"slug" => "supplier-manufacturer-collaboration-on-new-product-development"
"yearMonth" => "2007-01"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "Supplier Manufacturer Collaboration on New Product Development"
"description" => "BOWON, K. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2007). Supplier Manufacturer Collaboration on New Product Development. Dans: <i>Advances in Dynamic Game Theory. Numerical Methods, Algorithms, and Applications to Ecology and Economics</i>. 1st ed. Birkhäuser, pp. 527-546."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bowon K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Advances in Dynamic Game Theory. Numerical Methods, Algorithms, and Applications to Ecology and Economics"
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Amélioration de la qualité"
1 => "Innovation"
2 => "Jeux différentiels"
3 => "Supply chain"
4 => "Supply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 14:06:32"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "527-546"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans ce chapitre, nous formulons un modèle de jeu dynamique de collaboration entre un producteur et un fournisseur au sein duquel la problématique fondamentale pour chaque joueur réside dans l'allocation optimale de l'effort entre l'amélioration de la qualité d'un produit existant et le développement d'un nouveau produit. Les contextes non-coopératif et coopératif sont successivement analysés. Une analyse numérique est ensuite réalisée afin de déterminer la sensibilté des variables de décision aux variations des paramètres du jeu."
"en" => "In this chapter, we develop a dynamic model of collaboration between a manufacturer and its supplier, where the fundamental issue is, for each player, how to allocate own resources between improving an existing product and developping a new one. We study the optimal time path of effort allocation for each player in a noncooperative setting, and then look into the cooperative setting. We finally conduct a numerical analysis and observe how the optimal dynamics of keys variables change as parameters of the game vary."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5292"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5292"
"slug" => "a-dynamic-game-of-pollution-and-environmental-absorption-capacity"
"yearMonth" => "2011-07"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "A Dynamic Game of Pollution and Environmental Absorption Capacity"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2011). A Dynamic Game of Pollution and Environmental Absorption Capacity. Dans: IFORS 2011 Conference."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "IFORS 2011 Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we extend the model in El Ouardighi and Benchekroun (2010) with a dynamic environmental absorption capacity as a two-player dynamic game. We notably compare the open-loop Nash equilibrium with the cooperative solution. Also, the stability of both equilibria is analyzed."
"en" => "In this paper, we extend the model in El Ouardighi and Benchekroun (2010) with a dynamic environmental absorption capacity as a two-player dynamic game. We notably compare the open-loop Nash equilibrium with the cooperative solution. Also, the stability of both equilibria is analyzed."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5375"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5375"
"slug" => "advertising-and-quality-dependent-word-of-mouth-in-a-contagion-sales-model"
"yearMonth" => "2015-11"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Advertising and Quality-Dependent Word of Mouth in a Contagion Sales Model"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2015). Advertising and Quality-Dependent Word of Mouth in a Contagion Sales Model. Dans: INFORMS Annual Meeting 2015."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "INFORMS Annual Meeting 2015"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5398"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5398"
"slug" => "an-assessment-of-contracts-coordinating-power-in-supply-quality-management"
"yearMonth" => "2011-05"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "An Assessment of Contracts’ Coordinating Power in Supply Quality Management"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et KOGAN, K. (2011). An Assessment of Contracts’ Coordinating Power in Supply Quality Management. Dans: 2011 Optimization Days."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2011 Optimization Days"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5474"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5474"
"slug" => "autonomous-and-advertising-dependent-word-of-mouth-under-costly-dynamic-pricing"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Autonomous and Advertising Dependent Word of Mouth under Costly Dynamic Pricing"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., FEICHTINGER, G., GRASS, D., HARTL, R. et KORT, P.M. (2015). Autonomous and Advertising Dependent Word of Mouth under Costly Dynamic Pricing. Dans: 2015 Annual Meeting of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "FEICHTINGER G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "HARTL R."
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "KORT P. M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2015 Annual Meeting of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5475"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5475"
"slug" => "autonomous-and-induced-production-learning-under-price-and-quality-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2019-05"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Autonomous and Induced Production Learning Under Price and Quality Competition"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2019). Autonomous and Induced Production Learning Under Price and Quality Competition. Dans: Optimization Days 2019."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Optimization Days 2019"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5537"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5537"
"slug" => "capital-growth-with-recycling-and-the-environmental-kuznets-curve"
"yearMonth" => "2016-11"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Capital Growth With Recycling And The Environmental Kuznets Curve"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2016). Capital Growth With Recycling And The Environmental Kuznets Curve. Dans: 2016 Annual Meeting of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2016 Annual Meeting of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5555"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5555"
"slug" => "cheatin-or-delighting-customer-on-producquality"
"yearMonth" => "2018-05"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Cheatin or Delighting Customer on ProducQuality ?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et GRASS, D. (2018). Cheatin or Delighting Customer on ProducQuality ? Dans: Optimization Days 2018."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Optimization Days 2018"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5556"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5556"
"slug" => "cheating-or-delighting-customers-on-product-quality"
"yearMonth" => "2017-10"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2017). Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality. Dans: 2017 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Annual Meeting."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2017 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5557"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5557"
"slug" => "cheating-or-delighting-customers-on-product-quality"
"yearMonth" => "2018-05"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et GRASS, D. (2018). Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality? Dans: 2018 Séminaire Fondation HEC Montréal."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2018 Séminaire Fondation HEC Montréal"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2268
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5558"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5558"
"slug" => "cheating-or-delighting-customers-on-product-quality"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2019). Cheating or Delighting Customers on Product Quality? Dans: 30th European Conference on Operational Research 2019 (EURO 30)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "30th European Conference on Operational Research 2019 (EURO 30)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2269
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5640"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5640"
"slug" => "control-of-addictive-behaviors-with-relapsing"
"yearMonth" => "2018-07"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Control Of Addictive Behaviors with Relapsing"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et GRASS, D. (2018). Control Of Addictive Behaviors with Relapsing. Dans: 14th Viennese Conference on Optimal Control and Dynamic Games."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "14th Viennese Conference on Optimal Control and Dynamic Games"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2270
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5647"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5647"
"slug" => "cooperation-in-teams-a-real-effort-task-experiment-with-punishment-and-forgiveness"
"yearMonth" => "2012-09"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Cooperation in Teams: A Real Effort Task Experiment with Punishment and Forgiveness"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2012). Cooperation in Teams: A Real Effort Task Experiment with Punishment and Forgiveness. Dans: Economic Science Association European Conference 2012."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Economic Science Association European Conference 2012"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions le problème du mensonge dans un jeu de l'ultimatum, dans lequel les receveurs n'ont qu'une information imparfaite quant à la somme d'argent reçue par les offreurs. Les derniers peuvent envoyer un message invérifiable quant au montant reçu. En moyenne, 88.5 des offreurs vont communiquer un montant inférieur à la somme réelle. Le mensonge est associé systématiquement à une offre réelle plus faible."
"en" => "Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about the endowment received at the outset of the game. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders, simply in order to reduce their expected endowment and be able to submit smaller offers. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 19%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections increases. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2271
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5668"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5668"
"slug" => "cost-reducing-rd-with-free-spillovers-and-price-competition-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
"yearMonth" => "2013-07"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Cost-Reducing R&D with Free Spillovers and Price Competition in a Dynamic Duopoly"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., SHNIDERMAN, M. et PASIN, F. (2013). Cost-Reducing R&D with Free Spillovers and Price Competition in a Dynamic Duopoly. Dans: 26th EURO – INFORMS Joint International Conference."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHNIDERMAN M."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "26th EURO – INFORMS Joint International Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The objective in this paper is to study the R&D investment and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic setup. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit the rival firm without payment. The paper compares open-loop and closed-loop Nash strategies to determine the extent at which they affect the pricing and R&D investment decisions and the payoffs of the competitors."
