Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "11042"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "11042"
    "slug" => "un-modele-de-citoyens-candidats-en-information-asymetrique"
    "yearMonth" => "2002-05"
    "year" => "2002"
    "title" => "Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique"
    "description" => "CASAMATTA, G. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2002). Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique. <i>Revue Economique</i>, 53(3), pp. 537-544."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
        "bid" => "B00561609"
        "slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "CASAMATTA Georges"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:31:47"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/3502984"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "537-544"
      "volume" => "53"
      "number" => "3"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Cet article propose une extension en information saymétrique du modèle de citoyens-candidats développé par Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. Nous montrons que l'introduction d'information asymétrique sur les goûts des agents conduit à relativiser la prédominance des candidats médians. Nous montrons également que l'introduction de cette incertitude tend à augmenter le nombre de candidats."
      "en" => "This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T16:21:42.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sand-zantman-wilfried">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried</a>, CASAMATTA Georges"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried, CASAMATTA Georges</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2002</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique</b><br><span>2002-05 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3502984" target="_blank">Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.817001
  +"parent": null
}