Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8425"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8425"
    "slug" => "switching-costs-in-competitive-health-insurance-markets"
    "yearMonth" => "2013-02"
    "year" => "2013"
    "title" => "Switching Costs in Competitive Health Insurance Markets"
    "description" => "LAMIRAUD, K. (2013). <i>Switching Costs in Competitive Health Insurance Markets</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "LAMIRAUD Karine"
        "bid" => "B00278040"
        "slug" => "lamiraud-karine"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Dans ce papier, nous analysons la présence de coûts de changement (coûts de switching) lorsque les consommateurs ont la possibilité de changer d’assureur pour l’assurance maladie de base. Nous nous intéressons au cas de la Suisse qui a mis en place une forme relativement pure de concurrence en assurance maladie. Nous identifions différents types de coûts de changement : l’excès de choix (en termes de nombre de compagnies présentes sur le marché), le biais de statu quo, la possession d’un contrat d’assurance supplémentaire pour les assurés déclarant un mauvais état de santé, les stratégies tarifaires des firmes qui utilisent l’assurance supplémentaire comme produit d’appel, la mauvaise régulation des réserves des caisses et les limites liées au mécanisme initial de compensation des risques."
      "en" => "In this paper we investigate the possible presence of switching costs when consumers are offered the opportunity to change their basic health insurance provider. We focus on the specific case of Switzerland which implemented a  pure form of competition in basic health insurance markets. We identify several barriers to switching, namely choice overload, status quo bias, the possession of supplementary contracts for enrollees in bad health, firm’s pricing strategies based on providing low price supplementary products, poor regulation of reserves and the limitations of the previous risk-equalization mechanism which left room for risk selection practices."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T06:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Switching Costs in Competitive Health Insurance Markets"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/lamiraud-karine">LAMIRAUD Karine</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">LAMIRAUD Karine</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2013</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Switching Costs in Competitive Health Insurance Markets</b><br><span>2013-02 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Switching Costs in Competitive Health Insurance Markets</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.605642
  +"parent": null
}