Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2558"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2558"
    "slug" => "supply-quality-management-with-wholesale-price-and-revenue-sharing-contract-under-horizontal-competition"
    "yearMonth" => "2010-10"
    "year" => "2010"
    "title" => "Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition"
    "description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et BOWON, K. (2010). Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition. <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, 206(2), pp. 329-340."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
        "bid" => "B00000177"
        "slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BOWON K."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Supply Quality Management"
      1 => "design quality"
      2 => "Horizontal competition"
      3 => "Wholesale price contract"
      4 => "Revenue sharing contract"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.035"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "329-340"
      "volume" => "206"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "In this paper, a non-cooperative dynamic game is formulated in which a single supplier collaborates with two competing manufacturers in improving the quality of their respective products. Assuming a finite planning horizon, the paper analyzes how each party should allocate resources for quality improvement under wholesale price contract or revenue-sharing contract."
      "en" => "In this paper, a non-cooperative dynamic game is formulated in which a single supplier collaborates with two competing manufacturers in improving the quality of their respective products. Assuming a finite planning horizon, the paper analyzes how each party should allocate resources for quality improvement under wholesale price contract or revenue-sharing contract."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
      "en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T01:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, BOWON K."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, BOWON K.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2010</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Supply Quality Management</a>, <a href="#">design quality</a>, <a href="#">Horizontal competition</a>, <a href="#">Wholesale price contract</a>, <a href="#">Revenue sharing contract</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition</b><br><span>2010-10 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.035" target="_blank">Supply Quality Management With Wholesale Price and Revenue-sharing Contract Under Horizontal Competition</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.982854
  +"parent": null
}