"en" => "The objective in this paper is to study the R&D investment and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic setup. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit the rival firm without payment. The paper compares open-loop and closed-loop Nash strategies to determine the extent at which they affect the pricing and R&D investment decisions and the payoffs of the competitors."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
33 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2272
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5669"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5669"
"slug" => "cost-reducing-rd-with-free-spillovers-and-price-competition-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Cost-Reducing R&D with Free Spillovers and Price Competition in a Dynamic Duopoly"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., PASIN, F. et MATAN, S. (2013). Cost-Reducing R&D with Free Spillovers and Price Competition in a Dynamic Duopoly. Dans: Optimization Days 2013."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "MATAN S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Optimization Days 2013"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
34 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2273
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5718"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5718"
"slug" => "design-quality-improvement-and-cost-reducing-rd-strategies-under-conventional-supply-chain-contracts"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Design Quality Improvement and Cost-Reducing R&D Strategies Under Conventional Supply Chain Contracts"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2016). Design Quality Improvement and Cost-Reducing R&D Strategies Under Conventional Supply Chain Contracts. Dans: 7th Workshop on Dynamics Games in Management Science."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "7th Workshop on Dynamics Games in Management Science"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
35 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5824"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5824"
"slug" => "economic-and-environmental-impact-of-vertical-and-horizontal-competition-and-integration"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical and Horizontal Competition and Integration"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2019). Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical and Horizontal Competition and Integration. Dans: 2019 INFORMS International Conference."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 INFORMS International Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
36 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5825"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5825"
"slug" => "economic-and-environmental-impact-of-vertical-decisional-sequences-under-horizontal-competition-and-integration"
"yearMonth" => "2017-05"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical Decisional Sequences under Horizontal Competition and Integration"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2017). Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical Decisional Sequences under Horizontal Competition and Integration. Dans: 2017 Optimization Days."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2017 Optimization Days"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
37 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5828"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5828"
"slug" => "economic-growth-with-recycling-and-the-environmental-kuznets-curve"
"yearMonth" => "2016-09"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Economic Growth with Recycling and the Environmental Kuznets Curve"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2016). Economic Growth with Recycling and the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Dans: 5th EULOG Meeting 2016."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "5th EULOG Meeting 2016"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
38 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5848"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5848"
"slug" => "emissions-and-deforestation-policies-under-endogenous-environmental-absorption-efficiency"
"yearMonth" => "2016-05"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Emissions and Deforestation Policies under Endogenous Environmental Absorption Efficiency"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2016). Emissions and Deforestation Policies under Endogenous Environmental Absorption Efficiency. Dans: 2016 Optimization Days."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2016 Optimization Days"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
39 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8423"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8423"
"slug" => "supplier-manufacturer-collaboration-on-new-product-development"
"yearMonth" => "2003-06"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Supplier-manufacturer Collaboration on New Product Development"
"description" => "KIM, B. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2003). <i>Supplier-manufacturer Collaboration on New Product Development</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KIM B."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of collaboration between a manufacturer and its supplier, where the fundamental issue for each of them is how to allocate its resources between improving an existing product and developing a new one. We first study the optimal path of efforts allocation for each player in a non-cooperative setting, and then look into a cooperative setting. We finally conduct a numerical analysis and observe how the optimal dynamics of key variables change as initial configurations of the fame vary."
"en" => "In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of collaboration between a manufacturer and its supplier, where the fundamental issue for each of them is how to allocate its resources between improving an existing product and developing a new one. We first study the optimal path of efforts allocation for each player in a non-cooperative setting, and then look into a cooperative setting. We finally conduct a numerical analysis and observe how the optimal dynamics of key variables change as initial configurations of the fame vary."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
40 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8448"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8448"
"slug" => "the-dynamics-of-cooperation"
"yearMonth" => "2000-01"
"year" => "2000"
"title" => "The Dynamics of Cooperation"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2000). <i>The Dynamics of Cooperation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, le problème de la coopération est formulé dans un cadre dynamique. Le modèle proposé relie la dynamique de l'activité de production jointe associant deux joueurs et la dynamique de l'activité de monitoring commun des contributions individuelles des deux joueurs. L'analyse de l'existence d'un état d'équilibre stationnaire conduit à déterminer, à partir de conditions initiales données, un ensemble de prédictions sur l'issue de la coopération à long terme."
"en" => "In this paper, we formulate the problem of cooperation in a dynamic framework. The model proposed interrelates the dynamics of a joint production activity involving two players and the dynamics of a common monitoring activity of individual contributions of the two players. Analysis of the existence of a stationary equilibrium leads to a set of predictions on the long run outcome of cooperation, given initial conditions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
41 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8449"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8449"
"slug" => "the-dynamics-of-optimal-cooperation"
"yearMonth" => "2001-02"
"year" => "2001"
"title" => "The Dynamics of Optimal Cooperation"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et GANNON, F. (2001). <i>The Dynamics of Optimal Cooperation</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "GANNON F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal cooperation in a centralized dynamic framework. The proposed model interrelates the dynamics of a joint production activity and the dynamics of a common monitoring activity involving two partners delegating authority to an independent entity intended to solicit their optimal contributions. The specification of an objective function for the independent entity leads to the search for the dynamic optimal contribution policy that should be followed by each partner under a nonzero tolerance level of opportunism. Using the maximum principle, the determination of the existence of a cooperative stationary equilibrium provides a set of predictions on the long run issue of the partnership from particular initial conditions."
"en" => "In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal cooperation in a centralized dynamic framework. The proposed model interrelates the dynamics of a joint production activity and the dynamics of a common monitoring activity involving two partners delegating authority to an independent entity intended to solicit their optimal contributions. The specification of an objective function for the independent entity leads to the search for the dynamic optimal contribution policy that should be followed by each partner under a nonzero tolerance level of opportunism. Using the maximum principle, the determination of the existence of a cooperative stationary equilibrium provides a set of predictions on the long run issue of the partnership from particular initial conditions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
42 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8735"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8735"
"slug" => "comment-gerer-le-secteur-halieutique"
"yearMonth" => "1999-09"
"year" => "1999"
"title" => "Comment gérer le secteur halieutique ?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (1999). Comment gérer le secteur halieutique ? <i>La Vie Economique</i>, pp. 26-27."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "26-27"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles ou vidéos de vulgarisation"
"en" => "Press article, video or other popular media"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'objet de l'article est de dresser un diagnostic de l'état de la gestion du secteur halieutique au Maroc, et de proposer un mode de traitement adapté au double problème de l'allocation optimale au sein de chaque filière de transformation des ressources halieutiques au niveau national et de la réorganisation des systèmes d'approvisionnement au sein de chaque branche des différentes filières."
"en" => "This paper makes a diagnosis of the state of the management of the halieutic sector's management in Morroco, and proposes a methodological framework to solve the problem of optimal allocation of halieutical resources, as well as the problem of optimal provisionning, within each industry."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
43 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2282
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "9543"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "9543"
"slug" => "the-poseidon-adventure"
"yearMonth" => "2009"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "The Poseidon adventure"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2009). The Poseidon adventure. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Production"
1 => "Transportation"
2 => "Supply chain management"
3 => "Public policy"
4 => "Production and Operations Management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:16"
"publicationUrl" => "http://dspace.essec.fr/handle/essec/4023"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Etudes de cas déposées"
"en" => "Published cases"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "You have been asked by the Ministry of Fisheries (MOF) of Poseidon to design a plan for optimal allocation of sardine levies among the five branches of the sardine industry. The new plan should rely on a rigorous characterization of the problem and take into account any variation in levies volume. Further, in order to strengthening the competitiveness of the canning industry, you are also expected by the MOF of Poseidon to develop an optimal organization of supply in the canning industry. The new supply organization should rely on the results from the optimal allocation plan of resources and prove to be feasible."
"en" => "You have been asked by the Ministry of Fisheries (MOF) of Poseidon to design a plan for optimal allocation of sardine levies among the five branches of the sardine industry. The new plan should rely on a rigorous characterization of the problem and take into account any variation in levies volume. Further, in order to strengthening the competitiveness of the canning industry, you are also expected by the MOF of Poseidon to develop an optimal organization of supply in the canning industry. The new supply organization should rely on the results from the optimal allocation plan of resources and prove to be feasible."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
44 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2283
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "9608"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "9608"
"slug" => "the-poseidon-adventure"
"yearMonth" => "2009"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "The Poseidon adventure"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2009). The Poseidon adventure. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Production"
1 => "Transportation"
2 => "Supply chain management"
3 => "Public policy"
4 => "Production and Operations Management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:17"
"publicationUrl" => "http://dspace.essec.fr/handle/essec/4025"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Etudes de cas déposées"
"en" => "Published cases"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "You have been asked by the Ministry of Fisheries (MOF) of Poseidon to design a plan for optimal allocation of sardine levies among the five branches of the sardine industry. The new plan should rely on a rigorous characterization of the problem and take into account any variation in levies volume. Further, in order to strengthening the competitiveness of the canning industry, you are also expected by the MOF of Poseidon to develop an optimal organization of supply in the canning industry. The new supply organization should rely on the results from the optimal allocation plan of resources and prove to be feasible."
