Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2220
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2377"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2377"
    "slug" => "reciprocal-relationships-and-mechanism-design"
    "yearMonth" => "2016-09"
    "year" => "2016"
    "title" => "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design"
    "description" => "CELIK, G. et PETERS, M. (2016). Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design. <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i>, 49(1), pp. 374-411."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
        "bid" => "B00261796"
        "slug" => "celik-gorkem"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "PETERS M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228835747_Reciprocal_Relationships_and_Mechanism_Design"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "374-411"
      "volume" => "49"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Relations réciproques et design de m´mécanisme. Nous étudions un jeu en information incomplète dans lequel les joueurs peuvent coordonner leurs actions en passant des contrats entre eux. Nous modélisons cette relation comme un contrat réciproque où chaque joueur a la possibilité de prendre des engagements conditionnels aux engagements des autres joueurs. Nous nous distinguons du reste de la littérature sur les contrats réciproques en supposant que les sanctions ne peuvent ˆêtre appliquées dans le cas où la coopération prend fin. Nous caractérisons l’ensemble des allocations qui peuvent ˆêtre implémentées par des équilibres bayésiens parfaits. Nous utilisons cette caractérisation pour montrer que l’ensemble des allocations soutenables avec contrats réciproques est plus grand que l’ensemble des allocations soutenables avec un m´mécanisme d’incitation centralise dans lequel le planificateur ne peut pas punir les non-participants. Ce résultat provient de la capacité des joueurs dans le cadre de contrats réciproques `a transmettre des informations partielles sur leurs types au moment où ils offrent des contrats. Nous discutons des implications de notre analyse pour modéliser la collusion entre plusieurs agents qui interagissent avec le même principe."
      "en" => "We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players’ commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non-participants. The difference stems from the players’ ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-23T12:21:43.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/celik-gorkem">CELIK Gorkem</a>, PETERS M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CELIK Gorkem, PETERS M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2016</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design</b><br><span>2016-09 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228835747_Reciprocal_Relationships_and_Mechanism_Design" target="_blank">Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.542705
  +"parent": null
}