Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1363"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1363"
    "slug" => "incentives-for-partial-acquisitions-and-real-market-concentration"
    "yearMonth" => "2009-09"
    "year" => "2009"
    "title" => "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration"
    "description" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS, P., FAGART, M.C. et SOUAM, S. (2009). Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 165(3), pp. 508-534."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia"
        "bid" => "B00000096"
        "slug" => "charlety-lepers-patricia"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "FAGART M.-C."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "SOUAM S."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Actionnaires minoritaires "
      1 => "Gouvernance d'entreprise"
      2 => "Pouvoir de marché"
      3 => "Prises de participation"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 17:55:06"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "508-534"
      "volume" => "165"
      "number" => "3"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Nous analysons les incitations d'un actionnaire de contrôle à acquérir des parts silencieuses ou contrôlantes chez un concurrent. L'acquisition, quand elle existe, s'avère nocive pour les actionnaires de la cible ou de l'acquéreur, voire les deux. La structure de propriété initiale est déterminante. La possession de parts silencieuses incite toujours à davantage de prises de participations contrôlantes et silencieuses. Cependant, si une part contrôlante initiale plus élevée favorise généralement d'autres acquisitions contrôlantes, elle décourage les prises de participations silencieuses."
      "en" => "We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key variable. The possession of initial silent toeholds in rivals unambiguously encourages further partial acquisitions, both controlling and silent. However, a higher initial controlling share generally stimulates controlling acquisitions, but always discourages silent ones."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T16:21:40.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/charlety-lepers-patricia">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia</a>, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">CHARLETY-LEPERS Patricia, FAGART M.-C., SOUAM S.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2009</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Actionnaires minoritaires </a>, <a href="#">Gouvernance d'entreprise</a>, <a href="#">Pouvoir de marché</a>, <a href="#">Prises de participation</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration</b><br><span>2009-09 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.061221
  +"parent": null
}