"en" => "You have been asked by the Ministry of Fisheries (MOF) of Poseidon to design a plan for optimal allocation of sardine levies among the five branches of the sardine industry. The new plan should rely on a rigorous characterization of the problem and take into account any variation in levies volume. Further, in order to strengthening the competitiveness of the canning industry, you are also expected by the MOF of Poseidon to develop an optimal organization of supply in the canning industry. The new supply organization should rely on the results from the optimal allocation plan of resources and prove to be feasible."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
45 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2284
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "9729"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "9729"
"slug" => "dynamique-industrielle-et-cycle-de-vie-des-produits"
"yearMonth" => "1994-01"
"year" => "1994"
"title" => "Dynamique industrielle et cycle de vie des produits"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (1994). <i>Dynamique industrielle et cycle de vie des produits</i>. Rabat: Maarif El Jadida."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "El Ouardighi Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Livres"
"en" => "Books"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
46 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2285
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "9816"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "9816"
"slug" => "optimal-advertising-and-quality-under-imperfect-information"
"yearMonth" => "1997-01"
"year" => "1997"
"title" => "Optimal advertising and quality under imperfect information"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C.S. (1997). <i>Optimal advertising and quality under imperfect information</i>."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "El Ouardighi Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tapiero Charles S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:21"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
47 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2286
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6748"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6748"
"slug" => "non-cooperative-trade-offs-among-design-quality-and-cost-reducing-rd-in-a-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2013-10"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Non-cooperative Trade-offs among Design Quality and Cost-reducing R&D in a Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., DENOYEL, V. et ESPINOZA, J.C. (2013). Non-cooperative Trade-offs among Design Quality and Cost-reducing R&D in a Supply Chain. Dans: INFORMS Annual Meeting 2013."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DENOYEL V."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "ESPINOZA J.-C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "INFORMS Annual Meeting 2013"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
48 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2287
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6797"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6797"
"slug" => "operations-and-marketing-equilibrium-strategies-under-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contracts"
"yearMonth" => "2012-10"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Operations and Marketing Equilibrium Strategies Under Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., ERICKSON, G., GRAS, D. et JORGENSEN, S. (2012). Operations and Marketing Equilibrium Strategies Under Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts. Dans: INFORMS 2012 Annual Meeting."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRAS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "JORGENSEN S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "INFORMS 2012 Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:10"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
49 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2288
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6798"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6798"
"slug" => "operations-and-marketing-equilibrium-strategies-under-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contracts-in-a-dynamic-vertical-channel"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Operations and Marketing Equilibrium Strategies under Wholesale Price and Revenue sharing Contracts in a Dynamic Vertical Channel"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., ERICKSON, G., GRAS, D. et JORGENSEN, S. (2013). Operations and Marketing Equilibrium Strategies under Wholesale Price and Revenue sharing Contracts in a Dynamic Vertical Channel. Dans: 10th International Conference on Computational Management Science."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRAS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "JORGENSEN S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "10th International Conference on Computational Management Science"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
50 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2289
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6800"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6800"
"slug" => "optimal-advertising-and-signal-reliability"
"yearMonth" => "1998-07"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "Optimal Advertising and Signal Reliability"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1998). Optimal Advertising and Signal Reliability."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
51 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2290
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6908"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6908"
"slug" => "pollution-accumulation-and-abatement-policies-under-bilateral-duopolistic-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2015-05"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Pollution Accumulation and Abatement Policies under Bilateral Duopolistic Competition"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2015). Pollution Accumulation and Abatement Policies under Bilateral Duopolistic Competition. Dans: 13th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control and Dynamic Games."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "13th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control and Dynamic Games"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
52 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2291
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6909"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6909"
"slug" => "pollution-control-bilateral-duopoly-double-marginalization-dynamic-games"
"yearMonth" => "2014-11"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Pollution Control, Bilateral Duopoly, Double Marginalization, Dynamic Games"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et BOWON, K. (2014). Pollution Control, Bilateral Duopoly, Double Marginalization, Dynamic Games. Dans: 2014 INFORMS Annual Meeting."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BOWON K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2014 INFORMS Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
53 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2292
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6952"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6952"
"slug" => "production-capacity-and-pricing-equilibrium-strategies-in-a-dynamic-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2012-07"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Production Capacity and Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Dynamic Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2012). Production Capacity and Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Dynamic Supply Chain. Dans: 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
54 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2293
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6953"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6953"
"slug" => "production-capacity-and-pricing-equilibrium-strategies-in-a-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2011-11"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Production Capacity and Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et BOWON, K. (2011). Production Capacity and Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Supply Chain. Dans: INFORMS 2011 Annual Meeting."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BOWON K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "INFORMS 2011 Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
55 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2294
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6954"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6954"
"slug" => "production-capacity-of-pricing-equilibrium-strategies-in-a-dynamic-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2012-05"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Production Capacity of Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Dynamic Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et ERICKSON, G. (2012). Production Capacity of Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Dynamic Supply Chain. Dans: Journée de l'Optimisation 2012."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Journée de l'Optimisation 2012"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
56 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2295
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7160"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7160"
"slug" => "spilloverstransboundary-pollution-control-and-environmental-absorption-efficiency-management"
"yearMonth" => "2014-07"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "SpilloversTransboundary Pollution Control And Environmental Absorption Efficiency Management"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et KOGAN, K. (2014). SpilloversTransboundary Pollution Control And Environmental Absorption Efficiency Management. Dans: 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
57 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2296
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7347"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7347"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-double-marginalization-on-the-evolution-of-pollution-in-a-simple-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2014-05"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "The Impact of Double Marginalization on the Evolution of Pollution in a Simple Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2014). The Impact of Double Marginalization on the Evolution of Pollution in a Simple Supply Chain. Dans: Journée de l'Optimisation 2014."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Journée de l'Optimisation 2014"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
58 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2297
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7351"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7351"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-partial-information-sharing-in-a-two-echelon-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2011-11"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "The Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain"
"description" => "SHNAIDERMANN, M. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2011). The Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain. Dans: INFORMS 2011 Annual Meeting."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHNAIDERMANN M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "INFORMS 2011 Annual Meeting"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
59 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2298
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7511"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7511"
"slug" => "transboundary-pollution-control-and-environmental-absorption-efficiency-management"
"yearMonth" => "2013-11"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Transboundary Pollution Control and Environmental Absorption Efficiency Management"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2013). Transboundary Pollution Control and Environmental Absorption Efficiency Management. Dans: 5th Viennese Vintage Workshop on Heterogeneous Dynamic Models of Economic & Population System."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "5th Viennese Vintage Workshop on Heterogeneous Dynamic Models of Economic & Population System"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
60 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2299
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7734"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7734"
"slug" => "models-and-methods-in-economics-and-management-science-essays-in-honor-of-charles-s-tapiero"
"yearMonth" => "2013-07"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Tapiero"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et KONSTANTIN, K. [Eds] (2013). <i>Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Tapiero</i>. Springer."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KONSTANTIN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 16:57:04"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "198"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Direction d'ouvrage"
"en" => "Book editor"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This book presents important developments and contributions related to general modeling and analysis; applications to marketing, economy and finance; and applications to operations and manufacturing."
"en" => "This book presents important developments and contributions related to general modeling and analysis; applications to marketing, economy and finance; and applications to operations and manufacturing."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
61 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2300
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7842"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7842"
"slug" => "rescension-de-louvrage-la-mondialisation-stade-supreme-du-capitalisme"
"yearMonth" => "2013-12"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Rescension de l'ouvrage : La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2013). Rescension de l'ouvrage : La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ? Revue Française de Gestion, France."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:14"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "175-177"
"volume" => null
"number" => "236"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Compte-rendus d'ouvrage"
"en" => "Book reviews"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Rescension de l'ouvrage : "La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ?", sous la direction de Wladimir Andreff."
"en" => "Rescension de l'ouvrage : "La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ?", sous la direction de Wladimir Andreff."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
62 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2301
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7848"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7848"
"slug" => "supply-chain-games-operations-management-and-risk-valuation"
"yearMonth" => "2009-03"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Supply Chain Games: Operations Management and Risk Valuation"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2009). Supply Chain Games: Operations Management and Risk Valuation. International Game Theory Review, États-Unis."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
1 => "Théorie des jeux"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:14"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "117-119"
"volume" => "11"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Compte-rendus d'ouvrage"
"en" => "Book reviews"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
63 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2302
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7887"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7887"
"slug" => "achat-reachat-et-qualite-des-produits-en-contexte-dasymetrie-dinformation"
"yearMonth" => "1995-12"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Achat, réachat et qualité des produits en contexte d'asymétrie d'information"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1995). <i>Achat, réachat et qualité des produits en contexte d'asymétrie d'information</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle stochastique de comportement du consommateur régi par un processus séquentiel d'achat-réachat. La résolution analytique de ce modèle par l'application du principe du maximum permet de déterminer la trajectoire optimale stationnaire du prix, de l'investissement publicitaire et de la qualité pour un produit ayant une durée de vie exponentielle et pour un taux de fidélité de la demande inférieur à 1/2."
