Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2220
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "15060"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "15060"
    "slug" => "on-signaling-disability-in-anonymous-economic-games"
    "yearMonth" => "2020-06"
    "year" => "2020"
    "title" => "On signaling disability in anonymous economic games"
    "description" => "MAX, S., GROLLEAU, G., PERCHOT, R. et SUTAN, A. (2020). On signaling disability in anonymous economic games. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 78, pp. 102272."
    "authors" => array:4 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SUTAN Angela"
        "bid" => "B00819527"
        "slug" => "sutan-angela"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Max Sylvain"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Grolleau Gilles"
      ]
      3 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Perchot Rodolphe"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 10:13:08"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "102272"
      "volume" => "78"
      "number" => ""
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed."
      "en" => "We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Droit "
      "en" => "Business Law"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-24T03:21:44.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "On signaling disability in anonymous economic games"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sutan-angela">SUTAN Angela</a>, Max Sylvain, Grolleau Gilles, Perchot Rodolphe"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SUTAN Angela, Max Sylvain, Grolleau Gilles, Perchot Rodolphe</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Business Law</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2020</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>On signaling disability in anonymous economic games</b><br><span>2020-06 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272" target="_blank">On signaling disability in anonymous economic games</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.626299
  +"parent": null
}