Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "15080"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "15080"
    "slug" => "the-impact-of-monitoring-and-sanctions-on-cheating-experimental-evidence-from-tunisia"
    "yearMonth" => "2016-10"
    "year" => "2016"
    "title" => "The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia"
    "description" => "BÉKIR, I., HARBI, S.E., GROLLEAU, G., MZOUGHI, N. et SUTAN, A. (2016). The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, 37(7), pp. 461-473."
    "authors" => array:5 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SUTAN Angela"
        "bid" => "B00819527"
        "slug" => "sutan-angela"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Békir Insaf"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Harbi Sana El."
      ]
      3 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
      ]
      4 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Mzoughi Naoufel"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:42:50"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2731"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "461-473"
      "volume" => "37"
      "number" => "7"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains."
      "en" => "Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Droit "
      "en" => "Business Law"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T17:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sutan-angela">SUTAN Angela</a>, Békir Insaf, Harbi Sana El., Grolleau Gilles, Mzoughi Naoufel"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SUTAN Angela, Békir Insaf, Harbi Sana El., Grolleau Gilles, Mzoughi Naoufel</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Business Law</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2016</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia</b><br><span>2016-10 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2731" target="_blank">The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.462273
  +"parent": null
}