Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8185"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8185"
    "slug" => "legal-profit-sharing-shifting-the-tax-burden-in-a-dual-economy"
    "yearMonth" => "2004-08"
    "year" => "2004"
    "title" => "Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy"
    "description" => "CONTENSOU, F. (2004). <i>Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:1 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CONTENSOU François"
        "bid" => "B00000121"
        "slug" => "contensou-francois"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Quelles sont les conséquences de lois instituant un partage du profit obligatoire ? Cette question est examinée lorsqu'une partie seulement de l'économie, relativement protégée réalise des profits significatifs, le reste du secteur productif étant soumis à une concurrence ouverte. Dans l'hypothèse d'un marché du travail concurrentiel, le modèle montre comment la loi permet aux entreprises privilégiées de conserver leur personnel en substituant des parts de profit aux salaires, réduisant leur contribution aux charges sociales de la collectivité prélevées sur la masse salariale."
      "en" => "What are the consequences of laws imposing profit-sharing rates in the compensation of all forms of labor, when only a limited share of the productive sector is really making profit ? This problem is examined in the case of competitive labor markets, when firms of the profitable sector are facing a predetermined participation constraint. The proposed model details how legal profit-sharing contracts offer a form of evasion from wage-based social contributions in permitting substitution of wages with contingent claims on profits. Labor contracts are examined in a context in which effort is monitored or in which free-riding effects thwart the incentive effects of profit-sharing."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-24T19:21:48.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/contensou-francois">CONTENSOU François</a>"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CONTENSOU François</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2004</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy</b><br><span>2004-08 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.953466
  +"parent": null
}