Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233
#_id: "B00261796"
#_source: array:40 [
"bid" => "B00261796"
"academId" => "1939"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
"fullName" => "Gorkem CELIK"
"lastName" => "CELIK"
"firstName" => "Gorkem"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"email" => "celik@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "+33 (0)1 34 43 36 81"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "1939"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oiG2MRx2BuaGqodq8u4Fi0D4U3A9LPbF/view?usp=sharing"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=PRuJ__8AAAAJ"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8456-3331"
"career" => array:9 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2251
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2009-09-01"
"endDate" => "2015-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur associé"
"en" => "Associate Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2252
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2015-09-01"
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"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur"
"en" => "Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
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"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2253
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2010-01-01"
"endDate" => null
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur"
"en" => "Researcher"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "THEMA"
"en" => "THEMA"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2254
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2015-10-01"
"endDate" => "2015-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur visitant"
"en" => "Visiting Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université de Rome "Tor Vergata""
"en" => "Université de Rome "Tor Vergata""
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Italie"
"en" => "Italy"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2255
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2006-09-01"
"endDate" => "2007-06-30"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur Visitant Assistant"
"en" => "Visiting Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Koç University"
"en" => "Koç University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Turquie"
"en" => "Turkey"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2256
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2002-09-03"
"endDate" => "2009-06-30"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of British Columbia"
"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2257
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2017-09-01"
"endDate" => "2021-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Other Academic Appointments"
"fr" => "Autres positions académiques"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Responsable de la filière Economie"
"en" => "Head of the Economics Track"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2258
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2023-01-02"
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]
"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Visiting Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Allemagne"
"en" => "Germany"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2259
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2024-02-01"
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"en" => "Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Allemagne"
"en" => "Germany"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:2 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2235
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2002"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Ph.D. in Economics"
"fr" => "Ph.D. en Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Northwestern University"
"en" => "Northwestern University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2237
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "1997"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "B.A., Economics, with Highest Honors"
"fr" => "B.A., Economie, mention Très Bien (Highest Honors)"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bilkent University"
"en" => "Bilkent University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Turquie"
"en" => "Turkey"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
<p><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite">Personal website</a></p>\n
\n
<p>Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant private information (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses game theory to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research has been supported by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and the European Commission through a Marie Curie Reintegration Grant. His research papers appear in academic journals including Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and RAND Journal of Economics.</p>\n
\n
<p><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/home/pdf/ResearchStatement.pdf?attredirects=0" target="_blank">Research Statement </a> (August 2015)</p>\n
"""
"en" => """
<p><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite">Personal website</a></p>\n
\n
<p>Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant private information (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses game theory to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research has been supported by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and the European Commission through a Marie Curie Reintegration Grant. His research papers appear in academic journals including Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and RAND Journal of Economics.</p>\n
\n
<p><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/home/pdf/ResearchStatement.pdf?attredirects=0" target="_blank">Research Statement</a><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/home/pdf/ResearchStatement.pdf?attredirects=0" target="_blank"> </a> (2015)</p>\n
\n
<p> </p>\n
"""
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/"
"en" => "https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/"
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
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]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Microéconomie et théorie des jeux - Droit et économie"
"en" => "Microeconomics & Game Theory - Law and Economics"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Microéconomie et théorie des jeux"
"en" => "Microeconomics & Game Theory"
]
"distinctions" => array:7 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2260
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2011-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur pour “Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism,” Bourse Marie Curie Reintegration, Commission Européenne"
"en" => "Researcher for “Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism,” Marie Curie Reintegration Grant, European Commission"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bourses"
"en" => "Grants"
]
"tri" => " 2 "
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2261
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2006-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chercheur principal pour “Participation in Mechanisms when the alternative is a Default Game,” en collaboration avec Michael Peters. Financé par le Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. (SSHRC Standard Research Grant)"
"en" => "Principal investigator for “Participation in Mechanisms when the alternative is a Default Game,” joint project with Michael Peters. Funded by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. SSHRC Standard Research Grant"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bourses"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2262
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "1998-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Distinction lors du "Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Econometrics," Department d'Economie"
"en" => "Distinction in the "Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Econometrics," Department of Economics"
]
"type" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Awards"
]
"tri" => " 1 "
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"fr" => "Northwestern University"
"en" => "Northwestern University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2263
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Meilleur élève de sa promotion, School of Economic, Administrative and Social Sciences,"
"en" => "Highest ranking in graduating class, School of Economic, Administrative and Social Sciences,"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Prix"
"en" => "Awards"
]
"tri" => " 1 "
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"en" => "Bilkent University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Turquie"
"en" => "Turkey"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2264
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "2000-09-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, (décernée annuellement à un élève qui s'est distingué par son enseignement mais également par ses recherches)"
"en" => "Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, (awarded annually to a graduate student who has distinguished him/herself in both teaching and research)"
]
"type" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Grants"
]
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"en" => "Northwestern University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2265
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "1997-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
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]
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]
"tri" => " 2 "
"institution" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Northwestern University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "États-Unis"
"en" => "United States of America"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Distinction {#2266
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"date" => "1993-01-01"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University Fellowship"
