Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "12740"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "12740"
    "slug" => "price-caps-and-efficiency-in-markets-with-adverse-selection"
    "yearMonth" => "2022-03"
    "year" => "2022"
    "title" => "Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection"
    "description" => "DOSIS, A. (2022). Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, 99, pp. 102591."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "DOSIS Anastasios"
        "bid" => "B00536871"
        "slug" => "dosis-anastasios"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Insurance"
      1 => "Adverse selection"
      2 => "Competition Price caps"
      3 => "Existence Efficiency"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2023-01-27 01:00:41"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102591"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "102591"
      "volume" => "99"
      "number" => ""
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "This article studies general economies with adverse selection in which symmetric companies supply (potentially multiple) plans to privately informed consumers and compete in terms of price schedules. I show that a basic price cap regulation, in which the price caps are endogenously determined by companies, discourages risk selection over efficient allocations, and therefore, equilibrium exists in every economy. Moreover, I demonstrate that in generalisations of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) economies, companies earn zero profits in equilibrium, and every equilibrium allocation is efficient."
      "en" => "This article studies general economies with adverse selection in which symmetric companies supply (potentially multiple) plans to privately informed consumers and compete in terms of price schedules. I show that a basic price cap regulation, in which the price caps are endogenously determined by companies, discourages risk selection over efficient allocations, and therefore, equilibrium exists in every economy. Moreover, I demonstrate that in generalisations of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) economies, companies earn zero profits in equilibrium, and every equilibrium allocation is efficient."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T00:21:50.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/dosis-anastasios">DOSIS Anastasios</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">DOSIS Anastasios</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2022</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Insurance</a>, <a href="#">Adverse selection</a>, <a href="#">Competition Price caps</a>, <a href="#">Existence Efficiency</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection</b><br><span>2022-03 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102591" target="_blank">Price Caps and Efficiency in Markets with Adverse Selection</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.594523
  +"parent": null
}