Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "3600"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "3600"
    "slug" => "endogeneous-corruption-risk-and-fdi-in-the-developing-countries"
    "yearMonth" => "2001-01"
    "year" => "2001"
    "title" => "Endogeneous Corruption Risk and FDI in the Developing Countries"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2001). Endogeneous Corruption Risk and FDI in the Developing Countries. Dans: <i>International Public Policy and Regionalism at the Turn of the Century</i>. 1st ed. Pergamon, pp. 395-412."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => "International Public Policy and Regionalism at the Turn of the Century"
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-09-06 14:06:32"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "395-412"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Chapitres"
      "en" => "Book chapters"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Le chapitre étudie la décision des investisseurs internationaux de financer des entreprises dirigées par des gestionnaires dont la moralité est incertaine. Ceux-ci peuvent détourner une partie des revenus de l'entreprise sans sanction légale, mais, dans ce cas, ils perdront la "bonne" réputation. Dans un modèle à deux périodes, nous montrons l'existence d'un équilibre à anticipations rationnelles, où le détournement apparaît comme endogène. Dans une perspective macroéconomique, l'étendue de la corruption dépend de la durée de la relation entre investisseurs et managers."
      "en" => "This chapter analyses the decision of foreign investors to finance firms in developing countries that are run by unreliable managers. These may divert a fraction of the firm's turnover without risking legal sanctions, but, in this case, they would lose their "good" reputation. The two-period model has a rational expectation equilibrium, in which the risk of theft is endogeneous. In a macroeconomic context, economy-wide corruption appears to depend on the duration of the relationship between investors and managers."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-12-22T01:21:46.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Endogeneous Corruption Risk and FDI in the Developing Countries"
    "docSurtitle" => "Book chapters"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2001</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Endogeneous Corruption Risk and FDI in the Developing Countries</b><br><span>2001-01 | Book chapters </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Endogeneous Corruption Risk and FDI in the Developing Countries</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.982854
  +"parent": null
}