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]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Bourses"
"en" => "Grants"
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"tri" => " 2 "
"institution" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Bilkent University"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Turquie"
"en" => "Turkey"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"teaching" => array:7 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2250
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
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"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2244
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#_source: array:7 [
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2245
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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"en" => "France"
]
]
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2246
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#_source: array:7 [
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]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
]
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2247
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"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2248
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]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\TeachingItem {#2249
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#_source: array:7 [
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"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
}
]
"otherActivities" => array:9 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2234
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"uuid" => "203"
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"country" => array:2 [
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2238
#_index: null
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#_source: array:9 [
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}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2232
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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]
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]
+lang: "fr"
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}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2236
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"type" => array:2 [
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"subType" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Member of the Scientific Comittee of LabEx MME-DII"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
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]
]
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}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2239
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"endDate" => "2003-05-31"
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"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Activités de recherche"
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"en" => "Co-organizer of the Canadian Economic Theory Conference in Vancouver"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
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"fr" => "Canada"
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]
]
+lang: "fr"
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}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2240
#_index: null
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#_source: array:9 [
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
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]
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]
+lang: "fr"
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}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2241
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"fr" => "Relecteur pour Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)."
"en" => "Reviewer for Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)."
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"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
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"fr" => "Canada"
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}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2242
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"fr" => "THEMA"
"en" => "THEMA"
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"fr" => "France"
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]
]
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}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\ExtraActivity {#2243
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
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"fr" => "Relecteur pour American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; American Economic Review; Canadian Journal of Economics; Econometrica; Games; Games and Economic Behavior; International Game Theory Review; International Journal of Game Theory; International Journal of Industrial Organization; Journal of Development Economics; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Journal of Economic Theory; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Mathematical Social Sciences; Mathematics of Operations Research; RAND Journal of Economics; Review of Economic Design; Review of Economic Studies; The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Advances; Theoretical Economics"
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]
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+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
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0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2267
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2012"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2012"
"student" => "Andreoli Francesco"
"firstJob" => "Post-Doc Researcher - CEPS/INSTEAD & University of Verona"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
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"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2268
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2015"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2015"
"student" => "Choi Dong Ook"
"firstJob" => "Associate Fellow, Korea Development Institute"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
"en" => "/"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de jury"
"en" => "Thesis jury member"
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"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2269
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2020"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2020"
"student" => "FAZELI N."
"firstJob" => "Paris School of Business"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES"
"en" => "ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Co-directeur de thèse"
"en" => "Thesis co-director"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2270
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2005"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2005"
"student" => "Kwong Lester"
"firstJob" => "Brock University"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
"en" => "/"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de jury"
"en" => "Thesis jury member"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of British Columbia"
"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2271
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2013"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2013"
"student" => "Song Hui"
"firstJob" => "Assistant Professor - Shandong University"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
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]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de jury"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2272
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2008"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2008"
"student" => "Willmore Chris"
"firstJob" => "Senior Instructor - University of Victoria"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
"en" => "/"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de jury"
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]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of British Columbia"
"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\These {#2273
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:9 [
"year" => "2009"
"startDate" => null
"endDate" => "2009"
"student" => "Wong Adam Chi Leung"
"firstJob" => "Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "/"
"en" => "/"
]
"role" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Membre de jury"
"en" => "Thesis jury member"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "University of British Columbia"
"en" => "University of British Columbia"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Canada"
"en" => "Canada"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2233}
}
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:29.000Z"
"contributions" => array:33 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2275
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1106"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1106"
"slug" => "equilibrium-rejection-of-a-mechanism"
"yearMonth" => "2011-11"
"year" => "2011"
"title" => "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et PETERS, M. (2011). Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 73(2), pp. 375-387."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PETERS M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Mechanism design"
1 => "Default game"
2 => "Cartel agreements"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825611000686"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "375-387"
"volume" => "73"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study a mechanism design problem where the outside option is a default game. Players can reject the mechanism and play the default game non-cooperatively. We show that some allocation rules are implemented only when some players reject. Rejection is useful since it enables a player to signal private information. We establish a condition under which rejection is not required for implementation."
