Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "10277"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "10277"
    "slug" => "on-the-optimality-of-nonmaximal-fines-in-the-presence-of-corruptible-enforcers"
    "yearMonth" => "2008-09"
    "year" => "2008"
    "title" => "On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers"
    "description" => "CELIK, G. et SAYAN, S. (2008). On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers. <i>Review of Economic Design</i>, 12(3), pp. 209-227."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
        "bid" => "B00261796"
        "slug" => "celik-gorkem"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SAYAN Serdar"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:30"
    "publicationUrl" => "http://www.springerlink.com/content/f40748121746646p/"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "209-227"
      "volume" => "12"
      "number" => "3"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes withthe level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal."
      "en" => "In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes withthe level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-28T00:21:43.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/celik-gorkem">CELIK Gorkem</a>, SAYAN Serdar"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CELIK Gorkem, SAYAN Serdar</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2008</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers</b><br><span>2008-09 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/f40748121746646p/" target="_blank">On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.957939
  +"parent": null
}