Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "8298"
#_source: array:26 [
"id" => "8298"
"slug" => "one-share-one-vote-the-new-holy-graal"
"yearMonth" => "2007-05"
"year" => "2007"
"title" => "One Share-One Vote, the New Holy Graal?"
"description" => "DE BEAUFORT, V. (2007). <i>One Share-One Vote, the New Holy Graal?</i> ESSEC Business School."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "DE BEAUFORT Viviane"
"bid" => "B00000133"
"slug" => "de-beaufort-viviane"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Démocratie actionnariale"
1 => "Gouvernance d'entreprise"
2 => "Un titre"
3 => "une voix"
]
"updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => null
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Documents de travail"
"en" => "Working Papers"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Plus d'un tiers des entreprises référencées dans l'index FTSE EUROFIRST 300 sont régies selon des techniques différant de la stricte application du principe " One share - One vote ". Une application stricte de la règle One share - One vote au niveau européen peut elle être justifiée du point de vue du droit institutionnel européen et du point de vue de l'efficience économique et de l'équité juridique, bref au nom d'une bonne gouvernance de l'entreprise et du développement du marché financier ? La recherche d'une stricte et univoque égalité des voix ne semble pas pouvoir se justifier par un argument d'efficacité économique : les études et la pratique observée dans les États membres permettent, en effet, d'exprimer des doutes sérieux sur le caractère optimal de la règle du point de vue économique. La règle " One share - One vote " est surement souhaitable pour des raisons de lisibilité du marché, soit des exceptions doivent pouvoir se justifier dans l'intérêt de l'entreprise , ainsi, une certaine souplesse d'application reste plus que jamais justifiée."
"en" => "More than one third of companies listed in the FTSE EUROFIRST 300 index are governed accordingly to principles differing from the One share - One vote standards. These exceptions could be illustrated by several practices. The question at stake is to know if the application of the One share - One vote as a European standard would be justified with regard to European Law, including its underlying principles, and to economic efficiency in general. Indeed, One share - One vote enthusiast affirm that this rule participates to corporate democracy and contributes to increases firms' performance. Then, the application of One share - One vote, by the cancellation of certain rights attached to a share, would violate a democratic principle, founder of the European Union, and dedicated by Member States Constitutions, known as private property. It would have, as a result, an unjustified, not compensable and therefore, illegal expropriation. The respect of principles such as equity, shareholders general interest and company's interest, combined with transparency rules and protection of minority shareholders leads us to favour the second supposition. The One share - One vote rule could definitely be necessary for market readability purposes. But, some exception to this rule might be justified with regard to the company's interest. Therefore, some flexibility principles should remain. A dogmatic approach focused on shareholders, or certain type of shareholders, would disadvantage the development of the internal market and could not be justifiable on a legal ground."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Droit "
"en" => "Business Law"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-12-21T11:21:48.000Z"
"docTitle" => "One Share-One Vote, the New Holy Graal?"
"docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
"authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/de-beaufort-viviane">DE BEAUFORT Viviane</a>"
"docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">DE BEAUFORT Viviane</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Business Law</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2007</span>"
"keywordList" => "<a href="#">Démocratie actionnariale</a>, <a href="#">Gouvernance d'entreprise</a>, <a href="#">Un titre</a>, <a href="#">une voix</a>"
"docPreview" => "<b>One Share-One Vote, the New Holy Graal?</b><br><span>2007-05 | Working Papers </span>"
"docType" => "research"
"publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">One Share-One Vote, the New Holy Graal?</a>"
]
+lang: "en"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 8.755391
+"parent": null
}
