Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2555"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2555"
    "slug" => "suppliers-opportunistic-behavior-and-the-quality-efficiency-tradeoff-with-conventional-supply-chain-contracts"
    "yearMonth" => "2019-02"
    "year" => "2019"
    "title" => "Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts"
    "description" => "EL OUARDIGHI, F. et SCHAIDERMAN, M. (2019). Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts. <i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>, 70(11), pp. 1915-1937."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "EL OUARDIGHI Fouad"
        "bid" => "B00000177"
        "slug" => "el-ouardighi-fouad"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SCHAIDERMAN M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "cost-reducing R&D"
      1 => "design quality"
      2 => "linear contract"
      3 => "ssupply chain management"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2018.1510749"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "1915-1937"
      "volume" => "70"
      "number" => "11"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
      "en" => "This paper presents a supply chain game with a manufacturer and its supplier, where the firms agree on a linear contract where the supplier either periodically updates the transfer price, i.e., cost-plus contract (CPC), or sets a definitive transfer price at the beginning of the contract, i.e., wholesale price contract (WPC). Assuming a committed manufacturer, we account for the possibility that the supplier is either committed or non-committed, and derive homogeneous and heterogeneous Nash equilibrium strategies under a CPC and a WPC."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations"
      "en" => "Information Systems, Data Analytics and Operations"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-24T01:21:47.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/el-ouardighi-fouad">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad</a>, SCHAIDERMAN M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">EL OUARDIGHI Fouad, SCHAIDERMAN M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Systèmes d'Information, Data Analytics et Opérations</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">cost-reducing R&D</a>, <a href="#">design quality</a>, <a href="#">linear contract</a>, <a href="#">ssupply chain management</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts</b><br><span>2019-02 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2018.1510749" target="_blank">Supplier’s opportunistic behavior and the quality-efficiency tradeoff with conventional supply chain contracts</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.268672
  +"parent": null
}