Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2418"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2418"
    "slug" => "research-and-development-with-stock-dependent-spillovers-and-price-competition-in-a-duopoly"
    "yearMonth" => "2014-05"
    "year" => "2014"
    "title" => "Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly"
    "description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F., SHNAIDERMAN, M. et PASIN, F. (2014). Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly. <i>Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications</i>, 161(2), pp. 626-647."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
        "bid" => "B00000177"
        "slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SHNAIDERMAN M."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "PASIN F."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261726567_Research_and_Development_with_Stock-Dependent_Spillovers_and_Price_Competition_in_a_Duopoly"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "626-647"
      "volume" => "161"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "This paper investigates the R&D accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the rival firm’s R&D stock without payment. We consider decisions that follow from symmetric, non-cooperative equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria."
      "en" => "This paper investigates the R&D accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s R&D is production cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the rival firm’s R&D stock without payment. We consider decisions that follow from symmetric, non-cooperative equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
      "en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-23T07:21:43.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, SHNAIDERMAN M., PASIN F."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, SHNAIDERMAN M., PASIN F.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2014</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly</b><br><span>2014-05 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261726567_Research_and_Development_with_Stock-Dependent_Spillovers_and_Price_Competition_in_a_Duopoly" target="_blank">Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.090506
  +"parent": null
}