Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2233
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "15091"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "15091"
    "slug" => "my-teammate-myself-and-i-experimental-evidence-on-equity-and-equality-norms"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-08"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms"
    "description" => "CORGNET, B., SUTAN, A. et VESZTEG, R.F. (2011). My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms. <i>The Journal of Socio-Economics</i>, 40(4), pp. 347-355."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SUTAN Angela"
        "bid" => "B00819527"
        "slug" => "sutan-angela"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Corgnet Brice"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "Veszteg Róbert F."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2024-09-09 13:51:50"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "347-355"
      "volume" => "40"
      "number" => "4"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation."
      "en" => "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Droit "
      "en" => "Business Law"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-03T17:21:44.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms"
    "docSurtitle" => "Articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sutan-angela">SUTAN Angela</a>, Corgnet Brice, Veszteg Róbert F."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SUTAN Angela, Corgnet Brice, Veszteg Róbert F.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Droit </span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms</b><br><span>2011-08 | Articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005" target="_blank">My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "fr"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.697312
  +"parent": null
}