Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233
#_id: "B00819527"
#_source: array:40 [
"bid" => "B00819527"
"academId" => "34872"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
"fullName" => "Angela SUTAN"
"lastName" => "SUTAN"
"firstName" => "Angela"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"email" => "angela.sutan@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => ""
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "34872"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/sutan-angela/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.fr/citations?user=wjlHX6kAAAAJ&hl=fr"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6925-0970"
"career" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2234
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2024-09-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2238
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2024-09-01"
"endDate" => "2025-09-30"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Directrice Exécutive adjointe du programme de MGO sur le Sustainability Track"
"en" => "Associate Executive Director of the program de MGO (Sustainability Track)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2235
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2005"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Behavioral Economics"
"fr" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Economie Comportementale"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université de Strasbourg"
"en" => "Université de Strasbourg"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2237
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2011"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Habilitation à diriger des recherches, Behavioral Economics"
"fr" => "Habilitation à diriger des recherches, Economie Comportementale"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université de Montpellier"
"en" => "Université de Montpellier"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => "<p>Je suis professeur (HDR) en développement durable au département Droit et Environnement de l'Entreprise de l'ESSEC, en France. J'utilise principalement des outils d'économie comportementale et expérimentale dans mes recherches. J'écris des articles académiques dans Management Science, Ecological Economics, Games and Economic Behavior... et j'ai obtenu plusieurs subventions de recherche nationales et internationales sur des sujets liés au développement durable, au comportement (anti)social et à la pensée introspective de type level-k. Je contribue aux débats dans les médias (Harvard Business Review, The Conversation, Le Monde, etc...), à la vulgarisation scientifique, à l'innovation pédagogique. J'ai fait partie del'exposition du Ministère de la Recherche « 145 femmes parlent de science » et j'ai coordonné la Grande Expérience Participative pour la Nuit des Chercheurs. Je suis également rédactrice associée du Journal of Experimental and Behavioral Economics, secrétaire de l'ASFEE et membre du comité scientifique du Doctorat européen en études socio-économiques et statistiques à La Sapienza, Rome.</p>\n"
"en" => "<p><span style="background-color:transparent; color:rgb(0, 0, 0)">I am a (HDR) Professor in Sustainability at the Public and Private Policy Department in ESSEC, France. I mainly use behavioral and experimental economics tools in my research. I write academic papers in Management Science, Ecological Economics, Games and Economic Behavior… and I obtained several national and international research grants on topics related to sustainability, (anti)social behavior and introspective level-k thinking. I am active in the media (Harvard Business Review, The Conversation, Le Monde, etc…) in science popularization, in pedagogical innovation. I was part of the Ministry of Research Exhibition "145 women talk about science" and I coordinated the Big Experiment (la Grande Experience Participative) for the Researchers' Night. I also act as an associate editor for the Journal of Experimental and Behavioral Economics, as the secretary of the ASFEE and as a member of the Scientific Committee of the European PhD in socio-economic and statistical studies at La Sapienza, Rome.</span></p>\n"
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit et environnement de l’entreprise"
"en" => "Public & Private Policy"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://sites.google.com/view/angelasutan/"
"en" => "https://www.linkedin.com/in/angela-sutan-76692135/"
]
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]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Microéconomie et théorie des jeux - Comportement du consommateur - Economie environnementale - Comportement organisationnel - Développement durable et comptabilité sociale - Behavioral Economics"
"en" => "Microeconomics & Game Theory - Consumer Behavior - Environmental Economics - Organizational Behavior - Sustainability & Social Accounting - Other research theme"
]
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]
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2232
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"en" => "PHC Ulysses, ADEME, Campus France and Irish Research Council – Who suffers more from paperwork? Comparing Administrative Burdens Across Ireland and France as Barriers to Implementation of the National Climate Action Plans (PI) 10k€"
]
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]
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"fr" => "France"
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]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2236
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"fr" => "SPORT – Selection into competition, stereotypes and competitiveness, ANR project (CoPI; PI Marc Willinger) 360 k€"
"en" => "SPORT – Selection into competition, stereotypes and competitiveness, ANR project (CoPI; PI Marc Willinger) 360 k€"
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]
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]
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2239
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"fr" => "BE-AWARE – Bringing environmental issues closer to the public with augmented reality, ANR project (CoPI; PI Martin Hachet, INRIA Bordeaux) 500k€"
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]
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]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2240
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#_id: null
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"date" => "2019-09-01"
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"fr" => "ISITE UBFC International Coach – Coaching for the LESSAC team by Uri Gneezy (PI) 600k€"
"en" => "ISITE UBFC International Coach – Coaching for the LESSAC team by Uri Gneezy (PI) 600k€"
]
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"en" => "Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté"
]
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"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2241
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"fr" => "BEAM – Behavioral and Experimental Analyses in Macro-finance, ANR Open Research Area for the Social Sciences in Europe (WP leader; PI Nobuyuki Hanaki) 500k€"
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]
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"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2242
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"en" => "VINPEST – An experimental investigation of the willingness to respect the environment in the wine area, APR Pesticides Ministry of Ecology (PI) 200k€"
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]
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"fr" => "France"
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]
]
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}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2243
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"fr" => "TWAIN – Technology use at Work And INnovative work practices: Assessing the impact on work environment, employees' motivations and effort, FNR (Fonds National de Recherche) Luxembourg (WP leader; PI Ludivine Martin) 500k€"
"en" => "TWAIN – Technology use at Work And INnovative work practices: Assessing the impact on work environment, employees' motivations and effort, FNR (Fonds National de Recherche) Luxembourg (WP leader; PI Ludivine Martin) 500k€"
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"fr" => "Luxembourg"
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]
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2244
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]
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2245
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]
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}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2246
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"fr" => "France"
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]
]
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}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2247
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"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2248
#_index: null
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"fr" => "European Researchers' Night"
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]
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]
]
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}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2249
#_index: null
#_id: null
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"date" => "2013-09-01"
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"fr" => "Laureate of "145 femmes vous parlent de science", Ministère de la Recherche."
"en" => "Laureate of "145 femmes vous parlent de science", Ministère de la Recherche."
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"en" => "Ministère de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche"
]
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}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2250
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
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"fr" => "Grand Prix de l'Innovation Pédagogique in Business Schools pour la création du LESSAC"
"en" => "Grand Prix de l'Innovation Pédagogique in Business Schools pour la création du LESSAC"
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]
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"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2251
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2005-09-01"
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"fr" => "Best PhD Thesis Award (SAUAS, Academy of Strasbourg)"
"en" => "Best PhD Thesis Award (SAUAS, Academy of Strasbourg)"
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]
]
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}
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2253
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1985"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1985"
"slug" => "lying-about-delegation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-02"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Lying about Delegation"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2016). Lying about Delegation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, 121, pp. 29-40."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Delegation of responsibility"
1 => "Uncertain attribution"
2 => "Communications strategy"
3 => "Ultimatum game"
4 => "Dishonesty"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:45:00"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268115002905?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "29-40"
"volume" => "121"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une expérience pour tester si les décideurs peuvent mentir sur la délégation afin de transferer le blame de la responsabilité sur une tierce personne, et dans quelle mesure les délégués peuvent accepter le rôle de "bouc émissaire" où ils font tout simplement semblant de décider sans agir réellement."
"en" => "This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role, while the decision is made by the Proposer himself. In this uncertain attribution setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. One possible strategy is “false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2255
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "515"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "515"
"slug" => "facta-non-verba-an-experiment-on-pledging-and-giving"
"yearMonth" => "2018-04"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "‘‘Facta Non Verba”: An Experiment on Pledging and Giving"
"description" => "SUTAN, A., GROLLEAU, G., MATEU, G. et VRANCEANU, R. (2018). ‘‘Facta Non Verba”: An Experiment on Pledging and Giving. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 65, pp. 1-15."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "MATEU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Donations"
1 => "Experimentation"
2 => "Jeu du Dictateur"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:35:42"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322948553_Facta_Non_Verba_an_experiment_on_pledging_and_giving"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1-15"
"volume" => "65"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge."
"en" => "We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2257
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1015"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1015"
"slug" => "do-people-contribute-more-to-intra-temporal-or-inter-temporal-public-goods"
"yearMonth" => "2016-03"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2016). Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods? <i>Research in Economics</i>, 70(1), pp. 186-195."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Dynamic public goods"
1 => "Inter-temporal transfers"
2 => "Voluntary contribution mechanism"
3 => "Contribution vs. investment"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:37:37"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090944315000290?via%3Dihub"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "186-195"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous présentons les résultats d'une expérience réalisée autour d'un jeu du bien public dynamique, où les transfers augmentent la consommation des generations suivantes, que nous comparons avec un jeu repeté du bien public classique. Les contributions au bien public sont plus importantes dans le contexte dynamique que dans le contexte classique."
"en" => "We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a given round provides benefits to other individuals in the next round, and the individual himself benefits from investments in the public good made by his current group members in the previous round. Subjects turn out to be more generous in this inter-temporal context, than in a standard public goods experiment where contributions and transfers are exchanged at the same period. Furthermore, when known, benefits from the past investment are positively related to the individual's current investment in the public good."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2254
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7860"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7860"
"slug" => "facta-non-verba-an-experiment-on-pledging-and-giving"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "“Facta non verba”: An experiment on pledging and giving"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., MATEU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2015). <i>“Facta non verba”: An experiment on pledging and giving</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "MATEU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:53:02"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not\n
keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.
