Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8378"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8378"
    "slug" => "reputation-in-a-model-of-economy-wide-privatization"
    "yearMonth" => "1997-01"
    "year" => "1997"
    "title" => "Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (1997). <i>Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Le texte étudie la politique de privatisation dans les économies en transition sous la forme d'un jeu séquentiel en information incomplète. Il met en évidence le potentiel d'incohérence temporelle de cette réforme. Les Etats ont deux objectifs prioritaires : la privatisation et la protection des emplois, dont les agents ignorent le poids dans la fonction objectif de l'Etat. Il sera démontré que deux types d'équilibres Bayesiens parfaits, l'un séparateur, l'autre "pooling", peuvent se manifester selon la nature de l'Etat. Si certains Etats orientés-emploi peuvent signaler leur priorité, les Etats orientés-privatisation ne peuvent pas. De ce fait, d'autres Etats orientés-emploi peuvent agir pour construire une réputation de "privatisation rapide"."
      "en" => "This paper analyzes economy-wide privatization as a two-period sequential game with incomplete information, focusing on the potential for dynamic inconsistency of this reform. Governments have two main conflicting objectives: privatization and preservation of jobs. At the outset of the game, private agents do not know the weights attached to each objective by their government. It is shown that the game may present either a separating or a pooling Bayesian equilibrium, contingent upon the type of government. While some slow privatizers may successfully signal themselves in the eyes of private agents, others may attempt to build a reputation of "fast privatizers"."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T02:21:49.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">1997</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization</b><br><span>1997-01 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Reputation in a Model of Economy-wide Privatization</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.831011
  +"parent": null
}