Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "1228"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "1228"
    "slug" => "fiscal-policy-in-the-european-monetary-union-analytical-framework"
    "yearMonth" => "2000-07"
    "year" => "2000"
    "title" => "Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union: Analytical Framework"
    "description" => "FOURÇANS, A. et WARIN, T. (2000). Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union: Analytical Framework. <i>Global Economy Journal</i>, pp. 205-216."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "FOURÇANS André"
        "bid" => "B00000199"
        "slug" => "fourcans-andre"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "WARIN T."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:17"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "205-216"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'objet de cet article est d'examiner les règles de coordination budgétaire en Europe. Et d'en déduire le système institutionnel optimal. Le modèle proposé part de l'hypothèse d'une règle parfaite de coordination. Deux cas sont considérés : (1) une règle stricte de coordination , (2) une règle flexible de coordination. Le premier cas est analysé via un modèle avec information symétrique, le deuxième avec information asymétrique. Les résultats théoriques débouchent sur des implications de politique économique."
      "en" => "The objective of this article is to analyze the efficiency conditions of a coordinate rule. And from there, to establish the institutional framework best adapted to this rule. The proposed model starts from a position of perfect coordination of fiscal policies. Two cases are considered: (1) a strict coordination rule, (2) a flexible coordination rule. The first case is modeled within a symmetric information game, the second one within an asymmetric information situation. The theoretical results suggest policy implications about the optimal institutional structure in Europe."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-21T15:21:45.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union: Analytical Framework"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/fourcans-andre">FOURÇANS André</a>, WARIN T."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">FOURÇANS André, WARIN T.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2000</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union: Analytical Framework</b><br><span>2000-07 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union: Analytical Framework</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.194345
  +"parent": null
}