Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1106"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1106"
    "slug" => "equilibrium-rejection-of-a-mechanism"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-11"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism"
    "description" => "CELIK, G. et PETERS, M. (2011). Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 73(2), pp. 375-387."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CELIK Gorkem"
        "bid" => "B00261796"
        "slug" => "celik-gorkem"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "PETERS M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:3 [
      0 => "Mechanism design"
      1 => "Default game"
      2 => "Cartel agreements"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825611000686"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "375-387"
      "volume" => "73"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We study a mechanism design problem where the outside option is a default game. Players can reject the mechanism and play the default game non-cooperatively. We show that some allocation rules are implemented only when some players reject. Rejection is useful since it enables a player to signal private information. We establish a condition under which rejection is not required for implementation."
      "en" => "We study a mechanism design problem where the outside option is a default game. Players can reject the mechanism and play the default game non-cooperatively. We show that some allocation rules are implemented only when some players reject. Rejection is useful since it enables a player to signal private information. We establish a condition under which rejection is not required for implementation."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-23T15:21:42.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/celik-gorkem">CELIK Gorkem</a>, PETERS M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CELIK Gorkem, PETERS M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economie</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Mechanism design</a>, <a href="#">Default game</a>, <a href="#">Cartel agreements</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism</b><br><span>2011-11 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825611000686" target="_blank">Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.181117
  +"parent": null
}