Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2555"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "2555"
"slug" => "suppliers-opportunistic-behavior-and-the-quality-efficiency-tradeoff-with-conventional-supply-chain-contracts"
"yearMonth" => "2019-02"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts"
"description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et SCHAIDERMAN, M. (2019). Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts. <i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>, 70(11), pp. 1915-1937."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
"bid" => "B00000177"
"slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SCHAIDERMAN M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "cost-reducing R&D"
1 => "design quality"
2 => "linear contract"
3 => "ssupply chain management"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2018.1510749"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1915-1937"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "11"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
"en" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
"en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T00:21:50.000Z"
"docTitle" => "Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts"
"docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, SCHAIDERMAN M."
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, SCHAIDERMAN M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">cost-reducing R&D</a>, <a href="#">design quality</a>, <a href="#">linear contract</a>, <a href="#">ssupply chain management</a>"
"docPreview" => "<b>Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts</b><br><span>2019-02 | Journal articles </span>"
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2018.1510749" target="_blank">Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts</a>"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 9.178505
+"parent": null
}