Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8267"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8267"
    "slug" => "migratory-policy-in-developing-countries-how-to-bring-best-people-back"
    "yearMonth" => "2008-11"
    "year" => "2008"
    "title" => "Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2008). <i>Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?</i> ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:3 [
      0 => "Migration temporaire"
      1 => "Retour des migrants"
      2 => "Signalisation"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article étudie la décision des migrants de revenir au pays d'origine dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation à la spence. Le jeu à information imparfaite décrit le comportement des migrants, et celui des firmes, sous l'hypothèse d'information imparfaite quant à la productivité des migrants.L'article étudie la décision des migrants de revenir au pays d'origine dans le cadre d'un modèle de signalisation à la spence. Le jeu à information imparfaite décrit le comportement des migrants, et celui des firmes, sous l'hypothèse d'information imparfaite quant à la productivité des migrants."
      "en" => "This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T02:21:49.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2008</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Migration temporaire</a>, <a href="#">Retour des migrants</a>, <a href="#">Signalisation</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?</b><br><span>2008-11 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back?</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.517833
  +"parent": null
}