Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8379"
  #_source: array:25 [
    "id" => "8379"
    "slug" => "reputation-in-a-model-of-exchange-rate-policy-with-incomplete-information"
    "yearMonth" => "1997-03"
    "year" => "1997"
    "title" => "Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Inspiré par le contexte européen, le modèle étudie la politique de change en tant que jeu séquentiel à horizon fini entre l'Etat et les agents privés dans l'hypothèse d'information incomplète sur les priorités de l'Etat. Celui-ci poursuit deux objectifs contradictoires : préserver la parité de sa monnaie et stimuler la production. La dévaluation permet une amélioration temporaire de la production mais aussi favorise les anticipations de dévaluation future, d'où l'émergence d'une prime de risque sur les taux d'intérêt. Il est démontré que le jeu présente un équilibre parfait Bayesien. Sous certaines conditions, l'équilibre qui apparaît est de type "mélangeur". Dans ce cas, la politique de non-dévaluation ne permet pas de signaler le type d'Etat et la prime de risque persiste. Plusieurs pays européens qui envisagent le passage à la monnaie unique pourraient se trouver dans une telle situation."
      "en" => "Inspired by the contemporary process of European monetary integration, this paper analyzes exchange rate policy as a finite horizon sequential game under incomplete information of the private agents over the priorities of the central bank. The policymaker has two conflicting objectives: stimulating activity and preserving the parity of the currency. It will be shown that the game presents a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the most interesting case deals with the pooling situation, where in the central bank undertakes a policy of strong currency during an introductory period, and devaluates in the very few moments before the transfer of its functions to the supra-national central bank. The model suggests a rationale for the persistent risk premium on interest rates in the countries applying for the European Monetary Union."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2023-12-11T20:21:56.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1997</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Reputation in a Model of Exchange Rate Policy with Incomplete Information</b><br><span>1997-03 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.255378
  +"parent": null
}