"en" => "We study a mechanism design problem where the outside option is a default game. Players can reject the mechanism and play the default game non-cooperatively. We show that some allocation rules are implemented only when some players reject. Rejection is useful since it enables a player to signal private information. We establish a condition under which rejection is not required for implementation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2277
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "1353"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "1353"
"slug" => "implementation-by-gradual-revelation"
"yearMonth" => "2015-06"
"year" => "2015"
"title" => "Implementation by Gradual Revelation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2015). Implementation by Gradual Revelation. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 46(2), pp. 271-296."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1756-2171.12086"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "271-296"
"volume" => "46"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-crossing property over the set of randomized allocations, a weaker monotonicity condition is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation by gradual revelation."
"en" => "We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-crossing property over the set of randomized allocations, a weaker monotonicity condition is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation by gradual revelation."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2279
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "5559"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "5559"
"slug" => "child-custody-agreements-in-the-shadow-of-law"
"yearMonth" => "2019-07"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2019). Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law. Dans: 2019 Annual SAET Conference."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI N."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2019 Annual SAET Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 15:44:14"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2276
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2152"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2152"
"slug" => "optimal-auctions-with-simultaneous-and-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2009). Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation. <i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Advances</i>, 9(1)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "Bidding Preferences"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "9"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
"en" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2280
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6655"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6655"
"slug" => "matching-and-bilateral-communication"
"yearMonth" => "2017-07"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Matching and Bilateral Communication"
"description" => "SEVERNOV, S. et CELIK, G. (2017). Matching and Bilateral Communication. Dans: European Summer Seminar Symposium (ESSET) 2017."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SEVERNOV S."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "European Summer Seminar Symposium (ESSET) 2017"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2274
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "6847"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "6847"
"slug" => "overprovision-of-public-goods-under-information-manipulations"
"yearMonth" => "2018-11"
"year" => "2018"
"title" => "Overprovision of Public Goods under Information Manipulations"
"description" => "CELIK, G., DONGSOO, S. et STRAUSZ, R. (2018). Overprovision of Public Goods under Information Manipulations. Dans: 2018 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET)."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "DONGSOO S."
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "STRAUSZ R."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2018 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2278
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2377"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2377"
"slug" => "reciprocal-relationships-and-mechanism-design"
"yearMonth" => "2016-09"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et PETERS, M. (2016). Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design. <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i>, 49(1), pp. 374-411."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "PETERS M."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228835747_Reciprocal_Relationships_and_Mechanism_Design"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "374-411"
"volume" => "49"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Relations réciproques et design de m´mécanisme. Nous étudions un jeu en information incomplète dans lequel les joueurs peuvent coordonner leurs actions en passant des contrats entre eux. Nous modélisons cette relation comme un contrat réciproque où chaque joueur a la possibilité de prendre des engagements conditionnels aux engagements des autres joueurs. Nous nous distinguons du reste de la littérature sur les contrats réciproques en supposant que les sanctions ne peuvent ˆêtre appliquées dans le cas où la coopération prend fin. Nous caractérisons l’ensemble des allocations qui peuvent ˆêtre implémentées par des équilibres bayésiens parfaits. Nous utilisons cette caractérisation pour montrer que l’ensemble des allocations soutenables avec contrats réciproques est plus grand que l’ensemble des allocations soutenables avec un m´mécanisme d’incitation centralise dans lequel le planificateur ne peut pas punir les non-participants. Ce résultat provient de la capacité des joueurs dans le cadre de contrats réciproques `a transmettre des informations partielles sur leurs types au moment où ils offrent des contrats. Nous discutons des implications de notre analyse pour modéliser la collusion entre plusieurs agents qui interagissent avec le même principe."
