Competition to obtain consumers is assumed to put insurance providers under pressure to increase quality and/or decrease premiums. However, as for any market, competition in health insurance only works if the threat of consumers “voting with their feet” is credible. In other words, it only works if enough consumers switch to more competitive insurers. In this paper we investigate the role of consumers in the effectiveness of competition in Switzerland. Section 2 describes the features of managed competition in basic health insurance in Switzerland. Section 3 highlights the persistence of huge premium differences within cantons, which suggests that competition has not been effective so far. Section 4 explores one important factor for this ineffectiveness, that of low switching rates. Section 5 concludes and suggests ways of improving the current system.
LAMIRAUD, K. (2011). L’exemple de la Suisse. Le rôle des consommateurs dans la concurrence des systèmes de santé. Dans: Droit et économie de la régulation. La régulation des secteurs de la santé. 1st ed. Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 151-161.