"""
"en" => """
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not\n
keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2258
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7988"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7988"
"slug" => "discontent-with-taxes-and-the-timing-of-taxation-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2016-01"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2016). <i>Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:52:08"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We propose a new approach to analyse the effect of diversification on a portfolio of risks. By means of mixing techniques, we provide an explicit formula for the probability density function of the portfolio. These techniques allow to compute analytically risk measures as VaR or TVaR, and consequently the associated diversification benefit. The explicit formulas constitute ideal tools to analyse the properties of risk measures and diversification benefit. We use standard models, which are popular in the reinsurance industry, Archimedean survival copulas and heavy tailed marginals. We explore numerically their behavior and compare them to the aggregation of independent random variables, as well as of linearly dependent ones. Moreover, the numerical convergence of Monte Carlo simulations of various quantities is tested against the analytical result. The speed of convergence appears to depend on the fatness of the tail; the higher the tail index, the faster the convergence."
"en" => "We propose a new approach to analyse the effect of diversification on a portfolio of risks. By means of mixing techniques, we provide an explicit formula for the probability density function of the portfolio. These techniques allow to compute analytically risk measures as VaR or TVaR, and consequently the associated diversification benefit. The explicit formulas constitute ideal tools to analyse the properties of risk measures and diversification benefit. We use standard models, which are popular in the reinsurance industry, Archimedean survival copulas and heavy tailed marginals. We explore numerically their behavior and compare them to the aggregation of independent random variables, as well as of linearly dependent ones. Moreover, the numerical convergence of Monte Carlo simulations of various quantities is tested against the analytical result. The speed of convergence appears to depend on the fatness of the tail; the higher the tail index, the faster the convergence."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques"
"en" => "Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2252
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15072"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15072"
"slug" => "registered-replication-report-on-mazar-amir-and-ariely-2008"
"yearMonth" => "2018-09"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Registered Replication Report on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008)"
"description" => "VERSCHUERE, B., MEIJER, E.H. et SUTAN, A. (2018). Registered Replication Report on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008). <i>Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science</i>, 1(3), pp. 299-317."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Verschuere Bruno"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Meijer Ewout H."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:32:14"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "299-317"
"volume" => "1"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2256
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8429"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8429"
"slug" => "taking-the-well-being-of-future-generations-seriously-do-people-contribute-more-to-intra-temporal-or-inter-temporal-public-goods"
"yearMonth" => "2013-09"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously: Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2013). <i>Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously: Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "GROLLEAU G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:2 [
0 => "Jeu du bien public"
1 => "Transferts intergénérationnels"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:53:41"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions un jeu du bien public avec transferts inter temporels. Les résultats indiquent une forme d'altruisme intergénérationnel."
"en" => "We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2259
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8492"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "8492"
"slug" => "trust-and-financial-trades-lessons-from-an-investment-game-where-reciprocators-can-hide-behind-probabilities"
"yearMonth" => "2010-05"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2010). <i>Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities</i>. ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Confiance"
1 => "Economie expérimentale"
2 => "Finance"
3 => "Jeu de l'investissement"
4 => "Risk objectif"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:54:16"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L'article propose une étude expérimentale d'une variante originale du jeu de l'investissement. On introduit une probabilité objective de disparition du lien entre investisseur et récepteur. Le dernier pourra prétexter cet événement objectif pour jouer sa stratégie égoïste, ce que nous appelons "se cacher derrière les probabilités". Ce phénomène pourrait bien caractériser les échanges financiers."
"en" => "In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-building."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques"
"en" => "Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2260
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10735"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10735"
"slug" => "managerial-behavior-in-the-lab-information-disclosure-decision-process-and-leadership-style"
"yearMonth" => "2019-09"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et VRANCEANU, R. (2019). <i>Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style</i>. WP1910, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Managerial decision"
1 => "Decision process"
2 => "Asymmetric information"
3 => "Communication strategy"
4 => "Management style."
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:30:57"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02291210"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preferences of the manager also explain the choice of the option. However, the decision process and the managerial style based on self-reported attitudes have little influence on the choice of allocation. This is consistent with employee satisfaction essentially depending on the payoff and not being sensible to the process."
"en" => "This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preferences of the manager also explain the choice of the option. However, the decision process and the managerial style based on self-reported attitudes have little influence on the choice of allocation. This is consistent with employee satisfaction essentially depending on the payoff and not being sensible to the process."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2261
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10804"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10804"
"slug" => "discontent-with-taxes-and-the-timing-of-taxation-experimental-evidence"
"yearMonth" => "2019-11"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2019). Discontent with Taxes and the Timing of Taxation: Experimental Evidence. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 70(6), pp. 1227-1240."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "DUBART Delphine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:32:30"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/26854751"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1227-1240"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "L’article présente les résultats d’une expérience basée sur une variante du jeu « power-to-take » avec des implications concernant les modalités de prélèvement de l’impôt sur le revenu. L’étude compare le système d’impôt à la source avec un système a posteriori, dans lequel l’impôt est prélevé bien après le moment où le contribuable a perçu le revenu brut. Dans cette seconde situation, les contribuables peuvent développer un sentiment de propriété du revenu total, et ressentir un mécontentement plus important, à taux d’imposition identique. Nos résultats indiquent que l’insatisfaction associée à l’impôt, mesurée par la sanction imposée sur l’agent qui prélève, est significativement plus importante dans le système a posteriori comparée au prélèvement à la source. La communication vers le contribuable permet de réduire le taux de sanction, mais les participants n’exploitent pas vraiment cette opportunité."
"en" => "L’article présente les résultats d’une expérience basée sur une variante du jeu « power-to-take » avec des implications concernant les modalités de prélèvement de l’impôt sur le revenu. L’étude compare le système d’impôt à la source avec un système a posteriori, dans lequel l’impôt est prélevé bien après le moment où le contribuable a perçu le revenu brut. Dans cette seconde situation, les contribuables peuvent développer un sentiment de propriété du revenu total, et ressentir un mécontentement plus important, à taux d’imposition identique. Nos résultats indiquent que l’insatisfaction associée à l’impôt, mesurée par la sanction imposée sur l’agent qui prélève, est significativement plus importante dans le système a posteriori comparée au prélèvement à la source. La communication vers le contribuable permet de réduire le taux de sanction, mais les participants n’exploitent pas vraiment cette opportunité."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques"
"en" => "Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2262
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12051"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12051"
"slug" => "who-should-pay-the-bill-for-employee-upskilling"
"yearMonth" => "2020-10"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Who should pay the bill for employee upskilling?"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et SUTAN, A. (2020). <i>Who should pay the bill for employee upskilling?</i> WP2008, ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "contract theory"
1 => "upskilling"
2 => "screening"
3 => "training policy"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:30:08"
"publicationUrl" => "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02977891/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Upskilling is an investment in human capital that allows a worker to successfully undertake a new task or new project within his/her existing job. It involves costly effort on behalf of the employee to acquire new skills and new knowledge. In this context, one essential question for managers is whether to invest in workers' upskilling or let them pay for the investment in human capital and compensate them accordingly. Using traditional contract theory analysis, we show that the latter choice is not cost-neutral since the most flexible workers benefit of an informational rent. A profit comparison shows that it might be in the interest of a company to invest in worker upskilling, rather than to rely on worker self-training"
"en" => "Upskilling is an investment in human capital that allows a worker to successfully undertake a new task or new project within his/her existing job. It involves costly effort on behalf of the employee to acquire new skills and new knowledge. In this context, one essential question for managers is whether to invest in workers' upskilling or let them pay for the investment in human capital and compensate them accordingly. Using traditional contract theory analysis, we show that the latter choice is not cost-neutral since the most flexible workers benefit of an informational rent. A profit comparison shows that it might be in the interest of a company to invest in worker upskilling, rather than to rely on worker self-training"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2263
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "13061"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "13061"
"slug" => "should-the-firm-or-the-employee-pay-for-upskilling-a-contract-theory-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2023-01"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Should the firm or the employee pay for upskilling? A contract theory approach"
"description" => "VRANCEANU, R. et SUTAN, A. (2023). Should the firm or the employee pay for upskilling? A contract theory approach. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 44(1), pp. 197-207."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
"bid" => "B00000524"
"slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "upskilling"
1 => "montée en compétence"
2 => "théorie des contrats"
3 => "contract theory"
4 => "formation professionnelle"
5 => "training"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.3674"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "197-207"
"volume" => "44"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Upskilling involves costly effort on behalf of existing employees to acquire new skills that are required to execute high value-added projects. A firm-financed training scheme allows the screening of applicants but comes with the cost of hidden actions, as some employees might train themselves yet continue working on low-value projects. A policy relying on worker self-training and incentive compatible contracts allows attracting more workers to high-value projects, yet it must grant a positive informational rent to flexible workers. The analysis reveals the optimal contract specific to each of the two training schemes. The profit comparison shows that the training strategy depends on how large is the net value created by upskilling, which is a characteristic of the business or industry."
"en" => "Upskilling involves costly effort on behalf of existing employees to acquire new skills that are required to execute high value-added projects. A firm-financed training scheme allows the screening of applicants but comes with the cost of hidden actions, as some employees might train themselves yet continue working on low-value projects. A policy relying on worker self-training and incentive compatible contracts allows attracting more workers to high-value projects, yet it must grant a positive informational rent to flexible workers. The analysis reveals the optimal contract specific to each of the two training schemes. The profit comparison shows that the training strategy depends on how large is the net value created by upskilling, which is a characteristic of the business or industry."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2264
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15054"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15054"
"slug" => "cheating-and-loss-aversion-do-people-cheat-more-to-avoid-a-loss"
"yearMonth" => "2016-12"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat More to Avoid a Loss?"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., KOCHER, M.G. et SUTAN, A. (2016). Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat More to Avoid a Loss? <i>Management Science</i>, 62(12), pp. 3428-3438."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Kocher Martin G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2313"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "3428-3438"
"volume" => "62"
"number" => "12"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition—a clear indication of cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame under no monitoring. The fear of a loss seems to lead to more dishonest behavior than the lure of a gain."
