Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2220
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "16712"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => 16712
    "slug" => "16712-counter-orchestration-in-platform-ecosystems-how-complementors-forced-apple-to-change-platform-rules"
    "yearMonth" => "2026-07"
    "year" => 2026
    "title" => "Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules"
    "description" => "HUBER, T., KUDE, T., LEPOUTRE, J. et MALAURENT, J. (2026). Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules. <i>Information Systems Research</i>, forthcoming."
    "authors" => array:4 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "HUBER Thomas"
        "bid" => "B00759533"
        "slug" => "huber-thomas"
      ]
      1 => array:2 [
        "name" => "KUDE Thomas"
        "bid" => "B00703792"
      ]
      2 => array:3 [
        "name" => "LEPOUTRE Jan"
        "bid" => "B00460491"
        "slug" => "lepoutre-jan"
      ]
      3 => array:3 [
        "name" => "MALAURENT Julien"
        "bid" => "B00089355"
        "slug" => "malaurent-julien"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:1 [
      0 => "Platform ecosystems, Platform governance, Platform rules, Complementor giant counter-orchestration, Complementor perspective, Historical analysis, Process model, Longitudinal research, Non-market strategy"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2026-07-16 01:01:29"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2023.0491"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => ""
      "volume" => "forthcoming"
      "number" => ""
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Platform owners with substantial market power can set rules with unfavorable terms for complementors and restrict standard market-based strategies for opposing or circumventing those rules. Although complementors have limited recourse in the market domain, platform owners remain vulnerable to nonmarket challenges—ranging from public advocacy campaigns to litigation. We examine how complementors can leverage nonmarket strategies to effect platform rule changes in their favor. Drawing on a historical analysis of Apple’s iOS ecosystem (2009–2024), we develop a process model of complementor-driven rule change that highlights the pivotal roles of both large, influential complementors—referred to as “complementor giants”—as instigators and orchestrators of change and the legitimizing and amplifying responses of other complementors, users, regulators, media, and the platform owner. The model identifies three interlinked mechanisms—the Collective Action, Exposure, and Long-Term Accumulation Cycles—that explain how complementor giants’ deliberately designed and timed nonmarket attacks invite legitimizing responses from diverse actors, which amplify the original attack and, over time, accumulate into collective efficacy—the jointly held capacity to generate sustained pressure—creating momentum for rule change. By explaining how complementors can drive rule changes against the platform owner, our study recasts platform governance as a multidirectional process shaped by the interdependent agency of many actors rather than by a single entity. We extend research on complementor mitigation by moving beyond accommodation within owner-set rules to theorize how complementors directly confront structural disadvantages by changing the rules that reproduce them. We also advance nonmarket strategy research by revealing mechanisms of change distinctive to platform ecosystems."
      "en" => "Platform owners with substantial market power can set rules with unfavorable terms for complementors and restrict standard market-based strategies for opposing or circumventing those rules. Although complementors have limited recourse in the market domain, platform owners remain vulnerable to nonmarket challenges—ranging from public advocacy campaigns to litigation. We examine how complementors can leverage nonmarket strategies to effect platform rule changes in their favor. Drawing on a historical analysis of Apple’s iOS ecosystem (2009–2024), we develop a process model of complementor-driven rule change that highlights the pivotal roles of both large, influential complementors—referred to as “complementor giants”—as instigators and orchestrators of change and the legitimizing and amplifying responses of other complementors, users, regulators, media, and the platform owner. The model identifies three interlinked mechanisms—the Collective Action, Exposure, and Long-Term Accumulation Cycles—that explain how complementor giants’ deliberately designed and timed nonmarket attacks invite legitimizing responses from diverse actors, which amplify the original attack and, over time, accumulate into collective efficacy—the jointly held capacity to generate sustained pressure—creating momentum for rule change. By explaining how complementors can drive rule changes against the platform owner, our study recasts platform governance as a multidirectional process shaped by the interdependent agency of many actors rather than by a single entity. We extend research on complementor mitigation by moving beyond accommodation within owner-set rules to theorize how complementors directly confront structural disadvantages by changing the rules that reproduce them. We also advance nonmarket strategy research by revealing mechanisms of change distinctive to platform ecosystems."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Management"
      "en" => "Management"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2026-07-17T01:23:35.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/huber-thomas">HUBER Thomas</a>, KUDE Thomas, <a href="/cv/lepoutre-jan">LEPOUTRE Jan</a>, <a href="/cv/malaurent-julien">MALAURENT Julien</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">HUBER Thomas, KUDE Thomas, LEPOUTRE Jan, MALAURENT Julien</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Management</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2026</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Platform ecosystems, Platform governance, Platform rules, Complementor giant counter-orchestration, Complementor perspective, Historical analysis, Process model, Longitudinal research, Non-market strategy</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules</b><br><span>2026-07 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2023.0491" target="_blank">Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_score": 8.003623
  +"_ignored": array:2 [
    0 => "abstract.en.keyword"
    1 => "abstract.fr.keyword"
  ]
  +"parent": null
}