"en" => "We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players’ commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non-participants. The difference stems from the players’ ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2281
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "2417"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "2417"
"slug" => "resale-in-second-price-auctions-with-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2017-09"
"year" => "2017"
"title" => "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2017). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i>, 54, pp. 148-174."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "148-174"
"volume" => "54"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric equilibrium (where all bidders use the same cutoff) is less efficient than a class of two-cutoff asymmetric equilibria. Existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale. Moreover, the equilibria with resale are “more asymmetric” and (under a sufficient condition) more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale."
"en" => "We study sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric equilibrium (where all bidders use the same cutoff) is less efficient than a class of two-cutoff asymmetric equilibria. Existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale. Moreover, the equilibria with resale are “more asymmetric” and (under a sufficient condition) more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2282
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7020"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7020"
"slug" => "reciprocal-relationships-and-mechanism-design"
"yearMonth" => "2012-07"
"year" => "2012"
"title" => "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2012). Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design. Dans: 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2012)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2012)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2283
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7052"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7052"
"slug" => "resale-in-second-price-auctions-with-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-08"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. Dans: 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ESEM)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ESEM)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2284
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7053"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7053"
"slug" => "resale-in-second-price-auctions-with-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. Dans: 2016 North American Meeting of the Econometric Society (ES NASM 2016)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2016 North American Meeting of the Econometric Society (ES NASM 2016)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2285
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7054"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7054"
"slug" => "resale-in-second-price-auctions-with-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-11"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. Dans: Research Seminar at Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Research Seminar at Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2286
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7055"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7055"
"slug" => "resale-in-second-price-auctions-with-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2016-06"
"year" => "2016"
"title" => "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. Dans: 2016, Workshop on Competition and Incentives."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA O."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2016, Workshop on Competition and Incentives"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:11"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
13 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2287
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7123"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7123"
"slug" => "sense-and-suspense-implementation-by-gradual-revelation"
"yearMonth" => "2013-11"
"year" => "2013"
"title" => "Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2013). Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation. Dans: 2013 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2013 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
14 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2288
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "7124"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "7124"
"slug" => "sense-and-suspense-implementation-by-gradual-revelation"
"yearMonth" => "2014-04"
"year" => "2014"
"title" => "Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2014). Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation. Dans: Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2014."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2014"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-04-19 17:57:25"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
15 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2289
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12371"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12371"
"slug" => "child-custody-agreements-in-the-shadow-of-law"
"yearMonth" => "2019-05"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2019). Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law. Dans: Research seminar at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI N."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Research seminar at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 15:45:12"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Présentations dans un séminaire de recherche"
"en" => "Presentations at a Faculty research seminar"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
16 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2290
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12372"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12372"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2020-12"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2020). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: Online research seminar at Sabanci University. Istanbul (Virtual)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI N."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Online research seminar at Sabanci University"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 15:44:35"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Présentations dans un séminaire de recherche"
"en" => "Presentations at a Faculty research seminar"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
17 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2291
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12373"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12373"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2020-12"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2020). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: Online research seminar at Durham University Business School. Durham (Virtual)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI N."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Online research seminar at Durham University Business School"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 15:44:57"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Présentations dans un séminaire de recherche"
"en" => "Presentations at a Faculty research seminar"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
18 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2292
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12374"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12374"
"slug" => "public-good-overprovision-by-a-manipulative-provider"
"yearMonth" => "2020-05"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider"
"description" => "CELIK, G., SHIN, D. et STRAUSZ, R. (2020). Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider. Dans: Canadian Economic Theory Conference (online)."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHIN Dongsoo"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "STRAUSZ Roland"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Canadian Economic Theory Conference (online)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
19 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2293
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12527"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12527"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2021-06"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: 20èmes Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet. Marseille."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI Nejat"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "20èmes Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 17:22:45"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
20 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2294