"en" => "Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition—a clear indication of cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame under no monitoring. The fear of a loss seems to lead to more dishonest behavior than the lure of a gain."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2265
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15055"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15055"
"slug" => "on-the-merit-of-equal-pay-performance-manipulation-and-incentive-setting"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting"
"description" => "CORGNET, B., MARTIN, L., NDODJANG, P. et SUTAN, A. (2019). On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting. <i>European Economic Review</i>, 113, pp. 23-45."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Corgnet Brice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martin Ludivine"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ndodjang Peguy"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-04 01:01:22"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "23-45"
"volume" => "113"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production."
"en" => "Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2266
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15057"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15057"
"slug" => "social-interaction-and-negotiation-outcomes-an-experimental-approach"
"yearMonth" => "2023-02"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Social interaction and negotiation outcomes: An experimental approach"
"description" => "BRAÑAS-GARZA, P., CABRALES, A., MATEU, G., SÁNCHEZ, A. et SUTAN, A. (2023). Social interaction and negotiation outcomes: An experimental approach. <i>Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics</i>, 102, pp. 101948."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Brañas-Garza Pablo"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Cabrales Antonio"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mateu Guillermo"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Sánchez Angel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 09:57:13"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101948"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "101948"
"volume" => "102"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. We isolate the impact of several common components of interactions: conversations, food, and alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages. Participants perform a standardized (complex or simple) negotiation under six conditions: without interaction; interaction only; and interactions with water, wine, water and food, and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improves the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity, where we find the same lack of superiority of interaction."
"en" => "We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. We isolate the impact of several common components of interactions: conversations, food, and alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages. Participants perform a standardized (complex or simple) negotiation under six conditions: without interaction; interaction only; and interactions with water, wine, water and food, and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improves the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity, where we find the same lack of superiority of interaction."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2267
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15058"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15058"
"slug" => "management-of-common-pool-resources-in-a-nation-wide-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2022-11"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Management of common pool resources in a nation-wide experiment"
"description" => "TISSERAND, J.C., HOPFENSITZ, A., BLONDEL, S., LOHEAC, Y., MANTILLA, C., MATEU, G. ... SUTAN, A. (2022). Management of common pool resources in a nation-wide experiment. <i>Ecological Economics</i>, 201, pp. 107566."
"authors" => array:10 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tisserand Jean-Christian"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Hopfensitz Astrid"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Blondel Serge"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Loheac Youenn"
]
5 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mantilla César"
]
6 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mateu Guillermo"
]
7 => array:1 [
"name" => "Rosaz Julie"
]
8 => array:1 [
"name" => "Rozan Anne"
]
9 => array:1 [
"name" => "Willinger Marc"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:09:23"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107566"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "107566"
"volume" => "201"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Dilemmas related to the use of environmental resources concern diverse populations at local or global scales. Frequently, individuals are unable to visualize the consequences of their actions, where they belong in the decision-making line, and have no information about past choices or the time horizon. We design a new one-shot extraction game to capture these dynamic decisions. We present results from a nationwide common pool resource experiment, conducted simultaneously in eleven French cities, involving a total of 2813 participants. We examine, for the first time, the simultaneous impact of several variables on the amount of resource extracted: the local vs. the national scale of the resource, the size of the group (small vs. big), the low vs. high recovery rate of the resource, and the available information. We show that individuals significantly reduce extraction levels in local as compared to national level dilemmas and that providing recommendations on sustainable extraction amounts significantly improves the sustainability of the resource. Overall, women extract significantly less, but care more about preserving the local resource; older participants extract significantly more resources but extract less from the national resource. Our experiment also fulfills a science popularization pedagogical aim, which we discuss."
"en" => "Dilemmas related to the use of environmental resources concern diverse populations at local or global scales. Frequently, individuals are unable to visualize the consequences of their actions, where they belong in the decision-making line, and have no information about past choices or the time horizon. We design a new one-shot extraction game to capture these dynamic decisions. We present results from a nationwide common pool resource experiment, conducted simultaneously in eleven French cities, involving a total of 2813 participants. We examine, for the first time, the simultaneous impact of several variables on the amount of resource extracted: the local vs. the national scale of the resource, the size of the group (small vs. big), the low vs. high recovery rate of the resource, and the available information. We show that individuals significantly reduce extraction levels in local as compared to national level dilemmas and that providing recommendations on sustainable extraction amounts significantly improves the sustainability of the resource. Overall, women extract significantly less, but care more about preserving the local resource; older participants extract significantly more resources but extract less from the national resource. Our experiment also fulfills a science popularization pedagogical aim, which we discuss."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2268
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15059"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15059"
"slug" => "are-individuals-more-generous-in-loss-contexts"
"yearMonth" => "2020-12"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Are individuals more generous in loss contexts?"
"description" => "COCHARD, F., FLAGE, A., GROLLEAU, G. et SUTAN, A. (2020). Are individuals more generous in loss contexts? <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, 55(4), pp. 845-866."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Cochard François"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Flage Alexandre"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:11:48"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01266-y"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "845-866"
"volume" => "55"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper reports the results of dictator experiments in which the context is varied between a loss and gain frame. In some treatments, individuals have the possibility to sort and self-select the frame they prefer. We demonstrate that higher shares are transferred to the recipient in the loss frame compared to the gain frame when the situation occurs naturally, while the opposite result holds when the participants provoke themselves the situation. Our main result can be attributed primarily to a gender effect, i.e. female participants acting more generously in loss frames."
"en" => "This paper reports the results of dictator experiments in which the context is varied between a loss and gain frame. In some treatments, individuals have the possibility to sort and self-select the frame they prefer. We demonstrate that higher shares are transferred to the recipient in the loss frame compared to the gain frame when the situation occurs naturally, while the opposite result holds when the participants provoke themselves the situation. Our main result can be attributed primarily to a gender effect, i.e. female participants acting more generously in loss frames."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2269
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15060"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15060"
"slug" => "on-signaling-disability-in-anonymous-economic-games"
"yearMonth" => "2020-06"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "On signaling disability in anonymous economic games"
"description" => "MAX, S., GROLLEAU, G., PERCHOT, R. et SUTAN, A. (2020). On signaling disability in anonymous economic games. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 78, pp. 102272."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Max Sylvain"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Perchot Rodolphe"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:13:08"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "102272"
"volume" => "78"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed."
"en" => "We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2270
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15061"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15061"
"slug" => "are-individuals-with-entrepreneurial-characteristics-more-likely-to-engage-in-destruction-an-experimental-investigation-among-potential-21-century-entrepreneurs-in-tunisia"
"yearMonth" => "2020-01"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Are individuals with entrepreneurial characteristics more likely to engage in destruction? An experimental investigation among potential 21 century entrepreneurs in Tunisia"
"description" => "EL HARBI, S., GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A. et BEN TICHA, Z. (2020). Are individuals with entrepreneurial characteristics more likely to engage in destruction? An experimental investigation among potential 21 century entrepreneurs in Tunisia. <i>Bulletin of Economic Research</i>, 72(1), pp. 33-49."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "El Harbi Sana"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ben Ticha Zeyneb"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:17:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12204"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "33-49"
"volume" => "72"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We test experimentally whether individuals high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are more likely to engage in destructive behavior than other individuals. In the joy-of-destruction game, participants can either preserve or costly burn the endowment of each other. In some treatments they can hide from other participants whether they are responsible for destruction. We found that participants high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are significantly more likely to adopt destructive behaviours."
"en" => "We test experimentally whether individuals high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are more likely to engage in destructive behavior than other individuals. In the joy-of-destruction game, participants can either preserve or costly burn the endowment of each other. In some treatments they can hide from other participants whether they are responsible for destruction. We found that participants high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are significantly more likely to adopt destructive behaviours."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2271
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15062"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15062"
"slug" => "entrepreneurial-alertness-in-eustress-complex-environments-an-experimental-approach-of-the-exploitation-exploration-dilemma"
"yearMonth" => "2020-05"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Entrepreneurial alertness in eustress complex environments: An experimental approach of the exploitation/exploration dilemma"
"description" => "AIMAR, T., BOUHDAOUI, Y., MATEU, G. et SUTAN, A. (2020). Entrepreneurial alertness in eustress complex environments: An experimental approach of the exploitation/exploration dilemma. <i>Strategic Change</i>, 29(3), pp. 301-309."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "AIMAR Thierry"
"bid" => "B00068500"
"slug" => "aimar-thierry"
]
1 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bouhdaoui Yassine"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mateu Guillermo"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:15:40"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2329"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "301-309"
"volume" => "29"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Technological and organizational constraints hinder entrepreneurial ability in alertly selecting/exploiting new opportunities. This article aims at showing that the complexity of the environment shapes entrepreneurial alertness. We build an experiment to mimic the choice alertness process (a case of eustress) and measure alertness and its relations with opportunity appearances, entrepreneurial effort, and complexity of the production structure. We show that alertness increases with the selection of more opportunities, but not with the complexity of the environment itself. At the same time, the entrepreneurial effort rate reduces alertness significantly more when participants are in a complex environment."
