Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2188
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "10756"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "10756"
    "slug" => "quorum-rules-and-shareholder-voting"
    "yearMonth" => "2019-12"
    "year" => "2019"
    "title" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2019). Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i>, 60."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "FAGART Marie-Cécile"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM Saîd"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:6 [
      0 => "Shareholder Meeting"
      1 => "Strategic voting"
      2 => "Quorum rule"
      3 => "Coalitions"
      4 => "Shareholder proposal"
      5 => "Controlling shareholders"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2019.105855"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => "60"
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We analyze how a minimum quorum affects shareholder voting in meetings. We show that a quorum creates an incentive for coalition formation of shareholders supporting the resolution. It works as a coordination device for possibly small shareholders allied in a winning voting coalition. It also generates an equilibrium in which the resolution is not adopted due to lack of quorum. The shareholder structure is central to the determination of the outcome of the vote. A resolution supported by the dominant shareholder is always adopted if his ownership reaches the quorum. However, allied blockholders can successfully approve a resolution opposed by the dominant owner. As a consequence, it is more effective for an active shareholder to propose and pass a resolution than to oppose a board resolution. Finally, we find that the dominant shareholder de facto controls the meeting when his share by far exceeds the second largest share."
      "en" => "We analyze how a minimum quorum affects shareholder voting in meetings. We show that a quorum creates an incentive for coalition formation of shareholders supporting the resolution. It works as a coordination device for possibly small shareholders allied in a winning voting coalition. It also generates an equilibrium in which the resolution is not adopted due to lack of quorum. The shareholder structure is central to the determination of the outcome of the vote. A resolution supported by the dominant shareholder is always adopted if his ownership reaches the quorum. However, allied blockholders can successfully approve a resolution opposed by the dominant owner. As a consequence, it is more effective for an active shareholder to propose and pass a resolution than to oppose a board resolution. Finally, we find that the dominant shareholder de facto controls the meeting when his share by far exceeds the second largest share."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-05-02T05:21:58.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saîd"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saîd</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Shareholder Meeting</a>, <a href="#">Strategic voting</a>, <a href="#">Quorum rule</a>, <a href="#">Coalitions</a>, <a href="#">Shareholder proposal</a>, <a href="#">Controlling shareholders</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</b><br><span>2019-12 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2019.105855" target="_blank">Quorum Rules and Shareholder Voting</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 7.7317715
  +"parent": null
}