Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "10731"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "10731"
    "slug" => "mandatory-voting-large-shareholder-power-and-wolf-packs"
    "yearMonth" => "2019-09"
    "year" => "2019"
    "title" => "Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power and Wolf Packs"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2019). Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power and Wolf Packs. <i>Finance</i>, 40(2), pp. 51-76."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "FAGART Marie-Cécile"
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM Saîd"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:6 [
      0 => "General meeting"
      1 => "strategic voting"
      2 => "institutional shareholders"
      3 => "mandatory voting"
      4 => "proxy advisors"
      5 => "wolf packs"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.3917/fina.402.0051"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "51-76"
      "volume" => "40"
      "number" => "2"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Quelles sont les conséquences de l’exercice systématique du vote par certains actionnaires (par exemple les investisseurs institutionnels), alors que d’autres, les partisans, votent de manière stratégique ? Nous montrons que l’exercice systématique du vote a deux effets opposés sur les résultats de l’assemblée générale en fonction de la structure de l’actionnariat : un renforcement du pouvoir du groupe dominant de votants systématiques, mais également une incitation à voter pour s’opposer à ce même groupe pour les partisans. Nous appliquons nos résultats à différentes structures de propriété. Nous soulignons notamment l’importance, pour le conseil d’administration, d’avoir le soutien du plus gros partisan, nous examinons le rôle des « proxy advisors », ainsi que les conditions d’une opposition réussie à l’actionnaire dominant par un ou plusieurs actionnaires (« wolf pack »)."
      "en" => "Our model develops a theory of how systematic voters (e.g., institutional shareholders) who always vote, in addition to partisans who vote strategically, affect the outcome of general meetings. Depending on the shareholder structure, we show that systematic voting has two opposite consequences for meeting outcomes: it reinforces the power of the largest group of systematic voters, and less expectedly, it also creates an incentive for partisans to vote to oppose together this largest group. We apply our results to different ownership structures. In particular, we emphasize the importance, for the board, of having the support of the largest partisan and the role of proxy advisors and examine the conditions under which blockholders can successfully oppose the largest group of systematic voters either alone or together (wolf pack)."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-24T00:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power and Wolf Packs"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saîd"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saîd</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2019</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">General meeting</a>, <a href="#">strategic voting</a>, <a href="#">institutional shareholders</a>, <a href="#">mandatory voting</a>, <a href="#">proxy advisors</a>, <a href="#">wolf packs</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power and Wolf Packs</b><br><span>2019-09 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/fina.402.0051" target="_blank">Mandatory Voting, Large Shareholder Power and Wolf Packs</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.828319
  +"parent": null
}