"en" => "Technological and organizational constraints hinder entrepreneurial ability in alertly selecting/exploiting new opportunities. This article aims at showing that the complexity of the environment shapes entrepreneurial alertness. We build an experiment to mimic the choice alertness process (a case of eustress) and measure alertness and its relations with opportunity appearances, entrepreneurial effort, and complexity of the production structure. We show that alertness increases with the selection of more opportunities, but not with the complexity of the environment itself. At the same time, the entrepreneurial effort rate reduces alertness significantly more when participants are in a complex environment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2272
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15063"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15063"
"slug" => "on-the-merit-of-equal-pay-performance-manipulation-and-incentive-setting"
"yearMonth" => "2019-04"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting"
"description" => "CORGNET, B., MARTIN, L., NDODJANG, P. et SUTAN, A. (2019). On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting. <i>European Economic Review</i>, 113, pp. 23-45."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Corgnet Brice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martin Ludivine"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ndodjang Peguy"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:23:54"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "23-45"
"volume" => "113"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production."
"en" => "Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2273
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15064"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15064"
"slug" => "the-strategic-environment-effect-in-beauty-contest-games"
"yearMonth" => "2019-01"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games"
"description" => "HANAKI, N., KORIYAMA, Y., SUTAN, A. et WILLINGER, M. (2019). The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 113, pp. 587-610."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Hanaki Nobuyuki"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Koriyama Yukio"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Willinger Marc"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:27:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "587-610"
"volume" => "113"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This “strategic environment effect” offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size."
"en" => "Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This “strategic environment effect” offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15065"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15065"
"slug" => "fee-structure-and-mutual-fund-choice-an-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2019-02"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Fee structure and mutual fund choice: An experiment"
"description" => "ANUFRIEV, M., BAO, T., SUTAN, A. et TUINSTRA, J. (2019). Fee structure and mutual fund choice: An experiment. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, 158, pp. 449-474."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Anufriev Mikhail"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bao Te"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tuinstra Jan"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:25:30"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.013"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "449-474"
"volume" => "158"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Pays-Bas"
"en" => "Netherlands"
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We present a laboratory experiment designed to investigate the effect of the fee structure on mutual fund choice. We find that subjects tend to ignore periodic and small operating expenses fees and base their decisions on gross, instead of net, returns. A fee in the form of a, much larger, front-end load leads to lock-in into one of the funds. It is used by some subjects as a commitment device, but exacerbates the decision errors of other subjects. Although past returns do not convey information about future returns, return chasing helps explain subjects’ behavior."
"en" => "We present a laboratory experiment designed to investigate the effect of the fee structure on mutual fund choice. We find that subjects tend to ignore periodic and small operating expenses fees and base their decisions on gross, instead of net, returns. A fee in the form of a, much larger, front-end load leads to lock-in into one of the funds. It is used by some subjects as a commitment device, but exacerbates the decision errors of other subjects. Although past returns do not convey information about future returns, return chasing helps explain subjects’ behavior."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15066"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15066"
"slug" => "egoiste-maintenant-ou-altruiste-pour-demain-strategies-inter-vs-intragenerationnelles-pour-la-conservation-dune-ressource-commune"
"yearMonth" => "2019-06"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Égoïste maintenant, ou altruiste (pour) demain ? Stratégies inter vs intragénérationnelles pour la conservation d’une ressource commune"
"description" => "AJDUKOVIC, I., SPIEGELMAN, E. et SUTAN, A. (2019). Égoïste maintenant, ou altruiste (pour) demain ? Stratégies inter vs intragénérationnelles pour la conservation d’une ressource commune. <i>Revue Economique</i>, Vol. 70(6), pp. 1153-1170."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ajdukovic Ivan"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Spiegelman Eli"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:22:32"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.706.1153"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1153-1170"
"volume" => "Vol. 70"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "La protection de l’environnement passe par la mise en œuvre d’actions coûteuses, au profit de personnes parfois inconnues et éloignées dans le temps. Ces actions pourraient sembler irrationnelles, sauf dans le cas où un individu chercherait à protéger le bien-être de proches, dans de futures générations. Nous comparons expérimentalement deux situations d’exploitation d’une ressource commune : les individus extracteurs sont membres de générations qui se suivent, sans lien dynastique (1) ; les individus des diverses générations sont membres de dynasties (2). Les individus qui savent que leur décision d’extraction va affecter les membres de leur dynastie appartenant à des générations futures font une extraction significativement moindre que les autres."
"en" => "Environmental protection requires costly actions taken for other people’s benefit. Those actions are irrational for selfish individuals, but may not be for those who care for the well-being of people close to them, for instance in next generations. We compare two situations of exploitation of a common resource: a situation in which individuals are members of successive generations, without dynastic link (1), and a situation in which individuals of various generations are members of dynasties (2). Our results show that individuals who know that their extraction decision will impact members of their dynasty belonging to future generations make a significantly lower extraction than others"
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15067"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15067"
"slug" => "representations-de-la-convivialite-de-limaginaire-social-du-repas-au-bien-etre-alimentaire"
"yearMonth" => "2023-01"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Représentations de la convivialité : de l’imaginaire social du repas au bien-être alimentaire"
"description" => "BONESCU, M., GINON, E., TAVILLA, V., BIGUZZI, C. et SUTAN, A. (2023). Représentations de la convivialité : de l’imaginaire social du repas au bien-être alimentaire. <i>Décisions Marketing</i>, N° 109(1), pp. 103-130."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bonescu Mihaela"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ginon Emilie"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tavilla Valériane"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Biguzzi Coralie"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:7 [
0 => "Conviviality"
1 => "Gourmet meals"
2 => "Food well-being"
3 => "Social marketing"
4 => "bien-être alimentaire"
5 => "convivialité"
6 => "marketing social"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:05:21"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/dm.109.0103"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "103-130"
"volume" => "N° 109"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
This article seeks to study representations of conviviality in a meal context and its consequences on consumers’ food well-being, in order to guide decision makers.\n
A qualitative study was conducted on a representative sample of 195 people in a controlled laboratory setting. The first task consisted of defining the notion of conviviality; the second was an exercise that required completing the gaps in two narratives about meals – a convivial one and a non-convivial one, respectively. A content analysis was then performed.\n
A conceptual multidimensional model of conviviality has been proposed. If the constructed image of the ideal convivial meal is guided by the French gastronomic meal model, this study reveals new associations and preferences for consumers, particularly regarding the pragmatic and emotional dimensions of conviviality.\n
The utilization of conviviality and its imagery in social marketing could improve the self-assessment of the food well-being experienced by populations said to be fragile or at risk. In service marketing in particular, the user-friendly paradigm could help professionals better define and communicate the positioning of their offers and brands.\n
This article connects conviviality and food well-being and proposes a thematic analysis framework to characterize and structure conviviality forms.
"""
"en" => """
Cet article cherche à étudier les représentations de la convivialité dans un contexte de repas et ses conséquences sur le bien-être alimentaire des consommateurs, afin d’orienter les décideurs. Une étude qualitative a été conduite sur un échantillon de 195 personnes représentatives de la population. La première tâche a consisté à rédiger librement une définition de la convivialité, la seconde à compléter deux récits de repas, convivial respectivement non convivial, sous forme de textes à trous. Une analyse de contenu a ensuite été effectuée. Un modèle conceptuel multidimensionnel de la convivialité a été proposé. Si l’image construite du repas convivial idéal est guidée par le modèle du repas gastronomique des Français, cette étude révèle des associations et des préférences inédites pour les consommateurs, notamment pour les dimensions praxique et affective de la convivialité. \n
La mobilisation de la convivialité et de son imaginaire en marketing social pourrait améliorer l’auto-évaluation du bien-être alimentaire ressenti par des populations fragiles ou à risque. En marketing des services particulièrement, le dispositif de la convivialité pourrait aider les professionnels à mieux définir et communiquer le positionnement de leurs offres et de leurs marques. \n
Cet article fait le lien entre convivialité et bien-être alimentaire et propose un cadre d’analyse thématique pour caractériser et structurer les formes de convivialité.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15073"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15073"
"slug" => "do-we-need-more-time-to-give-less-experimental-evidence-from-tunisia"
"yearMonth" => "2018-10"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Do We Need More Time to Give Less? Experimental Evidence From Tunisia"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., SUTAN, A., EL HARBI, S. et JEDIDI, M. (2018). Do We Need More Time to Give Less? Experimental Evidence From Tunisia. <i>Bulletin of Economic Research</i>, 70(4), pp. 400-409."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "El Harbi Sana"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jedidi Marwa"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:29:03"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12163"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "400-409"
"volume" => "70"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a laboratory dictator game in Tunisia, we investigate whether the donation level is influenced by the time allotted to take the giving decision. We found that when participants have more time to decide, they give less compared to a situation where they have less time to take their decision. Some policy and managerial implications are drawn."
"en" => "Using a laboratory dictator game in Tunisia, we investigate whether the donation level is influenced by the time allotted to take the giving decision. We found that when participants have more time to decide, they give less compared to a situation where they have less time to take their decision. Some policy and managerial implications are drawn."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15071"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15071"
"slug" => "registered-replication-report-on-srull-and-wyer-1979"
"yearMonth" => "2018-09"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Registered Replication Report on Srull and Wyer (1979)"
"description" => "MCCARTHY, R.J., SKOWRONSKI, J.J., VERSCHUERE, B., MEIJER, E.H., JIM, A., HOOGESTEYN, K. ... SUTAN, A. (2018). Registered Replication Report on Srull and Wyer (1979). <i>Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science</i>, 1(3), pp. 321-336."
"authors" => array:11 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "McCarthy Randy J."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Skowronski John J."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Verschuere Bruno"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Meijer Ewout H."
