Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8422"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8422"
    "slug" => "suivi-qualitatif-des-opa-en-france-depuis-octobre-2013"
    "yearMonth" => "2015-07"
    "year" => "2015"
    "title" => "Suivi qualitatif des OPA en France depuis octobre 2013"
    "description" => "DE BEAUFORT, V. (2015). <i>Suivi qualitatif des OPA en France depuis octobre 2013</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "DE BEAUFORT Viviane"
        "bid" => "B00000133"
        "slug" => "de-beaufort-viviane"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:11 [
      0 => "Actionnariat"
      1 => "Assemblée générale"
      2 => "CEDE"
      3 => "Directive"
      4 => "Dispositifs anti-OPA"
      5 => "Droit de vote"
      6 => "Étude"
      7 => "Europe"
      8 => "Florange"
      9 => "Harmonisation"
      10 => "OPA"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "La directive européenne 2004/25/CE sur les OPA impose une transparence sur la structure du capital et les éventuels dispositifs anti-OPA de la société. La Commission européenne a en effet eu la volonté de limiter les obstacles aux offres publiques en instaurant dans le texte un dispositif assurant la transparence (article 10) dans l’optique de les limiter – effet de marché (article 11). Le jeu de l’article 12 de la directive limite cependant le « level playing field » en acceptant des différences entre dispositifs nationaux ; Depuis, la transcription en 2006, la France, au travers de la nouvelle loi dite Florange adoptée en 2013, a modifié l’arsenal anti-OPA notamment en consacrant un droit de vote double systématisé et l’abandon du principe de  neutralité. Il s’avère que le succès du texte, auprès des entreprises est mitigé car les investisseurs et actionnaires ont largement utilisé en 2014 et en 2015 des résolutions allant à l’encontre du texte. Une étude menée pour le CEDE ESSEC sur douze offres lancées en 2014-2015, dont la fameuse affaire Club Med, permet de détailler les différents arsenaux dont disposent aujourd’hui les entreprises françaises : clauses de changement de contrôle, actions à droit de vote double et déclarations de franchissement de seuils restent les plus visibles."
      "en" => "The European directive 2004/25/CE on take-over bids imposed the transparency on the structure of the capital and the anti-EPO measures, either obstacle to the access to the capital, or to the exercice of the control at the level of the general assembly or of the board of directors. The European Commission showed its will to limit the obstacles to buds by establishing in the text a device assuring, besides the transparency (article 10), the neutralization of the leader in case of offer (article 9) and the limitation of the defenses (article 11). But it seems clearly that the article 12 of the directive, added after negotiations with the European Parliament and the States, allows "arrangements" and limits the "level playing field". Since then, France, through the Florange law of 2013, dedicated among others the double voting right and the relinquishment of the neutrality of  the management;; but the success with companies is very reserved because the investors and the shareholders have very widely used the vote of resolutions going against the text. A study led for the CEDE ESSEC on twelve take-over bids launched in 2014-2015, of which the famous Club Med affair, helps detailing the various arsenals that the French companies have today: clauses of change of control, double voting right shares and statement of thresholds crossing stay the most visible.  Keywords: EPO, Florange Act, Voting right, European Union, Directive, Harmonisation, General assembly, Shareholders, Anti-TOB measures comparison, Survey."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Droit "
      "en" => "Business Law"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T12:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Suivi qualitatif des OPA en France depuis octobre 2013"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/de-beaufort-viviane">DE BEAUFORT Viviane</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">DE BEAUFORT Viviane</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Business Law</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2015</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Actionnariat</a>, <a href="#">Assemblée générale</a>, <a href="#">CEDE</a>, <a href="#">Directive</a>, <a href="#">Dispositifs anti-OPA</a>, <a href="#">Droit de vote</a>, <a href="#">Étude</a>, <a href="#">Europe</a>, <a href="#">Florange</a>, <a href="#">Harmonisation</a>, <a href="#">OPA</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Suivi qualitatif des OPA en France depuis octobre 2013</b><br><span>2015-07 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Suivi qualitatif des OPA en France depuis octobre 2013</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.7314005
  +"parent": null
}