"en" => "This paper proposes a stochastic model of consumer behavior with repeat purchases. An application of Pontryagin's Maximum principle to the defined model allowed us to calculate the optimal price, advertising investment and the product quality when the product life time has an exponential distribution and the repeat purchase probability is smaller than 0.5."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
64 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2303
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7889"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7889"
"slug" => "advertising-and-quality-decisions-over-time"
"yearMonth" => "2002-07"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Advertising and Quality Decisions over Time"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PASIN, F. (2002). <i>Advertising and Quality Decisions over Time</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article propose un modèle combinant une variable d'attraction (l'effort publicitaire) et une variable de rejet (la qualité) pour représenter la dynamique du marché. L'analyse du modèle proposé dans des contextes de monopole et de duopole produit des résultats qualitatifs relatifs au mix optimal de prix, publicité et qualité. Un algorithme numérique de résolution de jeux différentiels à variables de contrôle indépendantes est présenté afin de résoudre efficacement les valeurs optimales de l'effort publicitaire, de la qualité et du prix dans le temps. En ce sens, la résolution numérique des modèles proposés révèle des stratégies contrastées à la foi au sein du duopole et entre le monopole et le duopole."
"en" => "Abstract: In this paper, we propose a pull and push dynamic model involving one attraction factor (advertising) and one rejection factor (quality) to represent market share competition. The analysis of the proposed model in the monopoly and the duopoly contexts respectively provides qualitative results for the optimal price, advertising and quality mix. A numerical algorithm for the resolution of differential games involving interdependent control variables is introduced to efficiently solve the optimal advertising, quality and pricing values over time. In particular, the comparative numerical study reveals contrasting strategies within and between the duopoly and the monopoly market structures."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
65 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2304
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7959"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7959"
"slug" => "coordination-in-teams-a-real-effort-task-experiment-with-informal-punishment"
"yearMonth" => "2013-08"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2013). <i>Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Economie expérimentale"
1 => "Performance"
2 => "Sanction"
3 => "Travail d'équipe"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une étude expérimentale appliquée au problème du travail d'équipe. La tache consiste à compter le nombre d’occurrences du chiffre 7 dans des blocs de chiffre. Les équipes sont composées de deux joueurs. A chaque tour, le joueur qui fait le meilleur score peut appliquer une sanction à l'autre. Nous étudions les stratégies et les comportements des deux joueurs, dans une interaction qui dure quatre tours."
"en" => "This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
66 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2305
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8001"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8001"
"slug" => "dynamique-des-ventes-et-strategies-publicitaires-concurrentielles"
"yearMonth" => "2002-11"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Dynamique des ventes et stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2002). <i>Dynamique des ventes et stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, un inventaire sélectif des applications publicitaires des jeux différentiels est réalisé. Notamment, les stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles sont analysées en contexte de duopole à partir de modèles dynamiques des ventes en temps continu. Dans un premier temps, les stratégies publicitaires respectivement associées aux modèles d'effort publicitaire excédentaire, de Vidale-Wolfe et de Lanchester sont étudiées. Dans un second temps, les extensions reposant sur des combinaisons appariées de ces modèles génériques sont analysées. L'apport méthodologique des jeux différentiels dans le cadre de la formulation des stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles est ainsi mis en évidence."
"en" => "In this paper, a selective survey of differential games advertising applications is made. Using continuous time dynamic models of sales, the competitive advertising strategies are analyzed in duopoly market. In this first part, the advertising strategies derived from excess advertising, Vidale-Wolfe and Lanchester models are respectively studied. In the second part, extensions using a combination of these generic models are developed. Doing so, the methodological contribution of differential games to competitive advertising issues is emphasized."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
67 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2306
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8131"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8131"
"slug" => "la-multinationalisation-des-entreprises-francaises"
"yearMonth" => "1992-02"
"year" => "1992"
"title" => "La multinationalisation des entreprises françaises"
"description" => "VAN WIJK, G. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (1992). <i>La multinationalisation des entreprises françaises</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "van WIJK Gilles"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article présente les tendances récentes de la multinationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises. Il s'intéresse notamment à l'évolution des implantations françaises à l'étranger et il souligne l'impact de cette évolution sur l'équilibre extérieur de l'économie française. D'autre part, il montre que les déterminants de la délocalisation présentent un caractère d'invariance temporelle et que les modalités de la croissance à l'étranger s'inscrivent dans un contexte marqué par la spécialisation et des comportements concurrentiels hors-marché. Enfin, il examine le cadre institutionnel de la multinationalisation des firmes françaises et suggére la nécessité d'un engagement des pouvoirs publics aux côtés de ces dernières."
"en" => "This paper deals with the recent trends of the multinationalization process of French industrial firms. It describes the evolution of French assets abroad and its impact on the balance of trade. The paper shows that the determinants of delocation are temporally invariant and that multinationalization is characterized by a specialization process, and market independent competitive behaviors. Finally, the institutional context of French firms is examined. For long-term competitiveness, multinationals need to have their governments as partners rather than as regulators."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
68 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2307
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8145"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8145"
"slug" => "la-theorie-statistique-de-la-decision-i"
"yearMonth" => "1999-12"
"year" => "1999"
"title" => "La théorie statistique de la décision. I"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (1999). <i>La théorie statistique de la décision. I</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, les principes de base de la théorie statistique de la décision sont exposés dans les contextes d'ignorance complète et de risque. Dans le premier cas, on montre que les critères classiques de choix débouchent sur une impasse décisionnelle au regard du filtre de Milnor. Dans le second cas, les fondements de la théorie de l'utilité espérée sont présentés, ainsi que ses prolongements en terme de valorisation du risque et de caractérisation des choix multi-attributs."
"en" => "This paper presents the basic principles of statistical decision theory under complete ignorance and risk. In the first case, we show that the classical choice criteria lead to inadequate decisions according to Milnor's rationality axioms. In the second case, we present the foundations of expected utility theory, as well as their extensions in terms of risk valuation and multi-attribute choice."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
69 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2308
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8268"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8268"
"slug" => "modeles-de-diffusion-en-marketing"
"yearMonth" => "1996-04"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Modèles de diffusion en marketing"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1996). <i>Modèles de diffusion en marketing</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous exposons les fondements analytiques des principaux modèles de représentation de la diffusion des innovations. Par la suite, nous proposons une confrontation empirique de ces modèles liée à l'évolution des ventes d'un modèle automobile. Dans un dernier temps, nous développons les principaux résultats des modèles de contrôle optimal de la diffusion des innovations."
"en" => "In this paper, we deal with analytical foundations of classical innovation diffusion models. We then propose an empirical test of these models to the sales of a French car. Finally, we formulate the major results of optimal control models of innovation diffusion."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
70 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2309
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8300"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8300"
"slug" => "optimal-advertising-and-signal-reliability"
"yearMonth" => "1996-11"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Optimal Advertising and Signal Reliability"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1996). <i>Optimal Advertising and Signal Reliability</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle stochastique de comportement du consommateur régi par un processus séquentiel d'achat-réachat. La résolution analytique de ce modèle par l'application du principe du maximum permet de déterminer la trajectoire optimale stationnaire du prix, de l'investissement publicitaire et de la qualité pour un produit ayant une durée de vie exponentielle et pour un taux de fidélité de la demande inférieur à 1/2."
"en" => "In this paper, we formulate a stochastic model of consumer behavior with repeat purchases and imperfect information. By applying the Maximum principle to the defined model, we determine the optimal dynamic strategy of price, advertising investment and product quality when the lifetime of the product has an exponential distribution and the repeat purchase probability is smaller than 0.5."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
71 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2310
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8309"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8309"
"slug" => "optimal-quality-improvement-and-innovation-over-the-life-cycle"
"yearMonth" => "1996-06"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Optimal Quality Improvement and Innovation over the Life Cycle"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1996). <i>Optimal Quality Improvement and Innovation over the Life Cycle</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle de contrôle de la diffusion des produits par la qualité. La résolution analytique de ce modèle par l'application du principe du maximum permet de déterminer la trajectoire optimale de la qualité au cours du cycle de vie des produits. La validation économétrique des hypothèses sous-jacentes au modèle conduit à l'ébauche d'une solution numérique."