]
5 => array:1 [
"name" => "Jim Ariane"
]
6 => array:1 [
"name" => "Hoogesteyn Katherine"
]
7 => array:1 [
"name" => "Orthey Robin"
]
8 => array:1 [
"name" => "Acar Oguz A."
]
9 => array:1 [
"name" => "Aczel Balazs"
]
10 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bakos Bence E."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918777487"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "321-336"
"volume" => "1"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Srull and Wyer (1979) demonstrated that exposing participants to more hostility-related stimuli caused them subsequently to interpret ambiguous behaviors as more hostile. In their Experiment 1, participants descrambled sets of words to form sentences. In one condition, 80% of the descrambled sentences described hostile behaviors, and in another condition, 20% described hostile behaviors. Following the descrambling task, all participants read a vignette about a man named Donald who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner and then rated him on a set of personality traits. Next, participants rated the hostility of various ambiguously hostile behaviors (all ratings on scales from 0 to 10). Participants who descrambled mostly hostile sentences rated Donald and the ambiguous behaviors as approximately 3 scale points more hostile than did those who descrambled mostly neutral sentences. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 26 independent replications (N = 7,373 in the total sample; k = 22 labs and N = 5,610 in the primary analyses) of Srull and Wyer’s Experiment 1, each of which followed a preregistered and vetted protocol. A random-effects meta-analysis showed that the protagonist was seen as 0.08 scale points more hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% confidence interval, CI = [0.004, 0.16]). The ambiguously hostile behaviors were seen as 0.08 points less hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% CI = [−0.18, 0.01]). Although the confidence interval for one outcome excluded zero and the observed effect was in the predicted direction, these results suggest that the currently used methods do not produce an assimilative priming effect that is practically and routinely detectable."
"en" => "Srull and Wyer (1979) demonstrated that exposing participants to more hostility-related stimuli caused them subsequently to interpret ambiguous behaviors as more hostile. In their Experiment 1, participants descrambled sets of words to form sentences. In one condition, 80% of the descrambled sentences described hostile behaviors, and in another condition, 20% described hostile behaviors. Following the descrambling task, all participants read a vignette about a man named Donald who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner and then rated him on a set of personality traits. Next, participants rated the hostility of various ambiguously hostile behaviors (all ratings on scales from 0 to 10). Participants who descrambled mostly hostile sentences rated Donald and the ambiguous behaviors as approximately 3 scale points more hostile than did those who descrambled mostly neutral sentences. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 26 independent replications (N = 7,373 in the total sample; k = 22 labs and N = 5,610 in the primary analyses) of Srull and Wyer’s Experiment 1, each of which followed a preregistered and vetted protocol. A random-effects meta-analysis showed that the protagonist was seen as 0.08 scale points more hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% confidence interval, CI = [0.004, 0.16]). The ambiguously hostile behaviors were seen as 0.08 points less hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% CI = [−0.18, 0.01]). Although the confidence interval for one outcome excluded zero and the observed effect was in the predicted direction, these results suggest that the currently used methods do not produce an assimilative priming effect that is practically and routinely detectable."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15074"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15074"
"slug" => "mise-en-place-dune-experience-avec-le-grand-public-entre-recherche-vulgarisation-et-pedagogie"
"yearMonth" => "2017-05"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Mise en place d’une expérience avec le grand public : entre recherche, vulgarisation et pédagogie"
"description" => "LOHÉAC, Y. et SUTAN, A. (2017). Mise en place d’une expérience avec le grand public : entre recherche, vulgarisation et pédagogie. <i>Revue Economique</i>, Vol. 68(5), pp. 941-953."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Lohéac Youenn"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:38:46"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.pr3.0089"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "941-953"
"volume" => "Vol. 68"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous présentons la mise en place d’une expérience lors d’un événement grand public national, de manière simultanée dans onze villes françaises, en septembre 2015. L’expérience a impliqué plus de 2 700 participants et a duré quatre heures ininterrompues. L’objectif de cet article est à la fois de fournir une feuille de route pour une éventuelle réplication et de penser à la manière dont la discipline peut être utilisée dans des terrains nouveaux (vulgarisation, pédagogie populaire, communication grand public)."
"en" => "We present the implementation of an economic experiment conducted simultaneously in 11 French cities, with over 2700 participants, during four uninterrupted hours, during a popular-science event held in September 2015. Our goal is both to provide a roadmap for a possible replication and to discuss how the discipline can be used in new fields (science popularization, popular education, public communication)."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15075"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15075"
"slug" => "surveillance-informatique-versus-surveillance-classique-une-experience-deffort-reel"
"yearMonth" => "2017-05"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Surveillance informatique versus surveillance classique : une expérience d’effort réel"
"description" => "CORGNET, B., MARTIN, L., NDODJANG, P. et SUTAN, A. (2017). Surveillance informatique versus surveillance classique : une expérience d’effort réel. <i>Revue Economique</i>, Vol. 68(5), pp. 843-857."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Corgnet Brice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Martin Ludivine"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ndodjang Peguy"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.pr3.0090"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "843-857"
"volume" => "Vol. 68"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "La théorie de l’agence stipule que la surveillance constante est nécessaire pour augmenter l’effort des agents. Alors que la littérature se concentre plutôt sur la surveillance probabiliste de la production, cet article étudie l’impact de la surveillance constante et continue rendue possible par les technologies de l’information et la compare avec la surveillance classique, imparfaite et probabiliste. Nous analysons ainsi les différences des effets de la surveillance informatique et de la surveillance classique sur les comportements des agents. Nous analysons également les impacts sur les comportements des principaux qui sont largement ignorés dans la littérature existante. À cette fin, nous avons mené une expérience contrôlée en laboratoire, en utilisant le cadre de l’organisation virtuelle qui nous permet d’introduire une tâche à effort réel, ainsi que le suivi des activités de loisir et de tricherie. Nous constatons que la surveillance informatique implique un effet disciplinant, qui apparaît lorsque les agents ont une rémunération endogène et qu’ils perçoivent la sanction. La surveillance informatique, même si elle a un coût en termes de temps (le temps que le principal ne peut pas consacrer à travailler), est utile au principal pour qu’il sanctionne les comportements contre-productifs, en particulier la tricherie, et n’est pas préjudiciable à sa performance."
"en" => "Agency theory states that constant monitoring is necessary to increase agents’ effort. While the existing experimental evidence focuses on probabilistic output monitoring, this article studies the impact of constant and continuous monitoring allowed by information technologies (IT) and compares it with the classic imperfect and probabilistic form. We analyze thus the differences in the effects of IT vs. classic monitoring on agents’ behaviors. We also analyze the impacts on principal’s behaviors that are largely ignored in the existing literature. For this purpose, we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment using a virtual organization setting which enables us to introduce a real-effort work task as well as IT monitoring and shirking activities (leisure and cheating). We find that IT monitoring implies a disciplining effect which appears when the agents are in an endogenous share pay scheme and perceive the sanction of being caught shirking. IT monitoring, even if it implies a time cost (that the principal cannot dedicate to work), is yet useful for the principal to sanction counterproductive activities, especially cheating, and is not detrimental to his/her performance."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15076"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15076"
"slug" => "selecting-board-members-the-impact-of-common-knowledge-on-gender-diversity-an-experimental-investigation"
"yearMonth" => "2017-09"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Selecting Board Members: The Impact of Common Knowledge on Gender Diversity - An Experimental Investigation"
"description" => "GALIA, F., LENTZ, F., MAX, S., SUTAN, A. et ZENOU, E. (2017). Selecting Board Members: The Impact of Common Knowledge on Gender Diversity - An Experimental Investigation. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 38(6), pp. 806-821."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Galia Fabrice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Lentz Frank"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Max Sylvain"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Zenou Emmanuel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:33:34"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2818"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "806-821"
"volume" => "38"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a corporate governance experiment, we explore the role of common knowledge of diversity on board members' selection. Our results show that common knowledge of diversity impacts significantly and negatively the proportion of women selected on boards and in a higher proportion in sectors perceived as ‘masculine’. We also bring evidence of an order effect that makes the selection of men on boards likelier for the first chosen members. This bias is stronger for male decision makers. This article provides implications and directions for future research for the understanding of decision making involved in the selection process for board members."
"en" => "Using a corporate governance experiment, we explore the role of common knowledge of diversity on board members' selection. Our results show that common knowledge of diversity impacts significantly and negatively the proportion of women selected on boards and in a higher proportion in sectors perceived as ‘masculine’. We also bring evidence of an order effect that makes the selection of men on boards likelier for the first chosen members. This bias is stronger for male decision makers. This article provides implications and directions for future research for the understanding of decision making involved in the selection process for board members."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2282
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15079"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15079"
"slug" => "the-interplay-of-inequality-and-reference-dependence-with-trust-an-experimental-study"
"yearMonth" => "2016-04"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "The Interplay of Inequality and Reference Dependence With Trust an Experimental Study"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., EL HARBI, S., SAADAOUI, H. et SUTAN, A. (2016). The Interplay of Inequality and Reference Dependence With Trust an Experimental Study. <i>Bulletin of Economic Research</i>, 68(2), pp. 117-123."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "El Harbi Sana"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Saadaoui Hayet"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:46:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12049"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "117-123"
"volume" => "68"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference-dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer."
"en" => "Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference-dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2283
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15080"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15080"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-monitoring-and-sanctions-on-cheating-experimental-evidence-from-tunisia"
"yearMonth" => "2016-10"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia"
"description" => "BÉKIR, I., HARBI, S.E., GROLLEAU, G., MZOUGHI, N. et SUTAN, A. (2016). The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 37(7), pp. 461-473."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Békir Insaf"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Harbi Sana El."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mzoughi Naoufel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:42:50"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2731"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "461-473"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "7"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains."
