Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "11040"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "11040"
    "slug" => "internet-regulation-two-sided-pricing-and-sponsored-data"
    "yearMonth" => "2018-05"
    "year" => "2018"
    "title" => "Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data"
    "description" => "JULLIEN, B. et SAND-ZANTMAN, W. (2018). Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i>, 58, pp. 31-62."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried"
        "bid" => "B00561609"
        "slug" => "sand-zantman-wilfried"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "JULLIEN Bruno"
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Internet"
      1 => "net-neutrality"
      2 => "screening"
      3 => "zero-rating"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167718718300183"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "31-62"
      "volume" => "58"
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks’ incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid content)."
      "en" => "We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks’ incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid content)."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T10:21:44.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/sand-zantman-wilfried">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried</a>, JULLIEN Bruno"
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">SAND-ZANTMAN Wilfried, JULLIEN Bruno</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2018</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Internet</a>, <a href="#">net-neutrality</a>, <a href="#">screening</a>, <a href="#">zero-rating</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data</b><br><span>2018-05 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167718718300183" target="_blank">Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.619389
  +"parent": null
}