"en" => "In this paper, we formulate the problem of product diffusion control by quality. We apply the maximum principle of Pontryagin and obtain the optimal trajectory of quality during the life cycle of a product under various functional hypotheses."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
72 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2311
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8311"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8311"
"slug" => "optimal-recycling-under-heterogeneous-waste-sources-and-the-environmental-kuznets-curve"
"yearMonth" => "2017-11"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Optimal Recycling Under Heterogeneous Waste Sources and the Environmental Kuznets Curve"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et BOUCEKKINE, R. (2017). <i>Optimal Recycling Under Heterogeneous Waste Sources and the Environmental Kuznets Curve</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "BOUCEKKINE R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
73 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2312
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8354"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8354"
"slug" => "publish-or-teach-analysis-of-the-professors-optimal-career-path"
"yearMonth" => "2013-05"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution."
"en" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
74 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2313
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8357"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8357"
"slug" => "qualite-et-diffusion-des-produits"
"yearMonth" => "1995-07"
"year" => "1995"
"title" => "Qualité et diffusion des produits"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1995). <i>Qualité et diffusion des produits</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle de contrôle de la diffusion des produits par la qualité. La résolution analytique de ce modèle par l'application du principe du maximum permet de déterminer la trajectoire optimale de la qualité au cours du cycle de vie des produits. La validation économétrique des hypothèses sous-jacentes au modèle conduit à l'ébauche d'une solution numérique."
"en" => "In this paper, we suggest a model for product diffusion control based on quality. We apply the maximum principle of Pontryagin and obtain the optimal trajectory of quality during the products' life cycle. An econometric validation of the hypotheses formulated is verified and numerical solutions to the optimal control problem are obtained."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
75 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2314
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8358"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8358"
"slug" => "quality-improvement-and-a-goodwill-accumulation-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
"yearMonth" => "2002-10"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PASIN, F. (2002). <i>Quality Improvement and a Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Pasin F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, les activités d'accumulation du capital publicitaire et de gestion de la qualité de deux firmes en concurrence sont étudiées à partir d'un jeu différentiel. Un modèle de Lanchester est proposé pour représenter la concurrence inter-marques où, pour chaque joueur, le taux d'attraction dépend du niveau de goodwill et le taux d'abandon est fonction du niveau de qualité. Un algorithme numérique permet de déterminer l'équilibre de Nash de chaque compétiteur en termes d'effort publicitaire et d'effort d'amélioration de la qualité à partir de diverses configurations initiales. En outre, une analyse de sensibilité conduit à identifier les facteurs-clé de la performance concurrentielle."
"en" => "In this paper, goodwill and quality management of two competing firms are analyzed in a differential game framework. A Lanchester model is used to represent market share competition where own attraction rate depends on own goodwill, while own abandon rate depends on own quality. The search for a Nash solution by a numerical algorithm leads to determine for each competitor the optimal advertising and quality improvement efforts under various initial configurations. Moreover, a study of key-factors of performance points out the most appropriate reengineering projects to be implemented by a small inefficient firm in order to better its competitive position."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
76 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2315
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8361"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8361"
"slug" => "quality-advertising-price-and-the-diffusion-of-innovations"
"yearMonth" => "1996-12"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Quality, Advertising, Price and the Diffusion of Innovations"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (1996). <i>Quality, Advertising, Price and the Diffusion of Innovations</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous résolvons le problème du contrôle optimal de la diffusion des produits par la qualité et l'investissement publicitaire. En ce sens, nous utilisons une fonction de demande dynamique s'appuyant sur deux hypothèses : en premier lieu, le prix est un signal de qualité fiable , d'autre part, la demande exprime une préférence pour la qualité par rapport au prix. La résolution du problème posé par le principe du maximum de Pontryagin nous conduit alors à caractériser les trajectoires dynamiques optimales respectives de la qualité, de l'effort publicitaire et du prix, ainsi que les conditions de validité de ces dernières."
"en" => "In this paper, I solve the problem of an optimal control of innovations diffusion both by advertising and quality. To do so, I introduce a dynamic demand function leaning on two hypotheses : first, price seems to be a signal of quality , second, demand is more sensitive to quality than to price. Using the maximum principle of Pontryagin, I then characterize the optimal dynamic trajectories of quality, advertising and price, and their qualitative properties."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
77 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2316
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "3413"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "3413"
"slug" => "attachment-and-forgiveness-in-a-behavioural-non-cooperative-dynamic-game"
"yearMonth" => "2013-07"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Attachment and Forgiveness in a Behavioural, Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2013). Attachment and Forgiveness in a Behavioural, Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game. Dans: <i>Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Tapiero</i>. 1st ed. Springer, pp. 107-130."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science: Essays in Honor of Charles S. Tapiero"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 14:06:32"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "107-130"
"volume" => "198"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Despite an extensive body of economic literature discussing partner selection based on rational anticipation of the other people’s behavior, the influence of players’ behavioral patterns on the path of their collaborative decisions has as yet rarely been evaluated in the context of a dynamic game. This paper seeks to fill that gap by proposing to evaluate how certain specific behavioral patterns, namely propensity to forgiveness and propensity to attachment, can give rise to different collaborative archetypes. These two behavioral patterns are important as both are prominent in the most influential game theory and managerial approaches to cooperation. They are therefore used to derive a typology of behavioral profiles. Computation of each profile’s equilibrium effort leads to a ranking of the possible player profiles. The results suggest that the proposed behavioral profiles could be used for selection of potential partners."
"en" => "Despite an extensive body of economic literature discussing partner selection based on rational anticipation of the other people’s behavior, the influence of players’ behavioral patterns on the path of their collaborative decisions has as yet rarely been evaluated in the context of a dynamic game. This paper seeks to fill that gap by proposing to evaluate how certain specific behavioral patterns, namely propensity to forgiveness and propensity to attachment, can give rise to different collaborative archetypes. These two behavioral patterns are important as both are prominent in the most influential game theory and managerial approaches to cooperation. They are therefore used to derive a typology of behavioral profiles. Computation of each profile’s equilibrium effort leads to a ranking of the possible player profiles. The results suggest that the proposed behavioral profiles could be used for selection of potential partners."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
78 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2317
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "3582"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "3582"
"slug" => "dynamique-des-ventes-et-strategies-publicitaires-concurrentielles"
"yearMonth" => "2003-09"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Dynamique des ventes et stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2003). Dynamique des ventes et stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles. Dans: <i>Savoir gérer. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Claude Tarondeau</i>. 1st ed. Vuibert, pp. 151-168."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Savoir gérer. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Claude Tarondeau"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 14:06:32"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "151-168"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, un inventaire sélectif des applications publicitaires des jeux différentiels est réalisé. Notamment, les stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles sont analysées en contexte de duopole à partir de modèles dynamiques des ventes en temps continu. Dans un premier temps, les stratégies publicitaires respectivement associées aux modèles d'effort publicitaire excédentaire, de Vidale-Wolfe et de Lanchester sont étudiées. Dans un second temps, les extensions reposant sur des combinaisons appariées de ces modèles génériques sont analysées. L'apport méthodologique des jeux différentiels dans le cadre de la formulation des stratégies publicitaires concurrentielles est ainsi mis en évidence."
"en" => "In this paper, a selected survey of advertising differential games models is proposed. Using sales dynamics models in continuous time, we analyze competitive advertising strategies in the duopoly context. First, advertising strategies derived from excess advertising model, Vidale-Wolfe model and Lanchester model are studied. Then, extensions obtained from combinations of these models are exposed. This survey emphasizes how differential games models are potentially useful to formulate optimal strategies in advertising competition."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
79 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2318
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "4051"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "4051"
"slug" => "optimal-growth-with-polluting-waste-and-recycling"
"yearMonth" => "2016-12"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Optimal Growth with Polluting Waste and Recycling"
"description" => "BOUCEKKINE, R. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2016). Optimal Growth with Polluting Waste and Recycling. Dans: <i>Dynamic Perspectives on Managerial Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Richard F. Hartl</i>. 1st ed. Springer, pp. 109-126."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BOUCEKKINE R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Dynamic Perspectives on Managerial Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Richard F. Hartl"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "109-126"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study an optimal AK-like model of capital accumulation and growth in the presence of a negative environmental externality in the tradition of Stokey (1998). Both production and consumption activities generate polluting waste. The economy exerts a recycling effort to reduce the stock of waste. Recycling also generates income, which is fully devoted to capital accumulation. The whole problem amounts to choosing the optimal control paths for consumption and recycling to maximize a social welfare function that notably includes the waste stock and disutility from the recycling effort."
