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Journal articles (2002), Revue Economique, 53 (3), pp. 537-544

Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique

Casamatta Georges, SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried

This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates. Link to the article

CASAMATTA, G. and SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2002). Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique. Revue Economique, 53(3), pp. 537-544.