Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8084"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8084"
    "slug" => "interactions-on-the-quality-of-services-in-franchise-chains-externalities-and-free-riding-incentives"
    "yearMonth" => "1999-01"
    "year" => "1999"
    "title" => "Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding Incentives"
    "description" => "CONTENSOU, F. et LEE, J. (1999). <i>Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding Incentives</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CONTENSOU François"
        "bid" => "B00000121"
        "slug" => "contensou-francois"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "LEE Janghyuk"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'intérêt de notre recherche est inspiré par la question suivante : comment les différents magasins de la même chaîne de franchise réagissent-ils les uns par rapport aux autres lorsque les externalités sur la demande existent dans la chaîne ? Nous analysons principalement la relation horizontale entre franchisés en mettant l'accent sur leurs interactions liées à la qualité de service. Partant d'un simple modèle mathématique avec deux magasins, nous présentons la forme analytique de la réaction optimale sur laquelle sont basées les interactions de ces deux magasins. L'équilibre de ce modèle montre que la qualité de service optimale de ces magasins augmente au lieurde baisser en présence des externalités de la demande liées aux particularités de la chaîne de la franchise."
      "en" => "Our research interest is mainly inspired by the question how different outlets of the same franchise chain react to one another as the demand externalities of the quality of services exist in the chain. We analyze mainly the horizontal relationship between franchisees with focus on their interactions on service quality. Starting from a simple formal model with two independent outlets, we will present the analytic form of the optimal reaction function on which is based the interaction of two outlets. As a result of the interaction, the optimal service quality of two outlets rather increases than decreases."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Marketing"
      "en" => "Marketing"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-24T20:21:51.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding Incentives"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/contensou-francois">CONTENSOU François</a>, LEE Janghyuk"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CONTENSOU François, LEE Janghyuk</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Marketing</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1999</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding Incentives</b><br><span>1999-01 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding Incentives</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.447874
  +"parent": null
}