"en" => "We study an optimal AK-like model of capital accumulation and growth in the presence of a negative environmental externality in the tradition of Stokey (1998). Both production and consumption activities generate polluting waste. The economy exerts a recycling effort to reduce the stock of waste. Recycling also generates income, which is fully devoted to capital accumulation. The whole problem amounts to choosing the optimal control paths for consumption and recycling to maximize a social welfare function that notably includes the waste stock and disutility from the recycling effort."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
80 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2319
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "4096"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "4096"
"slug" => "production-control-in-a-competitive-environment-with-incomplete-information"
"yearMonth" => "2018-12"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Production Control in a Competitive Environment with Incomplete Information"
"description" => "KOGAN, K. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2018). Production Control in a Competitive Environment with Incomplete Information. Dans: <i>New Trends in Emerging Complex Real Life Problems</i>. 1st ed. Springer, pp. 321-329."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "New Trends in Emerging Complex Real Life Problems"
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Production"
1 => "Control"
2 => "Differential games"
3 => "Quantity competition"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-09-22 17:25:37"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_35"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "321-329"
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We consider an industry consisting of a large number of firms producing substitutable products and engaged in a dynamic Cournot-type competition. The firms are able to reduce their marginal production costs by accumulating their own experience as well as the experience spillovers from other firms. In particular, firms accumulate production experience through proprietary learning, which, however, depreciates over time. We determine steady-state Nash equilibrium policies that are based on the assumption that the firms do not have precise information about each competitor and therefore are unable to respond to a specific firm’s dynamics. The firms, however, do react to overall industry trends. We show that in such a case, though the information used for production control is incomplete, in the long run the firms tend to the output they would converge to under complete information. We also find that industry growth due to more firms entering the market results in decreasing long-run equilibrium output of each firm when the depreciation of experience is higher than the rate of spillovers. Otherwise, the opposite result can emerge, i.e., the steady-state output will grow."
"en" => "We consider an industry consisting of a large number of firms producing substitutable products and engaged in a dynamic Cournot-type competition. The firms are able to reduce their marginal production costs by accumulating their own experience as well as the experience spillovers from other firms. In particular, firms accumulate production experience through proprietary learning, which, however, depreciates over time. We determine steady-state Nash equilibrium policies that are based on the assumption that the firms do not have precise information about each competitor and therefore are unable to respond to a specific firm’s dynamics. The firms, however, do react to overall industry trends. We show that in such a case, though the information used for production control is incomplete, in the long run the firms tend to the output they would converge to under complete information. We also find that industry growth due to more firms entering the market results in decreasing long-run equilibrium output of each firm when the depreciation of experience is higher than the rate of spillovers. Otherwise, the opposite result can emerge, i.e., the steady-state output will grow."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
81 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2320
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2296"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2296"
"slug" => "production-capacity-buildup-and-double-marginalization-mitigation-in-a-dynamic-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2015-08"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Production Capacity Buildup and Double Marginalization Mitigation in a Dynamic Supply Chain"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et ERICKSON, G. (2015). Production Capacity Buildup and Double Marginalization Mitigation in a Dynamic Supply Chain. <i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>, 66(8), pp. 1281-1296."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Production capacity"
1 => "Pricing"
2 => "Double marginalization"
3 => "Supply chain management"
4 => "Differential games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1057/jors.2014.99?journalCode=tjor20"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1281-1296"
"volume" => "66"
"number" => "8"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent at which the observability of each other’s production capacity affects the magnitude of the double marginalization phenomenon in a two-member supply chain ruled by a wholesale price contract."
"en" => "The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent at which the observability of each other’s production capacity affects the magnitude of the double marginalization phenomenon in a two-member supply chain ruled by a wholesale price contract."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
82 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2321
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2297"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2297"
"slug" => "production-with-learning-and-forgetting-in-a-competitive-environment"
"yearMonth" => "2017-04"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Production with Learning and Forgetting in a Competitive Environment"
"description" => "KOGAN, K., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et HERBON, A. (2017). Production with Learning and Forgetting in a Competitive Environment. <i>International Journal of Production Economics</i>, 189, pp. 52-62."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "HERBON A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Production"
1 => "Duopolistic competition"
2 => "Learning-by-doing"
3 => "Organizational forgetting"
4 => "Dynamic games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925527317301342"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "52-62"
"volume" => "189"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "It has been shown that learning-by-doing enables firms to reduce marginal production costs, but that this effect weakens due to organizational forgetting. In order to assess the impact of both learning and forgetting on longterm competitiveness and a firm’s profitability, we model an experience accumulation process with depreciation and consider two competing firms that produce fully substitutable products. In this model, unit production costs decrease with the firm’s experience due to the proprietary learning process as well as the spillover of experience from the competing firm. Firms can either share or hide from each other their information about the state of their respective experience throughout the game. We found that in an equilibrium steady state, if the organizational forgetting is sufficiently large (larger than the spillover rate value), then information sharing, compared to information hiding, results both in less competitiveness and increased profits for firms. Conversely, if the organizational forgetting is small and the spillover opportunities are relatively large, then information sharing promotes both long term competitiveness and firm profits. Accordingly, firms are better off in the long term by deliberately limiting (expanding) their experience accumulation process whenever organizational forgetting is relatively large (small). A high ability of proprietary learning, however, can interfere in this relationship so that limiting the firms’ experience process will always be compatible with higher profitability."
"en" => "It has been shown that learning-by-doing enables firms to reduce marginal production costs, but that this effect weakens due to organizational forgetting. In order to assess the impact of both learning and forgetting on longterm competitiveness and a firm’s profitability, we model an experience accumulation process with depreciation and consider two competing firms that produce fully substitutable products. In this model, unit production costs decrease with the firm’s experience due to the proprietary learning process as well as the spillover of experience from the competing firm. Firms can either share or hide from each other their information about the state of their respective experience throughout the game. We found that in an equilibrium steady state, if the organizational forgetting is sufficiently large (larger than the spillover rate value), then information sharing, compared to information hiding, results both in less competitiveness and increased profits for firms. Conversely, if the organizational forgetting is small and the spillover opportunities are relatively large, then information sharing promotes both long term competitiveness and firm profits. Accordingly, firms are better off in the long term by deliberately limiting (expanding) their experience accumulation process whenever organizational forgetting is relatively large (small). A high ability of proprietary learning, however, can interfere in this relationship so that limiting the firms’ experience process will always be compatible with higher profitability."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
83 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2322
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2313"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2313"
"slug" => "publish-or-teach-analysis-of-the-professors-optimal-career-path"
"yearMonth" => "2013-10"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). Publish or Teach? Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Path. <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i>, 37(10), pp. 1995-2009."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Enseignement"
1 => "Externalités de compétence"
2 => "Management du corps professoral"
3 => "Recherche"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.05.007"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1995-2009"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "10"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article étudie le programme d'allocation optimale de l'effort d'un professeur qui a le choix entre développer ses compétences en recherche ou en pédagogie. On étudie comment le chemin de croissance des compétences dépend de la structure organisationnelle, notamment des éventuelles externalités croisées entre les deux compétences."
"en" => "This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
84 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2323
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2319"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2319"
"slug" => "qualite-et-diffusion-des-produits"
"yearMonth" => "1996-01"
"year" => "1996"
"title" => "Qualité et diffusion des produits"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1996). Qualité et diffusion des produits. <i>Recherche et Applications en Marketing</i>, pp. 35-51."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "35-51"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, nous proposons une solution au problème du contrôle optimal des produits par la qualité en contexte de concurrence monopolistique. Pour spécifier la dynamique des ventes instantanées, nous supposons que le prix est un signal fiable de qualité et que la demande exprime une préférence pour la qualité par rapport au prix. La réolution du programme dynamique par le principe du maximum de Pontryagin débouche sur des cas de figures différenciés. D'autre, part, une validation empirique des hypothèses du modèle des ventes de terminaux téléphoniques nous permet d'améliorer très sensiblement le coefficient de détermination obtenu par le modèle de Bass. Enfin, une application numérique du problème du contrôle optimal de la diffusion par la qualité permet de mesurer le coût d'opportunité de la stratégie optimale de qualité par rapport à la stratégie observée."
