Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2152"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2152"
    "slug" => "optimal-auctions-with-simultaneous-and-costly-participation"
    "yearMonth" => "2009-01"
    "year" => "2009"
    "title" => "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation"
    "description" => "CELIK, G. et YILANKAYA, O. (2009). Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation. <i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Advances</i>, 9(1)."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
        "bid" => "B00261796"
        "slug" => "celik-gorkem"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "YILANKAYA O."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:1 [
      0 => "Bidding Preferences"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => "9"
      "number" => "1"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
      "en" => "We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an example where it is asymmetric. We then investigate when the optimal auction will be symmetric/asymmetric and the nature of possible asymmetries. We also show that, under some conditions, the seller obtains her maximal profit in an (asymmetric) equilibrium of an anonymous second price auction. In general, the seller can also use non-anonymous auctions that resemble the ones that are actually observed in practice."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-28T00:21:43.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/celik-gorkem">CELIK Gorkem</a>, YILANKAYA O."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CELIK Gorkem, YILANKAYA O.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2009</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Bidding Preferences</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation</b><br><span>2009-01 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.447113
  +"parent": null
}