Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "2711"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "2711"
    "slug" => "the-role-of-commonality-between-ceo-and-divisional-managers-in-internal-capital-markets"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-06"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "The Role of Commonality Between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets"
    "description" => "GASPAR, J.M. et MASSA, M. (2011). The Role of Commonality Between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets. <i>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis</i>, 46(3), pp. 841-869."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "GASPAR José-Miguel"
        "bid" => "B00015852"
        "slug" => "gaspar-jose-miguel"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "MASSA M."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:1 [
      0 => "Conglomérats"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227406477_The_Role_of_Commonality_between_CEO_and_Divisional_Managers_in_Internal_Capital_Markets"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "841-869"
      "volume" => "46"
      "number" => "3"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Nous étudions le rôle joué par les liens informels entre le CEO (Président) et les directeurs divisionnaires des organisations conglomérés. L'article montre que les segments dirigés par les directeurs reliés au CEO reçoivent plus d'investissement. Au niveau d'entreprise, avoir plus des directeurs reliés présidant les segments au haut Tobin Q améliore l'allocation des ressources et augmente la valeur de la firme."
      "en" => "We study the role played by the informal links, or “connections,” between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. We show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow shortfalls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments’ cash flow). At the firm level, having more connected managers presiding over segments with high Tobin’s Q improves resource allocation and increases firm value."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Finance"
      "en" => "Finance"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T14:21:48.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "The Role of Commonality Between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/gaspar-jose-miguel">GASPAR José-Miguel</a>, MASSA M."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">GASPAR José-Miguel, MASSA M.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Finance</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Conglomérats</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>The Role of Commonality Between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets</b><br><span>2011-06 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227406477_The_Role_of_Commonality_between_CEO_and_Divisional_Managers_in_Internal_Capital_Markets" target="_blank">The Role of Commonality Between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.957939
  +"parent": null
}