"en" => "In this paper, we solve the problem of the optimal control of product diffusion by quality in a context of monopolistic competition. To do so, we introduce a dynamic demand function leaning on two hypotheses : first, price acts as a signal to quality , second, demand is more sensitive to quality than to price. Using the maximum principle of Pontryagin, we then characterize the optimal dynamic trajectory of quality and its qualitative properties."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
85 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2324
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2321"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2321"
"slug" => "quality-and-the-diffusion-of-innovations"
"yearMonth" => "1998-01"
"year" => "1998"
"title" => "Quality and the Diffusion of Innovations"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et TAPIERO, C. (1998). Quality and the Diffusion of Innovations. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, pp. 31-38."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "TAPIERO C."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "31-38"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article résout un problème de diffusion de produit par sa qualité, utilisant le contrôle optimal dans un contexte de compétition monopolistique. Pour cela, nous introduisons une fonction de demande dynamique reposant sur deux hypothèses. Dans une première, le prix agit comme signal de la qualité. Dans une deuxième, la demande est plus sensible à la qualité qu'au prix. On utilise finalement le Principe de Pontryagin afin de déterminer les trajectoires optimales de la qualité et ses propriétés."
"en" => "In this paper, we solve the problem of optimal control of quality-driven product diffusion in a context of monopolistic competition. To do so, we introduce a dynamic demand function leaning on two hypotheses : first, price acts as a signal of quality, second, demand is more sensitive to quality than to price. Using the maximum principle of Pontryagin, we then characterize the optimal dynamic trajectory of quality and its qualitative properties."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
86 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2325
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2322"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2322"
"slug" => "quality-improvement-and-goodwill-accumulation-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
"yearMonth" => "2006-01"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PASIN, F. (2006). Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, pp. 1021-1032."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Pasin F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Concurrence dynamique"
1 => "Jeux différentiels"
2 => "Publicité"
3 => "Qualité"
4 => "Réputation"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1021-1032"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Cet article analyse les politiques d'effort publicitaire et d'amélioration de la qualité dans le cadre d'un duopole dynamique. Une extension du modèle de Lanchester est proposée dans laquelle la qualité (au sens de conformité) et la réputation sont les principaux leviers de concurrence pour le développement de la part de marché. Le taux d'attraction de nouveaux consommateurs par un concurrent dépend de sa réputation tandis que le taux d'abandon des consommateurs effectifs est déterminé par le pourcentage de produits non conformes. La recherche d'une solution non-coopérative par des méthodes qualitatives et numériques conduisent à définir la stratégie optimale des efforts publicitaire et d'amélioration de la qualité pour chaque concurrent à travers un large éventail de configurations."
"en" => "This paper analyzes optimal advertising and quality improvement decisions by duopolist firms competing in a dynamic setting. An extended version of the Lanchester model is formulated where conformance quality and goodwill are both involved in competition for market share. Each competitor’s new customer attraction rate depends on its own goodwill, while the disloyalty rate for current customers is influenced by the proportion of defective items. The search for a non-cooperative solution by qualitative as well as numerical means leads to definition of the optimal path for advertising and improvement efforts for each competitor, examined under a wide range of configurations."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
87 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2326
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2418"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2418"
"slug" => "research-and-development-with-stock-dependent-spillovers-and-price-competition-in-a-duopoly"
"yearMonth" => "2014-05"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., SHNAIDERMAN, M. et PASIN, F. (2014). Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly. <i>Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications</i>, 161(2), pp. 626-647."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHNAIDERMAN M."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "PASIN F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261726567_Research_and_Development_with_Stock-Dependent_Spillovers_and_Price_Competition_in_a_Duopoly"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "626-647"
"volume" => "161"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper investigates the R&D accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the rival firm’s R&D stock without payment. We consider decisions that follow from symmetric, non-cooperative equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria."
"en" => "This paper investigates the R&D accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the rival firm’s R&D stock without payment. We consider decisions that follow from symmetric, non-cooperative equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
88 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2327
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2479"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2479"
"slug" => "self-regenerating-environmental-absorption-efficiency-and-the-soylent-green-scenario"
"yearMonth" => "2016-03"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Self-Regenerating Environmental Absorption Efficiency and the Soylent Green Scenario"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., BENCHEKROUN, H. et GRASS, D. (2016). Self-Regenerating Environmental Absorption Efficiency and the Soylent Green Scenario. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 238(1), pp. 179-198."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BENCHEKROUN H."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290477406_Self-regenerating_environmental_absorption_efficiency_and_the_varvec_soylentgreenscenario_s_o_y_l_e_n_t_g_r_e_e_n_s_c_e_n_a_r_i_o"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "179-198"
"volume" => "238"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper determines whether, in comparison with other influential exogenous parameters, self-regeneration capabilities can affect the trade-off between polluting emissions and anthropogenic efforts to restore the environmental absorption efficiency and prevent natural sinks from potentially turning into sources of pollution."
"en" => "This paper determines whether, in comparison with other influential exogenous parameters, self-regeneration capabilities can affect the trade-off between polluting emissions and anthropogenic efforts to restore the environmental absorption efficiency and prevent natural sinks from potentially turning into sources of pollution."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
89 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2328
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2555"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2555"
"slug" => "suppliers-opportunistic-behavior-and-the-quality-efficiency-tradeoff-with-conventional-supply-chain-contracts"
"yearMonth" => "2019-02"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et SCHAIDERMAN, M. (2019). Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts. <i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>, 70(11), pp. 1915-1937."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SCHAIDERMAN M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "cost-reducing R&D"
1 => "design quality"
2 => "linear contract"
3 => "ssupply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2018.1510749"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1915-1937"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "11"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
"en" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
90 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2329
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2557"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2557"
"slug" => "supply-quality-management-with-optimal-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contracts-a-two-stage-game-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2014-07"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2014). Supply Quality Management with Optimal Wholesale Price and Revenue Sharing Contracts: A Two Stage Game Approach. <i>International Journal of Production Economics</i>, 156(1), pp. 260-268."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
1 => "Design quality"
2 => "Wholesale price contract"
3 => "Revenue sharing contract"
4 => "Dynamic games"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.06.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "260-268"
"volume" => "156"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribute to mitigating this phenomenon. In this paper, we investigate the potential coordinating power of the revenue sharing contract in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier that collaborate to improve the design quality of a particular finished product. We set the cooperative outcome as a benchmark and compare the efficiency of an optimal revenue sharing contract with an optimal wholesale price contract in improving design quality in the setup of a non-cooperative two-stage game."
"en" => "One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribute to mitigating this phenomenon. In this paper, we investigate the potential coordinating power of the revenue sharing contract in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier that collaborate to improve the design quality of a particular finished product. We set the cooperative outcome as a benchmark and compare the efficiency of an optimal revenue sharing contract with an optimal wholesale price contract in improving design quality in the setup of a non-cooperative two-stage game."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
91 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2330
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2558"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2558"
"slug" => "supply-quality-management-with-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contract-under-horizontal-competition"
"yearMonth" => "2010-10"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et BOWON, K. (2010). Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, 206(2), pp. 329-340."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "BOWON K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Supply Quality Management"
1 => "design quality"
2 => "Horizontal competition"
3 => "Wholesale price contract"
4 => "Revenue sharing contract"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.035"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "329-340"
"volume" => "206"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, a non-cooperative dynamic game is formulated in which a single supplier collaborates with two competing manufacturers in improving the quality of their respective products. Assuming a finite planning horizon, the paper analyzes how each party should allocate resources for quality improvement under wholesale price contract or revenue-sharing contract."
"en" => "In this paper, a non-cooperative dynamic game is formulated in which a single supplier collaborates with two competing manufacturers in improving the quality of their respective products. Assuming a finite planning horizon, the paper analyzes how each party should allocate resources for quality improvement under wholesale price contract or revenue-sharing contract."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
92 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2331
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2578"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2578"
"slug" => "team-production-with-punishment-option-insights-from-a-real-effort-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2015-09"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., EL OUARDIGHI, F. et DUBART, D. (2015). Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real Effort Experiment. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 36(3), pp. 408-420."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART D."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Économie expérimentale"
1 => "Expérience à effort réel"
2 => "Performance"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262528770_Team_Production_with_Punishment_Option_Insights_from_a_Real-Effort_Experiment"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "408-420"
"volume" => "36"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article présente les résultats d'une expérience à effort réel de production en équipe, avec et sans possibilité de sanction. Si la performance globale demeure inchangée, les comportements du producteur plus (moins) efficace change."
"en" => "This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real-effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
93 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2332
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2627"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2627"
"slug" => "the-dynamics-of-cooperation"
"yearMonth" => "2002-01"
"year" => "2002"
"title" => "The Dynamics of Cooperation"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2002). The Dynamics of Cooperation. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, pp. 1-16."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-16"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dans cet article, le problème de la coopération interfirmes est formulé dans un cadre dynamique associaux deux partenaires. Le modèle proposé relie le processus de production jointe et la dynamique de monitoring commun des contributions respectives des deux partenaires. L'analyse de l'existence d'un équilibre stationnaire coopératif conduit à un ensemble de trajectoires de long terme à partir de conditions initiales données."
