Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "901"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "901"
    "slug" => "credibility-costs-in-the-monetary-integration-game"
    "yearMonth" => "2003-01"
    "year" => "2003"
    "title" => "Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D. et VRANCEANU, R. (2003). Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game. <i>The Economics of Transition</i>, pp. 727-741."
    "authors" => array:2 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => []
    "updatedAt" => "2021-07-13 14:30:07"
    "publicationUrl" => null
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "727-741"
      "volume" => null
      "number" => null
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue professionnelle"
      "en" => "Professional journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article met en relief les coûts de crédibilité engendrés par la procédure actuelle d'admission de nouveaux membres dans l'UEM. Le modèle représente un jeuséquentiel entre le gouvernement et les agents privés. En présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur les priorités du gouvernement, un équilibre Bayesien parfait de type mélangeant peut apparaître. Dans ce cas la politique de monnaie forte ne signale pas le type du gouvernement. Une prime de risque de dévaluation augmente inévitablement le taux d'intérêt."
      "en" => "Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two-stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a 'last devaluation', a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-11-23T09:21:42.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2003</span>"
    "keywordList" => ""
    "docPreview" => "<b>Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game</b><br><span>2003-01 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="#" target="_blank">Credibility Costs in the Monetary Integration Game</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 9.3333235
  +"parent": null
}