Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1353"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1353"
    "slug" => "implementation-by-gradual-revelation"
    "yearMonth" => "2015-06"
    "year" => "2015"
    "title" => "Implementation by Gradual Revelation"
    "description" => "CELIK, G. (2015). Implementation by Gradual Revelation. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>, 46(2), pp. 271-296."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
        "bid" => "B00261796"
        "slug" => "celik-gorkem"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1756-2171.12086"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "271-296"
      "volume" => "46"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-crossing property over the set of randomized allocations, a weaker monotonicity condition is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation by gradual revelation."
      "en" => "We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-crossing property over the set of randomized allocations, a weaker monotonicity condition is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation by gradual revelation."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-28T14:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Implementation by Gradual Revelation"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/celik-gorkem">CELIK Gorkem</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CELIK Gorkem</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2015</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Implementation by Gradual Revelation</b><br><span>2015-06 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1756-2171.12086" target="_blank">Implementation by Gradual Revelation</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.33932
  +"parent": null
}