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12581"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12581"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2021-08"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: 2021 European Economic Association, Econometric Society (EEA-ESEM) Congress. Virtual (Copenhagen)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI Nejat"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2021 European Economic Association, Econometric Society (EEA-ESEM) Congress"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2022-10-19 17:21:54"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
21 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2295
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12808"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12808"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2021-10"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: 42nd Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) 2021. Marseille."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI Nejat"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "42nd Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) 2021"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-01-27 01:00:42"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
22 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2296
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14146"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14146"
"slug" => "resolving-child-custody-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2022-06"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2022). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. Dans: 2022 International Conference on Public Economic Theory (PET). Marseille."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ANBARCI Nejat"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2022 International Conference on Public Economic Theory (PET)"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-20 01:00:38"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
23 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2297
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14147"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14147"
"slug" => "communication-on-binary-decisions"
"yearMonth" => "2022-10"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Communication on Binary Decisions"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2022). Communication on Binary Decisions. Dans: 2022 Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) Annual Conference. Rethimno."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2022 Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) Annual Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-20 16:47:50"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
24 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2298
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "9960"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "9960"
"slug" => "interested-experts-do-they-know-more"
"yearMonth" => "2003-03"
"year" => "2003"
"title" => "Interested Experts: Do They Know More?"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2003). <i>Interested Experts: Do They Know More?</i>"
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:24"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
A decisionmaker, whose optimal decision is state dependent, has to take an action in an uncertain environment. An expert, whose utility is monotonic in the action, has access to a verifiable evidence production technology. If the expert is\n
fully informed about the state, then the intuitive criterion selects the equilibrium where the decisionmaker fully infers the state by observing the level of the created evidence. If the expert is uninformed at the beginning of her investigation, then the information is produced as a by-product of the evidence production technology. In that case, there exists no equilibrium where the generated information is fully revealed to the decisionmaker.
"""
"en" => """
A decisionmaker, whose optimal decision is state dependent, has to take an action in an uncertain environment. An expert, whose utility is monotonic in the action, has access to a verifiable evidence production technology. If the expert is\n
fully informed about the state, then the intuitive criterion selects the equilibrium where the decisionmaker fully infers the state by observing the level of the created evidence. If the expert is uninformed at the beginning of her investigation, then the information is produced as a by-product of the evidence production technology. In that case, there exists no equilibrium where the generated information is fully revealed to the decisionmaker.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
25 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2299
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10075"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10075"
"slug" => "optimal-auctions-with-simultaneous-and-costly-participation"
"yearMonth" => "2005-01"
"year" => "2005"
"title" => "Optimal auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2005). <i>Optimal auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation</i>."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "YILANKAYA Okan"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:26"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
"en" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
26 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2300
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10139"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10139"
"slug" => "mechanism-design-with-weaker-incentive-compatibility-constraints"
"yearMonth" => "2006-07"
"year" => "2006"
"title" => "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2006). Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 56(1), pp. 37-44."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "37-44"
"volume" => "56"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the\n
solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.
"""
"en" => """
We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the\n
solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
27 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2301
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10243"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10243"
"slug" => "counter-marginalization-of-information-rents-implementing-negatively-correlated-compensation-schemes-for-colluding-parties"
"yearMonth" => "2008-02"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2008). Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties. <i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Contributions</i>, 8(1)."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 18:37:46"
"publicationUrl" => "http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol8/iss1/art3/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "8"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
"en" => "Professional journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
A principal contracts with a productive agent whose production cost is private information and with an insurer who can insure the principal against variations in the payment to the agent. The insurer and the agent can collude in their responses to the principal's contract. Non-cooperative play of the principal's contract constitutes the outside option for the colluding parties. In this setup, we characterize the implementable outcomes for the principal. We then identify the optimal implementable outcome under the assumption that the principal faces a budget constraint. The optimal outcome provides the principal with\n
partial insurance: For higher realizations of the production cost, the budget may not be exhausted even though the principal is not directly concerned with the unspent portion of the monetary funds.
"""
"en" => """
A principal contracts with a productive agent whose production cost is private information and with an insurer who can insure the principal against variations in the payment to the agent. The insurer and the agent can collude in their responses to the principal's contract. Non-cooperative play of the principal's contract constitutes the outside option for the colluding parties. In this setup, we characterize the implementable outcomes for the principal. We then identify the optimal implementable outcome under the assumption that the principal faces a budget constraint. The optimal outcome provides the principal with\n
partial insurance: For higher realizations of the production cost, the budget may not be exhausted even though the principal is not directly concerned with the unspent portion of the monetary funds.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
28 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2302
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10277"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10277"
"slug" => "on-the-optimality-of-nonmaximal-fines-in-the-presence-of-corruptible-enforcers"
"yearMonth" => "2008-09"
"year" => "2008"
"title" => "On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers"
"description" => "CELIK, G. et SAYAN, S. (2008). On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers. <i>Review of Economic Design</i>, 12(3), pp. 209-227."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SAYAN Serdar"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:30"
"publicationUrl" => "http://www.springerlink.com/content/f40748121746646p/"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "209-227"
"volume" => "12"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes withthe level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal."