"en" => "Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2284
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15082"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15082"
"slug" => "mandatory-integrated-pest-management-in-the-european-union-experimental-insights-on-consumers-reactions"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Mandatory integrated pest management in the European Union: experimental insights on consumers’ reactions"
"description" => "LEFEBVRE, M., BIGUZZI, C., GINON, E., GOMEZ-Y-PALOMA, S., LANGRELL, S.R.H., MARETTE, S. ... SUTAN, A. (2017). Mandatory integrated pest management in the European Union: experimental insights on consumers’ reactions. <i>Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies (ex Revue d'Étude en Agriculture et Environnement)</i>, 98(1-2), pp. 25-54."
"authors" => array:8 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Lefebvre M."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Biguzzi C."
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ginon E."
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Gomez-y-Paloma S."
]
5 => array:1 [
"name" => "Langrell S. R. H."
]
6 => array:1 [
"name" => "Marette S."
]
7 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mateu G."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:35:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1007/s41130-017-0041-x"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "25-54"
"volume" => "98"
"number" => "1-2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "A realistic experiment with 189 French consumers was conducted to analyse consumers’ reaction to the transition towards integrated pest management (IPM) as the standard in European farming. Results indicate high substitutability between IPM and organic tomatoes. It suggests that IPM sales will benefit from the withdrawal of conventional products from the market only if there is a significant reduction in the price of IPM products as compared to organic ones and/or an important increase in the shelf space dedicated to IPM products. While information on IPM guidelines increases IPM products purchases, providing extra information on residue levels in IPM tomatoes has no further impact on consumers’ choices in this experiment."
"en" => "A realistic experiment with 189 French consumers was conducted to analyse consumers’ reaction to the transition towards integrated pest management (IPM) as the standard in European farming. Results indicate high substitutability between IPM and organic tomatoes. It suggests that IPM sales will benefit from the withdrawal of conventional products from the market only if there is a significant reduction in the price of IPM products as compared to organic ones and/or an important increase in the shelf space dedicated to IPM products. While information on IPM guidelines increases IPM products purchases, providing extra information on residue levels in IPM tomatoes has no further impact on consumers’ choices in this experiment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
33 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2285
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15081"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15081"
"slug" => "are-children-more-paternalistic-than-their-mothers-when-choosing-snacks"
"yearMonth" => "2016-08"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Are children more paternalistic than their mothers when choosing snacks?"
"description" => "MARETTE, S., ISSANCHOU, S., MONNERY-PATRIS, S., GINON, E. et SUTAN, A. (2016). Are children more paternalistic than their mothers when choosing snacks? <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 55, pp. 61-76."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Marette Stéphan"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Issanchou Sylvie"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Monnery-Patris Sandrine"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ginon Emilie"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:44:34"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.02.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "61-76"
"volume" => "55"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper focuses on an experiment in which mothers and their child separately chose between relatively healthy foods (flasks of stewed apples) and relatively unhealthy foods (candy bars). Each participant first filled up a first bag for her/himself, and then, a second one for the other person of the dyad. A simple nutritional message on vitamins and sugar contents of foods was then provided, and subsequently each participant filled up a third bag for her/himself and a fourth one for the other person of the dyad. The results show that before revealing the nutritional message, mothers are, on average, “indulgent”, which means that they choose a lower number of relatively healthy foods for their child than the one they choose for themselves. Children tend to be rather “paternalistic”, which means that they choose a higher number of relatively healthy foods for their mothers than they choose for themselves. The nutritional message leads many mothers and children to significantly increase the number of relatively healthy foods selected for themselves and for the other person. The mothers’ indulgence versus the children’s paternalism, along with the children’s reactivity to the message, suggest that mothers underestimate the children’s acceptance of healthy food."
"en" => "This paper focuses on an experiment in which mothers and their child separately chose between relatively healthy foods (flasks of stewed apples) and relatively unhealthy foods (candy bars). Each participant first filled up a first bag for her/himself, and then, a second one for the other person of the dyad. A simple nutritional message on vitamins and sugar contents of foods was then provided, and subsequently each participant filled up a third bag for her/himself and a fourth one for the other person of the dyad. The results show that before revealing the nutritional message, mothers are, on average, “indulgent”, which means that they choose a lower number of relatively healthy foods for their child than the one they choose for themselves. Children tend to be rather “paternalistic”, which means that they choose a higher number of relatively healthy foods for their mothers than they choose for themselves. The nutritional message leads many mothers and children to significantly increase the number of relatively healthy foods selected for themselves and for the other person. The mothers’ indulgence versus the children’s paternalism, along with the children’s reactivity to the message, suggest that mothers underestimate the children’s acceptance of healthy food."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
34 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2286
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15083"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15083"
"slug" => "efficiency-equality-positionality-what-do-people-maximize-experimental-vs-hypothetical-evidence-from-tunisia"
"yearMonth" => "2015-04"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Efficiency, equality, positionality: What do people maximize? Experimental vs. hypothetical evidence from Tunisia"
"description" => "EL HARBI, S., BEKIR, I., GROLLEAU, G. et SUTAN, A. (2015). Efficiency, equality, positionality: What do people maximize? Experimental vs. hypothetical evidence from Tunisia. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 47, pp. 77-84."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "El Harbi Sana"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Bekir Insaf"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:47:48"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.007"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "77-84"
"volume" => "47"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We experimentally test in a developing country whether people prefer a situation where individual and social interests coincide, a situation promoting equality or another one promoting a better relative position. We also investigate whether incentive compatible choices are consistent with results obtained by hypothetical surveys and whether results remain robust when higher stakes are considered. Our results show when stakes are low, a similar proportion of individuals (about 40%) choose the option that maximizes self-interest and social good and the option that promotes equality. Our findings suggest that hypothetical surveys may lead individuals to overestimate positional concerns and to be insensitive to stakes. In presence of higher stakes, egalitarian concerns prevail in incentive compatible experiments."
"en" => "We experimentally test in a developing country whether people prefer a situation where individual and social interests coincide, a situation promoting equality or another one promoting a better relative position. We also investigate whether incentive compatible choices are consistent with results obtained by hypothetical surveys and whether results remain robust when higher stakes are considered. Our results show when stakes are low, a similar proportion of individuals (about 40%) choose the option that maximizes self-interest and social good and the option that promotes equality. Our findings suggest that hypothetical surveys may lead individuals to overestimate positional concerns and to be insensitive to stakes. In presence of higher stakes, egalitarian concerns prevail in incentive compatible experiments."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
35 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2287
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15084"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15084"
"slug" => "behavioral-microfinance-evidence-from-a-field-experiment-in-cairo"
"yearMonth" => "2015-01"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Behavioral Microfinance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Cairo"
"description" => "ALIA, H., MATEU, G. et SUTAN, A. (2015). Behavioral Microfinance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Cairo. <i>Strategic Change</i>, 24(1), pp. 85-97."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Alia Hayyan"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mateu Guillermo"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:49:07"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.1999"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "85-97"
"volume" => "24"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Experimental incentive-compatible techniques bring unbiased evidence from the field about what is unique in the behavior of microfinance clients."
"en" => "Experimental incentive-compatible techniques bring unbiased evidence from the field about what is unique in the behavior of microfinance clients."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
36 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2288
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15085"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15085"
"slug" => "having-a-drink-in-a-bar-an-immersive-approach-to-explore-the-effects-of-context-on-drink-choice"
"yearMonth" => "2013-04"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "“Having a drink in a bar”: An immersive approach to explore the effects of context on drink choice"
"description" => "SESTER, C., DEROY, O., SUTAN, A., GALIA, F., DESMARCHELIER, J.F., VALENTIN, D. et DACREMONT, C. (2013). “Having a drink in a bar”: An immersive approach to explore the effects of context on drink choice. <i>Food Quality and Preference</i>, 28(1), pp. 23-31."
"authors" => array:7 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Sester Carole"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Deroy Ophelia"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Galia Fabrice"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Desmarchelier Jean-François"
]
5 => array:1 [
"name" => "Valentin Dominique"
]
6 => array:1 [
"name" => "Dacremont Catherine"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:51:01"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodqual.2012.07.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "23-31"
"volume" => "28"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper aims to evaluate the effect of context on food choices. Two studies are presented to test the potential of an immersive approach to help understanding contextual influences on drink choices. To generate contextual effects, two bar-like environments based on the idea of “having a drink in a bar” were created: one with wood furniture and one with blue furniture. In both immersive bars, clips with visual and music stimuli were projected on a wall to change the overall warmth of the ambience. In the first study, five different clips were projected. Participants in the immersive bars had to choose a drink within a large range of drinks for each projected clip. Results showed that these elements were sufficient to have an influence on declarative drink choices. Beverages were selected according to perceptual, semantic or cognitive associations between the drink and the clips. The second study was designed to evaluate the robustness of the method. Participants had to choose between five beers in one ambience. Again results showed that drink choices were different according to the ambience. These findings suggest that the immersive approach presented in this paper might be a good tool to explore the integrated influence of contextual variables on food and drink choices."
