Journal articles
Year
2000
Abstract
Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from the state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in an economy with a high unemployment rate.The model builds a two-stage game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling bayesian equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogeneous probability of privatization slowdown. As a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment.
BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2000). Macroeconomic Implications of Voucher Privatization in a Model with Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, pp. 147-164.