"en" => "In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes withthe level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
29 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2303
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "10338"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "10338"
"slug" => "mechanism-design-with-collusive-supervision"
"yearMonth" => "2009-01"
"year" => "2009"
"title" => "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision"
"description" => "CELIK, G. (2009). Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i>, 144(1), pp. 69-95."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:32"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "69-95"
"volume" => "144"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => """
We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is partly informed of the agent's type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with\n
the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces\n
the principal's payoff compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition on the distribution of the agent's types. In contrast, if the principal contracts with both the\n
agent and the supervisor, there exists a mechanism that improves the principal's payoff over the no-supervision payoff.
"""
"en" => """
We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is partly informed of the agent's type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with\n
the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces\n
the principal's payoff compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition on the distribution of the agent's types. In contrast, if the principal contracts with both the\n
agent and the supervisor, there exists a mechanism that improves the principal's payoff over the no-supervision payoff.
"""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
30 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2304
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12067"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12067"
"slug" => "public-good-overprovision-by-a-manipulative-provider"
"yearMonth" => "2021-07"
"year" => "2021"
"title" => "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider"
"description" => "CELIK, G., SHIN, D. et STRAUSZ, R. (2021). Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 52(2), pp. 314-333."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHIN Dongsoo"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "STRAUSZ Roland"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12370"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "314-333"
"volume" => "52"
"number" => "2"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users may obtain positive rents—users may prefer facing a manipulative provider."
"en" => "We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users may obtain positive rents—users may prefer facing a manipulative provider."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
31 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2305
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12745"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12745"
"slug" => "aggregate-information-and-organizational-structures"
"yearMonth" => "2023-03"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures"
"description" => "CELIK, G., SHIN, D. et STRAUSZ, R. (2023). Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures. <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 71(1), pp. 256-290."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SHIN Dongsoo"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "STRAUSZ Roland"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2024-10-31 13:51:19"
"publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12314"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "256-290"
"volume" => "71"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high."
"en" => "We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
32 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2306
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "15359"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "15359"
"slug" => "ideal-default-for-resolving-disputes-efficiently"
"yearMonth" => "2024-10"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently"
"description" => "ANBARCI, N. et CELIK, G. (2024). Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently. <i>International Economic Review</i>, In press."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
"bid" => "B00261796"
"slug" => "celik-gorkem"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "Anbarci Nejat"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Arbitration mechanisms"
1 => "Dispute resolution"
2 => "Efficient mechanism design"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-11-29 15:34:54"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12737"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => "In press"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study arbitration mechanisms where two parties to the dispute have single-peaked preferences over outcomes, represented by concave utility functions. The most preferred outcome of each party is her private information. By participating in an arbitration mechanism, the parties forfeit the default outcome, which is set without consideration of private preferences. We show that the ideal default outcome for efficient dispute resolution maximizes the sum of the reservation payoffs of the most difficult agent types to persuade to participate in the mechanism. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that an unattractive default could force the parties to agree."
"en" => "We study arbitration mechanisms where two parties to the dispute have single-peaked preferences over outcomes, represented by concave utility functions. The most preferred outcome of each party is her private information. By participating in an arbitration mechanism, the parties forfeit the default outcome, which is set without consideration of private preferences. We show that the ideal default outcome for efficient dispute resolution maximizes the sum of the reservation payoffs of the most difficult agent types to persuade to participate in the mechanism. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that an unattractive default could force the parties to agree."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.030485
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00261796.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 33
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8456-3331" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=PRuJ__8AAAAJ" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Gorkem CELIK"
"docSubtitle" => "Professeur"
"docDescription" => "Département: Economie<br>Campus de Cergy"
"docType" => "cv"
"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00261796.jpg"><span><span>Gorkem CELIK</span><span>B00261796</span></span>"
"academ_cv_info" => ""
]
#_index: "academ_cv"
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 5.0369525
+"parent": null
}