"en" => "This paper aims to evaluate the effect of context on food choices. Two studies are presented to test the potential of an immersive approach to help understanding contextual influences on drink choices. To generate contextual effects, two bar-like environments based on the idea of “having a drink in a bar” were created: one with wood furniture and one with blue furniture. In both immersive bars, clips with visual and music stimuli were projected on a wall to change the overall warmth of the ambience. In the first study, five different clips were projected. Participants in the immersive bars had to choose a drink within a large range of drinks for each projected clip. Results showed that these elements were sufficient to have an influence on declarative drink choices. Beverages were selected according to perceptual, semantic or cognitive associations between the drink and the clips. The second study was designed to evaluate the robustness of the method. Participants had to choose between five beers in one ambience. Again results showed that drink choices were different according to the ambience. These findings suggest that the immersive approach presented in this paper might be a good tool to explore the integrated influence of contextual variables on food and drink choices."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
37 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2289
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15089"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15089"
"slug" => "how-can-positional-concerns-prevent-the-adoption-of-socially-desirable-innovations"
"yearMonth" => "2012-09"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "How Can Positional Concerns Prevent the Adoption of Socially Desirable Innovations?"
"description" => "SALHI, S., GROLLEAU, G., MZOUGHI, N. et SUTAN, A. (2012). How Can Positional Concerns Prevent the Adoption of Socially Desirable Innovations? <i>Journal of Economic Issues</i>, 46(3), pp. 799-810."
"authors" => array:4 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Salhi Salima"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mzoughi Naoufel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 11:13:55"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624460311"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "799-810"
"volume" => "46"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the role of positional concerns in explaining the (non-) diffusion of profitable and environmentally friendly innovations in situations where there is no conventional prisoner dilemma. Based on anecdotal evidence from farming activities, we introduce the concept of negative positional goods, that is, goods that destroy status in a given reference group, and show how interactions between status concerns and profitability can lead to unexpected outcomes. Several policy implications are drawn."
"en" => "We study the role of positional concerns in explaining the (non-) diffusion of profitable and environmentally friendly innovations in situations where there is no conventional prisoner dilemma. Based on anecdotal evidence from farming activities, we introduce the concept of negative positional goods, that is, goods that destroy status in a given reference group, and show how interactions between status concerns and profitability can lead to unexpected outcomes. Several policy implications are drawn."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
38 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2290
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15086"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15086"
"slug" => "perception-of-wine-quality-according-to-extrinsic-cues-the-case-of-burgundy-wine-consumers"
"yearMonth" => "2013-01"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Perception of wine quality according to extrinsic cues: The case of Burgundy wine consumers"
"description" => "SÁENZ-NAVAJAS, M.P., CAMPO, E., SUTAN, A., BALLESTER, J. et VALENTIN, D. (2013). Perception of wine quality according to extrinsic cues: The case of Burgundy wine consumers. <i>Food Quality and Preference</i>, 27(1), pp. 44-53."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Sáenz-Navajas María-Pilar"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Campo Eva"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ballester Jordi"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Valentin Dominique"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:52:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodqual.2012.06.006"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "44-53"
"volume" => "27"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The value consumers put on specific products depends on the information they can get from experience and from the commercial description of the products. For wine, this information derives mainly from tasting (intrinsic factors) and from the packaging of the bottles (extrinsic factors). The main purpose of this work is to compare different methodologies able to disclose the extrinsic factors playing an important role in wine quality perception of consumers. Twenty-four Chardonnay commercial wines were selected according to different criteria such as origin, denomination of origin and information provided in the label or back label. Forty-eight participants living in Burgundy took part in the study. Two incentive-compatible marketing and economic based purchase methodologies were compared: choice and auction approach, as well as a laboratory categorization task based on sensory analysis methodology at three quality levels (low, average and high quality). In all cases wines were evaluated by examination of the bottles with no tasting. Relative choice and willingness to pay (WTP) ranking for samples were consistent across both purchase methods (choice and auction approaches) however, consumers gave higher prices in the choice approach. The categorization task gives similar results as the two purchase tasks. Results show that it exists an important trade-off in quality perception among different extrinsic cues such as origin, denomination of origin (1er Cru vs vin de pays), label aesthetic (classical vs modern), bottling (estate vs cooperative bottled), the presence of awards as well as different cues commonly linked to tradition such as “special cuvée” or being produced by independent winemakers or being perceived as a wine with a potential for ageing."
"en" => "The value consumers put on specific products depends on the information they can get from experience and from the commercial description of the products. For wine, this information derives mainly from tasting (intrinsic factors) and from the packaging of the bottles (extrinsic factors). The main purpose of this work is to compare different methodologies able to disclose the extrinsic factors playing an important role in wine quality perception of consumers. Twenty-four Chardonnay commercial wines were selected according to different criteria such as origin, denomination of origin and information provided in the label or back label. Forty-eight participants living in Burgundy took part in the study. Two incentive-compatible marketing and economic based purchase methodologies were compared: choice and auction approach, as well as a laboratory categorization task based on sensory analysis methodology at three quality levels (low, average and high quality). In all cases wines were evaluated by examination of the bottles with no tasting. Relative choice and willingness to pay (WTP) ranking for samples were consistent across both purchase methods (choice and auction approaches) however, consumers gave higher prices in the choice approach. The categorization task gives similar results as the two purchase tasks. Results show that it exists an important trade-off in quality perception among different extrinsic cues such as origin, denomination of origin (1er Cru vs vin de pays), label aesthetic (classical vs modern), bottling (estate vs cooperative bottled), the presence of awards as well as different cues commonly linked to tradition such as “special cuvée” or being produced by independent winemakers or being perceived as a wine with a potential for ageing."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
39 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2291
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15090"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15090"
"slug" => "for-me-the-taste-of-soy-is-not-a-barrier-to-its-consumption-and-how-about-you"
"yearMonth" => "2012-06"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "For me the taste of soy is not a barrier to its consumption. And how about you?"
"description" => "TU, V.P., HUSSON, F., SUTAN, A., HA, D.T. et VALENTIN, D. (2012). For me the taste of soy is not a barrier to its consumption. And how about you? <i>APPETITE</i>, 58(3), pp. 914-921."
"authors" => array:5 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Tu Viet Phu"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Husson Florence"
]
3 => array:1 [
"name" => "Ha Duyen Tu"
]
4 => array:1 [
"name" => "Valentin Dominique"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 11:16:26"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2012.01.023"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "914-921"
"volume" => "58"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This research investigates the cultural influence on beliefs about and attitudes towards soy foods (French from France vs. Vietnamese from Vietnam) and possible change of beliefs and attitudes and soy consumption habits with a change in cultural environment (French from France vs. French from Vietnam, Vietnamese from Vietnam vs. Vietnamese from France) of French and Vietnamese participants, two countries with very different soy food consumption. Expressed beliefs and attitudes of soy foods resulting from discussions in focus groups, conducted in both countries, were collected and used to derive a questionnaire. French participants differ mainly from Vietnamese participants in questions associated to taste and price of soy foods. Both groups reported positive attitudes towards health benefits of soy foods. With a change in cultural environment, French participants showed a notable change in attitudes related to taste and price of soy foods and in soy consumption habit whereas almost no change was observed in Vietnamese participants. The asymmetry in magnitude of change and cultural differences in components of beliefs and attitudes are discussed."
"en" => "This research investigates the cultural influence on beliefs about and attitudes towards soy foods (French from France vs. Vietnamese from Vietnam) and possible change of beliefs and attitudes and soy consumption habits with a change in cultural environment (French from France vs. French from Vietnam, Vietnamese from Vietnam vs. Vietnamese from France) of French and Vietnamese participants, two countries with very different soy food consumption. Expressed beliefs and attitudes of soy foods resulting from discussions in focus groups, conducted in both countries, were collected and used to derive a questionnaire. French participants differ mainly from Vietnamese participants in questions associated to taste and price of soy foods. Both groups reported positive attitudes towards health benefits of soy foods. With a change in cultural environment, French participants showed a notable change in attitudes related to taste and price of soy foods and in soy consumption habit whereas almost no change was observed in Vietnamese participants. The asymmetry in magnitude of change and cultural differences in components of beliefs and attitudes are discussed."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
40 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2292
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15091"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15091"
"slug" => "my-teammate-myself-and-i-experimental-evidence-on-equity-and-equality-norms"
"yearMonth" => "2011-08"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms"
"description" => "CORGNET, B., SUTAN, A. et VESZTEG, R.F. (2011). My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms. <i>The Journal of Socio-Economics</i>, 40(4), pp. 347-355."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Corgnet Brice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Veszteg Róbert F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 13:51:50"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "347-355"
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation."
"en" => "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
41 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2293
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15092"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15092"
"slug" => "mon-equipe-et-moi"
"yearMonth" => "2010-04"
"year" => "2010"
"title" => "Mon équipe et moi"
"description" => "CORGNET, B., SUTAN, A. et VESZTEG, R.F. (2010). Mon équipe et moi. <i>Revue Economique</i>, Vol. 61(4), pp. 771-782."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Corgnet Brice"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Veszteg Róbert F."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 11:19:28"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.614.0771"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "771-782"
"volume" => "Vol. 61"
"number" => "4"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Nous étudions la formation des équipes dans des expériences à effort réel dans lesquelles est négocié un profit commun qui dépend de l’effort et des aptitudes de chacun. Les participants décident d’effectuer une tâche seuls ou en équipe. Les équipes sont maintenues quand les différents individus parviennent à s’accorder sur la répartition des gains futurs de l’équipe. Nos résultats montrent que la norme d’égalité prévaut dans un contexte où le mérite devrait jouer un rôle important, même dans le cas d’individus performants qui ne demandent pas une part importante des gains. Nous analysons des données françaises, japonaises et espagnoles et identifions des différences dans la formation des équipes. La norme d’égalité est particulièrement forte dans le cas des sujets japonais."
