Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2188
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8492"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8492"
    "slug" => "trust-and-financial-trades-lessons-from-an-investment-game-where-reciprocators-can-hide-behind-probabilities"
    "yearMonth" => "2010-05"
    "year" => "2010"
    "title" => "Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities"
    "description" => "VRANCEANU, R., SUTAN, A. et DUBART, D. (2010). <i>Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SUTAN A."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "DUBART Delphine"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Confiance"
      1 => "Economie expérimentale"
      2 => "Finance"
      3 => "Jeu de l'investissement"
      4 => "Risk objectif"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article propose une étude expérimentale d'une variante originale du jeu de l'investissement. On introduit une probabilité objective de disparition du lien entre investisseur et récepteur. Le dernier pourra prétexter cet événement objectif pour jouer sa stratégie égoïste, ce que nous appelons "se cacher derrière les probabilités".  Ce phénomène pourrait bien caractériser les échanges financiers."
      "en" => "In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-building."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Systèmes d’Information, Sciences de la Décision et Statistiques"
      "en" => "Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-05-02T13:22:03.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, SUTAN A., DUBART Delphine"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, SUTAN A., DUBART Delphine</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Information Systems, Decision Sciences and Statistics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2010</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Confiance</a>, <a href="#">Economie expérimentale</a>, <a href="#">Finance</a>, <a href="#">Jeu de l'investissement</a>, <a href="#">Risk objectif</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities</b><br><span>2010-05 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.172572
  +"parent": null
}