CELIK Gorkem

Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant private information (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses game theory to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research has been supported by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and the European Commission through a Marie Curie Reintegration Grant. His research papers appear in academic journals including Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and RAND Journal of Economics.

Research Statement (August 2015)

• 2002 : Ph.D. en Economie (Northwestern University, États-Unis)
• 1997 : B.A., Economie, mention Très Bien (Highest Honors) (Bilkent University, Turquie)

Positions académiques principales

• 2015 - présent : Professeur (ESSEC Business School, France)
• 2009 - 2015 : Professeur associé (ESSEC Business School, France)
• 2002 - 2009 : Professeur assistant (University of British Columbia, Canada)

Autres positions académiques

• 2017 - 2021 : Responsable de la filière Economie (ESSEC Business School, France)
• 2010 - présent : Chercheur (THEMA, France)
• 2015 : Professeur visitant (Université de Rome "Tor Vergata", Italie)
• 2006 - 2007 : Professeur Visitant Assistant (Koç University, Turquie)

• 1998 : Distinction lors du "Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Econometrics," Department d'Economie (Northwestern University, États-Unis)
• 1997 : Meilleur élève de sa promotion, School of Economic, Administrative and Social Sciences, (Bilkent University, Turquie)

• 2011 - 2013 : Chercheur pour “Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism,” Bourse Marie Curie Reintegration, Commission Européenne
• 2006 : Chercheur principal pour “Participation in Mechanisms when the alternative is a Default Game,” en collaboration avec Michael Peters. Financé par le Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. (SSHRC Standard Research Grant)
• 2000 - 2001 : Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, (décernée annuellement à un élève qui s'est distingué par son enseignement mais également par ses recherches) (Northwestern University, États-Unis)
• 1997 - 1998 : University Fellowship (Northwestern University, États-Unis)
• 1993 - 1997 : University Fellowship (Bilkent University, Turquie)

• CELIK, G., SHIN, D. and STRAUSZ, R. (2023). Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures. Journal of Industrial Economics, 71(1), pp. 256-290.
• CELIK, G., SHIN, D. and STRAUSZ, R. (2021). Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider. RAND Journal of Economics, 52(2), pp. 314-333.
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2017). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 54, pp. 148-174.
• CELIK, G. and PETERS, M. (2016). Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design. Canadian Journal of Economics, 49(1), pp. 374-411.
• CELIK, G. (2015). Implementation by Gradual Revelation. RAND Journal of Economics, 46(2), pp. 271-296.
• CELIK, G. and PETERS, M. (2011). Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), pp. 375-387.
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2009). Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Advances, 9(1).
• CELIK, G. (2009). Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), pp. 69-95.
• CELIK, G. (2008). Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Contributions, 8(1).
• CELIK, G. and SAYAN, S. (2008). On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers. Review of Economic Design, 12(3), pp. 209-227.
• CELIK, G. (2006). Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints. Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), pp. 37-44.

• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: 20èmes Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet. Marseille.
• CELIK, G. and ANBARCI, N. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: European Economic Association - Econometric Society Congress.
• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: 2021 European Economic Association, Econometric Society (EEA-ESEM) Congress. Virtual (Copenhagen).
• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2021). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: 42nd Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) 2021. Marseille.
• CELIK, G., SHIN, D. and STRAUSZ, R. (2020). Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider. In: Canadian Economic Theory Conference (online).
• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2019). Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law. In: 2019 Annual SAET Conference.
• CELIK, G., DONGSOO, S. and STRAUSZ, R. (2018). Overprovision of Public Goods under Information Manipulations. In: 2018 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET).
• SEVERNOV, S. and CELIK, G. (2017). Matching and Bilateral Communication. In: European Summer Seminar Symposium (ESSET) 2017.
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. In: 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ESEM).
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. In: 2016 North American Meeting of the Econometric Society (ES NASM 2016).
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. In: Research Seminar at Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM).
• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2016). Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation. In: 2016, Workshop on Competition and Incentives.
• CELIK, G. (2014). Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation. In: Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2014.
• CELIK, G. (2013). Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation. In: 2013 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists.
• CELIK, G. (2012). Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design. In: 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2012).

• CELIK, G. and YILANKAYA, O. (2005). Optimal auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation.
• CELIK, G. (2003). Interested Experts: Do They Know More?

• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2020). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: Online research seminar at Sabanci University. Istanbul (Virtual).
• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2020). Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently. In: Online research seminar at Durham University Business School. Durham (Virtual).
• ANBARCI, N. and CELIK, G. (2019). Child Custody Agreements in the Shadow of Law. In: Research seminar at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.