"en" => "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome depending both on effort and ability. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role, even for high-ability individuals not willing to claim a large share of the joint profits. We analyze data from France, Japan and Spain, and identify international differences in the patterns of team formation. The equality norm is especially strong in the case of Japanese participants."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
42 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2294
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15093"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15093"
"slug" => "guessing-with-negative-feedback-an-experiment"
"yearMonth" => "2009-05"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et WILLINGER, M. (2009). Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment. <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i>, 33(5), pp. 1123-1133."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Willinger Marc"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 11:21:16"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.01.005"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "1123-1133"
"volume" => "33"
"number" => "5"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players’ actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that chosen numbers are closer to the rational expectation equilibrium than in a strategic complements environment (a positive feedback BCG). We also find that the estimated average depth of reasoning from the cognitive hierarchy model does not differ between the two environments. We show that the difference may be attributed to the fact that additional information is more valuable when players’ actions are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements, in line with other recent experimental findings."
"en" => "We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players’ actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that chosen numbers are closer to the rational expectation equilibrium than in a strategic complements environment (a positive feedback BCG). We also find that the estimated average depth of reasoning from the cognitive hierarchy model does not differ between the two environments. We show that the difference may be attributed to the fact that additional information is more valuable when players’ actions are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements, in line with other recent experimental findings."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
43 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2295
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15094"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15094"
"slug" => "the-impact-of-envy-related-behaviors-on-development"
"yearMonth" => "2009-09"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "The Impact of Envy-Related Behaviors on Development"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., MZOUGHI, N. et SUTAN, A. (2009). The Impact of Envy-Related Behaviors on Development. <i>Journal of Economic Issues</i>, 43(3), pp. 795-808."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mzoughi Naoufel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 13:50:20"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624430311"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "795-808"
"volume" => "43"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Envy is a complex emotion that influences the behavior of envious and envied individuals. Because envy can imply ill will, discontent or dislike of the envied individual who possesses something that the envious individual desires, or aspiration to emulate the envied position, it can lead the envious individual to undertake costly efforts to reduce the gap between the envied situation and his own situation. The envious individual can seek either to damage or match the situation enjoyed by the envied individual. In return, the envied individual can adopt either envy-appeasing strategies or envy-arousing strategies. We argue that these costly envy-related behaviors impede or stimulate economic development."
"en" => "Envy is a complex emotion that influences the behavior of envious and envied individuals. Because envy can imply ill will, discontent or dislike of the envied individual who possesses something that the envious individual desires, or aspiration to emulate the envied position, it can lead the envious individual to undertake costly efforts to reduce the gap between the envied situation and his own situation. The envious individual can seek either to damage or match the situation enjoyed by the envied individual. In return, the envied individual can adopt either envy-appeasing strategies or envy-arousing strategies. We argue that these costly envy-related behaviors impede or stimulate economic development."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
44 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2296
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15095"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15095"
"slug" => "please-do-not-pirate-it-you-will-rob-the-poor-an-experimental-investigation-on-the-effect-of-charitable-donations-on-piracy"
"yearMonth" => "2008-12"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Please do not pirate it, you will rob the poor! An experimental investigation on the effect of charitable donations on piracy"
"description" => "GROLLEAU, G., MZOUGHI, N. et SUTAN, A. (2008). Please do not pirate it, you will rob the poor! An experimental investigation on the effect of charitable donations on piracy. <i>The Journal of Socio-Economics</i>, 37(6), pp. 2417-2426."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "Mzoughi Naoufel"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 13:44:24"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2008.02.001"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "2417-2426"
"volume" => "37"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Producers in the recording industry frequently market products for which a part of the proceeds goes to charitable causes. We investigate whether a corporate pledge to donate a portion of profits to a charitable cause will decrease the extent to which customers illegally obtain that company's products. Donations to charitable causes may increase the moral intensity of piracy (robbing the poor rather than robbing the rich) and consequently may reduce the willingness to pirate. This rationale is empirically tested through a dual empirical strategy, that is, a market survey and a laboratory experiment. We show that market piracy decreases when a very low or very high donation mechanism is implemented. Nevertheless, for intermediate levels of transfer, piracy increases again."
"en" => "Producers in the recording industry frequently market products for which a part of the proceeds goes to charitable causes. We investigate whether a corporate pledge to donate a portion of profits to a charitable cause will decrease the extent to which customers illegally obtain that company's products. Donations to charitable causes may increase the moral intensity of piracy (robbing the poor rather than robbing the rich) and consequently may reduce the willingness to pirate. This rationale is empirically tested through a dual empirical strategy, that is, a market survey and a laboratory experiment. We show that market piracy decreases when a very low or very high donation mechanism is implemented. Nevertheless, for intermediate levels of transfer, piracy increases again."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
45 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2297
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15096"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15096"
"slug" => "quand-les-cercles-vicieux-deviennent-vertueux-une-experience-de-marche-cobweb-circulaire"
"yearMonth" => "2006-01"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Quand les cercles vicieux deviennent vertueux : une expérience de marché cobweb circulaire"
"description" => "SUTAN, A. et WILLINGER, M. (2006). Quand les cercles vicieux deviennent vertueux : une expérience de marché cobweb circulaire. <i>Revue d'Économie Industrielle</i>, pp. 267-289."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "SUTAN Angela"
"bid" => "B00819527"
"slug" => "sutan-angela"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Willinger Marc"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 13:47:12"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.434"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "267-289"
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Les participants à un marché de type cobweb doivent simultanément prendre deux décisions : une décision de production et une prévision du prix de vente de cette production. Dans ce papier nous essayons de neutraliser les comportements stratégiques et l’incohérence entre les décisions de production et les prévisions de prix habituellement observés dans ce type de marchés expérimentaux (Sutan et Willinger, 2002, 2003). À cet effet, nous introduisons dans le design expérimental un opérateur de circularité qui modifie la configuration du marché en cela que chaque producteur i doit anticiper un prix pour lequel il est complètement preneur (ce prix étant déterminé par la mise sur le marché de la production de tous les autres producteurs, i exclu). À travers cette procédure nous éliminons le pouvoir de marché, en générant une situation d’interaction locale asymétrique : dans un marché à N participants, chaque producteur i est preneur de prix sur son marché, alors que les autres N-i producteurs sont faiseurs de prix. Cependant, à un niveau global, tous les participants sont interconnectés, et sont, de ce fait, parfaitement symétriques. Chaque participant i assume deux rôles : il agit en tant que preneur de prix sur son marché, puisque sa propre production n’affecte pas son prix, mais en tant que faiseur de prix sur les marchés des N-i autres participants, puisque sa production est prise en compte dans la détermination de leurs prix. Les connexions circulaires de ce type peuvent être vicieuses, puisqu’un participant qui adopte un comportement à risque (en surproduisant par exemple) entraîne tous les marchés dans lesquels il est impliqué dans la direction de sa prise de risque. Cependant, nous faisons l’hypothèse que cette possibilité contribue à stabiliser les croyances et le type de raisonnement que les participants mettent en place lors de leur prise de décision : la circularité pourrait éliminer les comportements stratégiques et les incohérences décisionnelles (elle devient vertueuse). Cette hypothèse est testée expérimentalement. Nous montrons que : i) les prix sont stationnaires autour de l’équilibre d’anticipations rationnelles ; ii) dès le début de l’expérience, les participants ne révèlent pas de comportements stratégiques ; iii) leurs anticipations sont très proches de l’équilibre ; iv) les séries de prix sur différents marchés sont corrélées ; v) avec le temps, les participants prennent en compte les prix et leur production individuelle lorsqu’ils forment leurs croyances sur les prix, ce qui témoigne de leur capacité de sophistication et de compréhension des interactions de l’économie."
"en" => "Participants in cobweb experimental markets simultaneously take two decisions : a production decision and a price forecast. In this paper we try to neutralize the strategic behaviour commonly observed in this type of markets (Sutan and Willinger, 2002, 2003) in order to restore the coherence of the production decisions and price forecasts. This is done by introducing into the experimental design a circularity operator by the means of which each producer becomes a pure price taker and has to make a guess about a price determined by the production decisions of all other agents in the market (except himself). With this procedure we eliminate individual market power, by generating a situation of local asymmetrical interaction : each producer i acts as a price-taker on his own market, while the n-i remaining producers are price-makers. However, from a global point of view, all the subjects are inter-connected, and therefore are perfectly symmetric. Each subject assumes fundamentally two roles : he acts as a price-taker on his own market since his production decision does not affect his own price, but he acts as a price-maker on the other players' markets, since his production decision affects other players' market price. Such circular links between agents can be vicious, because if a single agent adopts a risky behaviour, he drives all markets in which he is involved in the same direction. However, we make the assumption that circularity could eliminate the non-coherent behaviours and transform the producers into real price-takers (it becomes virtuous). This assumption is tested experimentally. We show that : i) prices are stationary around the rational expectations equilibrium ; ii) subjects do not exhibit strategic behaviour even in the first part of the experiment ; iii) the subjects' forecasts come very close to the equilibrium ; iv) price series on various markets are correlated ; v) over time, participants take into account the prices and their individual production while forecasting, a proof of their ability of sophistication and comprehension of the interactions in the market."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T09:21:53.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.1257834
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00819527.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 46
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6925-0970" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.fr/citations?user=wjlHX6kAAAAJ&hl=fr" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Angela SUTAN"
"docSubtitle" => "Professeur associé"
"docDescription" => "Département: Droit et environnement de l’entreprise<br>Campus de Cergy"
"docType" => "cv"
"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00819527.jpg"><span><span>Angela SUTAN</span><span>B00819527</span></span>"
"academ_cv_info" => ""
]
#_index: "academ_cv"
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.867534
+"parent": null
}