"en" => "In this paper, the probleme of cooperation is formulated in a dynamic framework. The proposed model interrelates the process of a joint production activity involving two partners and the dynamics of a common monitoring activity of their respective contributions. Analysis of the existence of a stationary equilibrium lead to a set of predictions on the long run issue of cooperation from given initial conditions."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
94 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2333
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2675"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2675"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-partial-information-sharing-in-a-two-echelon-supply-chain"
"yearMonth" => "2014-05"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "The Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain"
"description" => "SHNAIDERMAN, M. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2014). The Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain. <i>Operations Research Letters</i>, 42(3), pp. 234-237."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHNAIDERMAN M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Supply chain management"
1 => "Information sharing"
2 => "Stochastic demand"
3 => "Autoregressive process"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.03.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "234-237"
"volume" => "42"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We consider a simple two-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in which the demand process of the retailer is an AR(1) where the random component is a function of both sides' information. We focus on partial information sharing under which each side informs the other of an interval in which the exact value of its own component of demand lies. These various levels of information sharing can reduce the supply chain costs."
"en" => "We consider a simple two-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in which the demand process of the retailer is an AR(1) where the random component is a function of both sides' information. We focus on partial information sharing under which each side informs the other of an interval in which the exact value of its own component of demand lies. These various levels of information sharing can reduce the supply chain costs."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
95 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2334
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2765"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2765"
"slug" => "transboundary-pollution-control-and-environmental-absorption-efficiency-management"
"yearMonth" => "2020-06"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KOGAN, K., GNECCO, G. et SANGUINETI, M. (2020). Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 287, pp. 653-681."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN Konstantin"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GNECCO Giorgio"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "SANGUINETI Marcello"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-018-2927-7"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "653-681"
"volume" => "287"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we suggest a two-player differential game model of transboundary pollution that accounts for time-dependent environmental absorption efficiency, which allows the biosphere to switch from a carbon sink to a source. We investigate the impact of negative externalities resulting from a transboundary pollution noncooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved."
"en" => "In this paper, we suggest a two-player differential game model of transboundary pollution that accounts for time-dependent environmental absorption efficiency, which allows the biosphere to switch from a carbon sink to a source. We investigate the impact of negative externalities resulting from a transboundary pollution noncooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
96 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2335
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10795"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10795"
"slug" => "contracts-and-information-structure-in-a-supply-chain-with-operations-and-marketing-interaction"
"yearMonth" => "2020-01"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., ERICKSON, G., GRASS, D. et JØRGENSEN, S. (2020). Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction. Dans: Leon A Petrosyan, David Wing Kay Yeung eds. <i>Game Theoretic Analysis</i>. 1st ed. World Scientific, pp. 93-128."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ERICKSON G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GRASS D."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "JØRGENSEN S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Game Theoretic Analysis"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "93-128"
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The objective of this chapter is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures."
"en" => "The objective of this chapter is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
97 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2336
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10833"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10833"
"slug" => "should-forest-be-restored-by-polluters-or-deforesters"
"yearMonth" => "2020-05"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Should Forest be Restored by Polluters or Deforesters ?"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., GNECCO, G. et SANGUINETI, M. (2020). Should Forest be Restored by Polluters or Deforesters ? Dans: 2020 Optimization Days."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "GNECCO G."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "SANGUINETi M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2020 Optimization Days"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
98 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2337
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10838"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10838"
"slug" => "false-quality-claims-prevention-and-supply-chain-implications"
"yearMonth" => "2021-06"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "False Quality Claims: Prevention and Supply Chain Implications"
"description" => "KOGAN, K. et EL OUARDIGHI, F. (2021). False Quality Claims: Prevention and Supply Chain Implications. <i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>, 72(6), pp. 1347-1357."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KOGAN K."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Manufacturing"
1 => "optimal control"
2 => "quality management"
3 => "supply chain management"
4 => "cheating"
]
"updatedAt" => "2022-03-04 14:35:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339340740_False_quality_claims_Prevention_and_supply_chain_implications"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1347-1357"
"volume" => "72"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "False quality claims have recently rocked the automobile industry. To promote customer demand while seemingly complying with regulations, manufacturers may cheat even at the risk of incurring severe penalties. As a result, the production horizon becomes uncertain. Assuming it is socially critical to enforce quality standards (e.g., specific emission levels or safety levels for food, drugs, or transportation), we study dynamic production policies under the threat of penalties and assess when a false quality claim can be optimal for the firm. We find that regardless of the specific form of a convex penalty function, the production rate will gradually decrease to slow down the increase in the probability of getting caught. We show that the government or regulatory department can determine a minimal finite penalty to prevent the manufacturer from cheating. In the context of an underlying supply chain, we show that vertical competition between the manufacturer and its suppliers can play a socially positive role by reducing the batch produced under a false quality claim."
"en" => "False quality claims have recently rocked the automobile industry. To promote customer demand while seemingly complying with regulations, manufacturers may cheat even at the risk of incurring severe penalties. As a result, the production horizon becomes uncertain. Assuming it is socially critical to enforce quality standards (e.g., specific emission levels or safety levels for food, drugs, or transportation), we study dynamic production policies under the threat of penalties and assess when a false quality claim can be optimal for the firm. We find that regardless of the specific form of a convex penalty function, the production rate will gradually decrease to slow down the increase in the probability of getting caught. We show that the government or regulatory department can determine a minimal finite penalty to prevent the manufacturer from cheating. In the context of an underlying supply chain, we show that vertical competition between the manufacturer and its suppliers can play a socially positive role by reducing the batch produced under a false quality claim."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
99 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2338
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10925"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10925"
"slug" => "production-based-pollution-versus-deforestation-optimal-policy-with-state-independent-and-dependent-environmental-absorption-efficiency-restoration-process"
"yearMonth" => "2020-05"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Production-Based Pollution Versus Deforestation: Optimal Policy With State-Independent And-Dependent Environmental Absorption Efficiency Restoration Process"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., KHMELNITSKY, E. et LEANDRI, M. (2020). Production-Based Pollution Versus Deforestation: Optimal Policy With State-Independent And-Dependent Environmental Absorption Efficiency Restoration Process. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i>, 292(1), pp. 1–26."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "KHMELNITSKY E."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "LEANDRI M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-020-03638-0"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1–26"
"volume" => "292"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "An important yet largely unexamined issue is how the interaction between deforestation and pollution affects economic and environmental sustainability. This article seeks to bridge the gap by introducing a dynamic model of pollution accumulation where polluting emissions can be mitigated and the absorption efficiency of pollution sinks can be restored. We assume that emissions are due to a production activity, and we include deforestation both as an additional source of emissions and as a cause of the exhaustion of environmental absorption efficiency. To account for the fact that the switching of natural sinks to a pollution source can be either possible, and in such a case even reversible, or impossible, we consider that restoration efforts can be either independent from or dependent on environmental absorption efficiency, i.e., state-independent versus state-dependent restoration efforts. We determine (i) whether production or deforestation is the most detrimental from environmental and social welfare perspectives, and (ii) how state-dependent restoration process affects pollution accumulation and deforestation policies and the related environmental and social welfare consequences."
"en" => "An important yet largely unexamined issue is how the interaction between deforestation and pollution affects economic and environmental sustainability. This article seeks to bridge the gap by introducing a dynamic model of pollution accumulation where polluting emissions can be mitigated and the absorption efficiency of pollution sinks can be restored. We assume that emissions are due to a production activity, and we include deforestation both as an additional source of emissions and as a cause of the exhaustion of environmental absorption efficiency. To account for the fact that the switching of natural sinks to a pollution source can be either possible, and in such a case even reversible, or impossible, we consider that restoration efforts can be either independent from or dependent on environmental absorption efficiency, i.e., state-independent versus state-dependent restoration efforts. We determine (i) whether production or deforestation is the most detrimental from environmental and social welfare perspectives, and (ii) how state-dependent restoration process affects pollution accumulation and deforestation policies and the related environmental and social welfare consequences."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Management"
"en" => "Management"
]
"indexedAt" => "2023-12-04T06:22:12.000Z"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.8985853
+"parent": null
}
100 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2339
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12436"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12436"
"slug" => "control-of-an-epidemic-with-endogenous-treatment-capabilit 
