Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2322"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2322"
    "slug" => "quality-improvement-and-goodwill-accumulation-in-a-dynamic-duopoly"
    "yearMonth" => "2006-01"
    "year" => "2006"
    "title" => "Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
    "description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et PASIN, F. (2006). Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, pp. 1021-1032."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
        "bid" => "B00000177"
        "slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "PASIN F."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Concurrence dynamique"
      1 => "Jeux différentiels"
      2 => "Publicité"
      3 => "Qualité"
      4 => "Réputation"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "1021-1032"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article analyse les politiques d'effort publicitaire et d'amélioration de la qualité dans le cadre d'un duopole dynamique. Une extension du modèle de Lanchester est proposée dans laquelle la qualité (au sens de conformité) et la réputation sont les principaux leviers de concurrence pour le développement de la part de marché. Le taux d'attraction de nouveaux consommateurs par un concurrent dépend de sa réputation tandis que le taux d'abandon des consommateurs effectifs est déterminé par le pourcentage de produits non conformes. La recherche d'une solution non-coopérative par des méthodes qualitatives et numériques conduisent à définir la stratégie optimale des efforts publicitaire et d'amélioration de la qualité pour chaque concurrent à travers un large éventail de configurations."
      "en" => "This paper analyzes optimal advertising and quality improvement decisions by duopolist firms competing in a dynamic setting. An extended version of the Lanchester model is formulated where conformance quality and goodwill are both involved in competition for market share. Each competitor’s new customer attraction rate depends on its own goodwill, while the disloyalty rate for current customers is influenced by the proportion of defective items. The search for a non-cooperative solution by qualitative as well as numerical means leads to definition of the optimal path for advertising and improvement efforts for each competitor, examined under a wide range of configurations."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
      "en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T11:21:49.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, PASIN F."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, PASIN F.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2006</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Concurrence dynamique</a>, <a href="#">Jeux différentiels</a>, <a href="#">Publicité</a>, <a href="#">Qualité</a>, <a href="#">Réputation</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</b><br><span>2006-01 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Quality Improvement and Goodwill Accumulation in a Dynamic Duopoly</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.953466
  +"parent": null
}