Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2188
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "8284"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "8284"
    "slug" => "multiple-equilibria-in-a-firing-game-with-impartial-justice"
    "yearMonth" => "2007-11"
    "year" => "2007"
    "title" => "Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2007). <i>Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice</i>. ESSEC Business School."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:5 [
      0 => "Coût de licenciement"
      1 => "Equilibres multiples"
      2 => "Juges du travail"
      3 => "Motif de licenciement"
      4 => "Protection légale de l'emploi"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2020-12-17 21:00:33"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => null
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Documents de travail"
      "en" => "Working Papers"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Editeur"
      "en" => "Publisher"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Dans de nombreux pays d'Europe, les employés sont couverts par des contrats de travail qui encadrent de manière stricte la possibilité de licenciement. Par ailleurs, les employés licenciés peuvent contester en justice le motif du licenciement. L'article étudie l'interaction entre entreprises, employés et système juridique, dans le contexte spécifique aux pays du Sud de l'Europe. Si la marge d'erreur des juges augmente avec le nombre de cas à traiter, nous montrons que le jeu présente des équilibres multiples qui diffèrent dans la fréquence de travailleurs virés de manière abusive pour motif personnel."
      "en" => "In many European countries, a majority of employees are hired under very protective labor contracts that restrict the ability of the employer to dismiss them. In particular, employees can take to courts the firm's layoff motive. This paper analyses the interaction between firms, employees and the labor judicial system specific to South European countries. If judges' error margin increases when the judicial system is subject to congestion, the game presents multiple equilibria which differ in the frequency of workers abusively fired for personal motives. Policy implications can be inferred."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-26T21:22:03.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice"
    "docSurtitle" => "Working Papers"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2007</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Coût de licenciement</a>, <a href="#">Equilibres multiples</a>, <a href="#">Juges du travail</a>, <a href="#">Motif de licenciement</a>, <a href="#">Protection légale de l'emploi</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice</b><br><span>2007-11 | Working Papers </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.794946
  +"parent": null
}