Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8529"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8529"
    "slug" => "working-time-and-unemployment-in-an-efficiency-wage-model"
    "yearMonth" => "1999-11"
    "year" => "1999"
    "title" => "Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model"
    "description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et VRANCEANU, R. (1999). <i>Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CONTENSOU François"
        "bid" => "B00000121"
        "slug" => "contensou-francois"
      ]
      1 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Comme l'indique l'analyse de Shapiro et Stiglitz (1984), lorsque la surveillance parfaite des travailleurs est impossible, les entreprises sont incitées à payer un salaire supérieur au salaire walrassien pour inciter ceux-ci à fournir un maximum d'efforts. Ce texte étudie la décision du travailleur en relation avec la compensation salariale et avec la durée du travail. Nous mettons en relief l'existence d'un taux de chômage positif à l'équilibre de cette économie et nous étudions l'impact sur l'emploi d'une contrainte légale sur l'horaire de travail."
      "en" => "As put forward by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), when perfect worker monitoring is impossible, firms may pay higher than Walrasian wages in order to motivate workers not to shirk in the workplace. In this model, we analyze the shirking decision in relation with working time and wage compensation set by the firm. The equilibrium unemployment resulting from the incentive constraints is derived and the model is applied to exploring the effects of binding legislated working time on joblessness."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T14:21:49.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/contensou-francois">CONTENSOU François</a>, <a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CONTENSOU François, VRANCEANU Radu</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1999</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model</b><br><span>1999-11 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Working Time and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.670292
  +"parent": null
}